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Abstract
In the early hours of 20 October 1962, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched a 
series of devastating assaults on Indian posts stretched along thousands of miles of mountainous 
border. The attack drew a line under several years of acrimony over the border and an even longer 
period of uncertainty and ambiguity regarding each sides’ respective claims. However, the Sino-
Indian War was far more than just a territorial scrap, bloody as it was. It was widely perceived as a 
Chinese attack on Nehruvian non-alignment, a peculiar foreign policy posture that he had 
developed to counter the Cold War. By rejecting Nehru so firmly, Beijing was demonstrating a clear 
turn from the moderation it had pursued in tandem with the Soviets to engage non-socialist Asia 
through the mid-1950s. Mao’s attack on India was then a firm rejection of both Delhi’s moderation 
and Soviet partnership and a major turning point in the history of the Cold War and Asia.
This thesis adds to the existing histories of the war by exploring Sino-Indian relations from 1949 
when the two Asian giants cautiously swapped ambassadors. The ambiguous relationship between 
Beijing and Delhi is examined from the perspective of Nehru’s ambitious overall foreign policy 
agenda, rather than just a narrow focus on the border and Tibet. The deterioration of ties between 
Delhi and Beijing is often characterised as the result of conflicting territorial and indeed imperial 
ambitions. But it is also true to say that from early in the 1950s there was a remarkable effort at 
collaboration and accommodation of their respective ambitions. Simultaneously, collaboration was 
always underpinned by an acute sense of competition for influence in Asia, in particular over the  
appropriate model of development for the region. In particular, this thesis gives far greater 
emphasis on Beijing’s function within the dynamics of Sino-Indian relations, and shows how vital 
were the ideological shifts within the Chinese leadership. The ideologically framed judgements 
about Indian economic development policies had a major impact on how Beijing assessed the 
ongoing feasibility of its entire experiment with a moderate foreign policy in general and 
cooperation with Delhi specifically. By illustrating how these understandings of India also affected 
Chinese views of the Soviet leadership’s competence, this thesis also makes an important 
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contribution to the historiography of the Sino-Soviet split. Ultimately, relations collapsed with Delhi 
not just because of hard territorial interests, but because Mao came to believe that the continued 
deferral of revolutionary goals was leaving the field clear for reactionary elements in China, India 
and beyond
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Introduction
On  the morning of 19 October 1962, one day before the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
attacked Indian forces at various positions along their massive Himalayan border, Beijing’s 
ambassador to Pakistan had sought a meeting in Islamabad. Pakistan’s leadership was due to 
discuss the Sino-Indian border problem, and Beijing wanted to be sure its interests were 
considered.  After emphasising that Islamabad’s official desire was that the conflict be contained, 
Pakistan’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs said that in their hearts they felt, ‘India deserved to be 
taught a lesson, [we] hope China will hit India hard, and wear India down with a long-term struggle’. 
The Pakistanis then provided evidence of the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru’s, hypocrisy. 
Nehru had ‘all along been spreading a monstrous lie, on the surface opposing imperialism and 
colonialism, conducting a “neutral” policy, and strenuously opposing military alliances and 
agreements etc’. But, the Pakistani revealed, they had proof of a secret military understanding 
between India and the US agreed back in 1951, and they asked the Chinese to circulate the 
evidence amongst Afro-Asian neutral countries.1
A few weeks later, in November 1962, TN Kaul, Delhi’s Ambassador to Moscow, met several times 
with Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU). The friendly meetings followed China’s initial attack on Indian border 
positions and continued after the attack was renewed in the middle of November. At one meeting, 
the Soviet leader assured Kaul that Moscow would revive a deal to supply Delhi with MiG fighters, 
held up temporarily in deference to Chinese sensitivities. Khrushchev coyly explained that the end 
 ‘Ding dashi yu Ba waishi mishu tan Zhongyin bianjing chongtu deng wenti,’ 20 October 1962, 1
Bajisitan xielu Yindu tong meiguo zao yi qianding mimi xieding, CMFA 105-01111-01, 1-4
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of the ‘Caribbean crisis’ provided new possibilities with regard to the supply of military material. As 
their conversation wound down, Khrushchev asked Kaul, ‘I hear Mr ambassador, you are arresting 
a whole range of communists in your country?’ Kaul's answer provoked loud laughter from the 
Russian, ‘They are all Stalinists.’  2
These encounters highlighted how the 1962 war was a turning point in both the post-war history of 
Asia and the Third World, and also in the history of the Cold War. The war ended the possibility of 
Sino-Indian international cooperation. The first wave of decolonisation after World War Two had 
seen an unprecedented extension of the European nation-state system to Asia and the 
concomitant enlargement of the United Nations. The partnership of Beijing and Delhi had 
symbolised the potential power of broad collective action across Asia and the Third World. China 
and India’s subsequent collapse into enmity reflected the challenges to Third World unity given 
differing national interests, ideologies and Cold War pressures. This history reverberates in the 
21st Century within debates about the possibilities for cooperation between China and India, and 
amongst the emerging economies of the world, not least because India remains deeply scarred by 
the 1962 war. Furthermore, the enduring relationship between Islamabad and Beijing, indicative of 
a profound underlying pragmatism in 1962, continues to disturb Indian security experts today.
The war with India was also a major brick in the wall Mao constructed between Moscow and 
Beijing. India had been an important factor for the Sino-Soviet relationship since the establishment 
of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, simultaneously an object of common action and yet also 
a source of varying degrees of competition. In a Pan-Asianist fog, Nehru had initially predicted that 
Beijing’s Asian character would dilute its commitment to Moscow and radical politics. While 
Beijing’s very positive relations with Delhi in the mid-1950s seemed to Nehru a product of his 
initiative, it had in fact been part of a shared Sino-Soviet project to engage moderate Asia. As 
Nehru had suspected however, there had always been a certain ambiguity about Beijing, and 
 ‘Some notes made by Kaul in 1962 on Khrushchev,’ 1966-1992, articles on Indo-Soviet Relations 2
by TN Kaul, TN Kaul I, II & III Instalments, Subject File 11, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library 
(NMML), 17
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especially Mao’s, willingness to tolerate Moscow’s pre-eminence, and starting from 1958 the 
Chairman began to actively steer his country away from the USSR’s influence. The 1962 attack on 
India was part of a shift to irrevocably, and publicly, sever ties with Moscow. This shift was a major 
step towards the acute isolation that Mao forged in the 1960s to preserve China’s revolutionary 
virtue. The ensuing period of self-destructive narcissism would destabilise the PRC and its hyper-
radical dogmatism would leave a legacy of international distrust. India for its part would maintain 
the banner of non-alignment while gradually shifting to what became a longstanding prioritisation of 
relations with Moscow. Before underlining the contributions this thesis will make, I turn below to the 
relevant literature that has influenced the course of my research.
The history of Sino-Indian relations in the 20th Century has been dominated by the war of 1962 
and the Tibet and border crises that preceded it. Befitting the stature of the topic - the discord 
between the two most populous countries in the world - this historiography has played a uniquely 
important role in the most dramatic shift to occur in the international system of the Cold War. The 
Grandsire of China-India War studies, Anglo-Australian journalist and academic, Neville Maxwell, 
author of the pioneering and still controversial India's China War, received a special telegram in 
1972 from China.  Zhou Enlai, China’s Premier and pre-eminent diplomat, wrote to thank Maxwell 3
for the impact his book had on Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s Assistant for National Security 
Affairs. Zhou told Maxwell that Kissinger had told him, ‘Reading that book showed me I could do 
business with you people.’4
The initial phase in the literature, overwhelmingly written in Indian ink, does not portray the 
Chinese as people with whom one ought to do business. These original accounts of Chinese 
betrayal, aggression and revolutionary aggrandisement were stained by Cold War paranoia and 
barely balanced by reference to India’s shameful military collapse and some limited criticism of 
 Maxwell, Neville. India's China War.  London: Cape, 19703
 Chowdhury, Debasish Roy. ‘Neville Maxwell Interview: The Full Transcript.’ South China Morning 4
Post, 31 March, 2014.
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Indian diplomatic naiveté.  Even before the war, many already regarded the growing hostility 5
towards India as an inevitable evolution from China’s conquest of Tibet.  Subsequently, Chinese 6
aggression towards the Tibetans and the ‘invasion’ of India were connected even more stridently.  7
Military accounts from the mid-1960s were more introspective, but maintained the basic 
assumption of China’s unreasonable belligerence. A bickering tone between different authors also 
included more direct criticisms of the Government of India’s role, including Nehru’s close adviser, 
the Defence Minister, VK Krishna Menon, and even the Prime Minister himself.  Early Western 8
portrayals of the war also inclined to Cold War, but a revisionist perspective soon emerged to prod 
Kissinger towards his more pragmatic view of Beijing.9
Maxwell's coming was heralded by Alistair Lamb’s studies of the disputed borders which tempered 
the impression of Beijing’s belligerence by suggesting that China had a fair historical case.  But it 10
was Maxwell’s critical analysis that dismissed Indian innocence and condemned Nehru’s personal 
role. Maxwell benefitted from his access to the still classified, post hoc military report into the war, 
the Henderson-Brooks Bhagat Report (HBBR). From the outset in 1950, Maxwell argued, Nehru 
took an unconditional and unilateral stance on his conception of India's territorial integrity, despite 
the patent ambiguity and arbitrary character of the territorial inheritance from British India. Early 
policy towards Tibet was similarly provocative. Desirous of cooperative and sustainable relations 
with the PRC, Delhi moved to concede China’s rights in Tibet in 1954, but the continuation of a firm 
 China Invades India: The Story of Invasion against the Background of Chinese History and Sino-5
Indian Relations, Bombay, 1964
 Jain, Girilal. Panchsheela and After : A Re-Appraisal of Sino-Indian Relations in the Context of the 6
Tibetan Insurrection.  London: Asia Publishing House, 1960.
 Maitra, Nikhil. Rape of Tibet: A Companion Volume to Chinese Propaganda and Aggression on 7
India. Calcutta: Biswas, 1963.
 Dalvi, J.P. Himalayan Blunder: The Curtain-Raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962.  Bombay: 8
Thacker, 1969; BM Kaul, The Untold Story. Allied, 1967; Khera, S. S. India's Defence Problem.  
New Delhi, 1968; Rao, Pattadakal Venkanna Raghavendra. Defence without Drift.  Bombay, 1970.
 Fisher, Margaret W., Leo E. Rose and R. A. Huttenback. Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian 9
Rivalry in Ladakh. Pall Mall Press. 1963;
 For example, Lamb, Alastair. The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries. 10
Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford U.P, 1964
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and fixed view of the border made confrontation with Beijing inevitable. Therefore, the border 
dispute that eventually arose was not the result of intrinsic Chinese hostility and expansionism, but 
the simple Chinese desire to have a fair and mutual definition of the boundary. India's arrogant, 
foolhardy and persistent effort to impose its own conception of the border, encapsulated by the 
'Forward Policy’ formulated in late 1961, finally provoked Beijing into launching a punitive military 
strike against Indian bully tactics. The drawbacks of Maxwell’s account were firstly that his 
imbalance of sources meant that his analysis of Beijing’s behaviour was severely limited. Secondly, 
his very detailed study of Delhi’s policy was very much focused on the questions of the border and 
Tibet. So, the Chinese perspective is largely missing, and Beijing’s reasonable attitude is largely 
inferred from its behaviour, and Nehru’s action is not really framed by his wider international, or 
domestic concerns. Nevertheless, just as Maxwell's portrayal of Chinese pragmatism contributed 
to the Sino-American political rapprochement, so it also heralded more sympathetic studies of 
China’s international policy. Alan Whiting, for one, challenged the caricature of an incorrigibly 
irredentist and aggressive China, emphasising an insecurity borne of isolation and fear.  11
Meanwhile, many in India have also  dismissed the idea of Nehru’s naiveté and continued the 
criticism of his policy as unreasonable, provocative and having masked a deep distrust of China.  12
Post-revisionist accounts have provided a more sympathetic explanation of Nehru’s apparently 
self-defeating policy by highlighting its more practical aspects and giving a wider perspective on 
Sino-Indian conflict. However, Beijing’s role is still under-explored and the concern to show where 
Nehru was more reasonable on Tibet and the border meant his broader policy remains peripheral. 
A more complex picture of Nehru has emerged in which realist, pragmatic concerns have been 
intertwined with his undoubted ethical approach. Srinath Raghvan emphasised Nehru’s self-
awareness of his inheritance from his ‘Master’ Gandhi, while Steven Hoffman has described the 
Indian Prime Minister as a ‘pragmatic idealist’. But both show that Nehru’s border policy was 
 Whiting, Allen S. The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina.  Ann Arbor: 11
University of Michigan Press, 1975.
 Deshingkar, Giri. ‘The Nehru Years Revisited’, Across the Himalayan Gap: An Indian Quest for 12
Understanding China, Tan Chung, ed., New Delhi: Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, 1998; 
Noorani, A.G. "Nehru's China Policy." Frontline, 4 August 2000.
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fashioned to give Delhi time to consolidate its control, and furthermore the Indians’ willingness to 
compromise survived the major loss of trust that occurred in 1959. They suggest it was Chinese 
hostility that hardened Nehru’s attitude after 1960 and led to the rash ‘Forward Policy’. Raghavan 
embossed this account by starting his analysis in 1950.  None of these really attempted to place 13
Tibet, the border and China within Nehru’s broader foreign policy. Ramachandra Guha has made 
some contribution in this direction by explaining Delhi’s apparent obstinacy after 1959 as the result 
of being trapped by public opinion, a non-aligned policy, and suspicion of the US.  Elsewhere, he 14
has argued that Asian sentiment blinded Nehru to the force of Beijing’s ideology and attachment to 
Tibet.  Conversely, John Garver, has zoomed out to propose a broad geopolitical confrontation 15
between resurgent Asian nationalisms in their overlapping ‘spheres of perceived national 
greatness’ across the Himalayas and beyond.   But as with the other accounts Nehru’s peculiar 16
international agenda seems largely absent.   
While this literature has partially restored Nehru’s reputation, fundamental gaps in the history 
remain. Chiefly, China’s perspective is still under-appreciated. However, there is also very little 
attempt to place the border, Tibet and China policy within the frame of Nehru’s broadest 
international concerns. Hoffman was limited by his narrow temporal lens and Raghavan’s focus 
was international crisis management. Even Garver repeated the accusation of Nehru’s most ardent 
critics that he got nothing in return for the 1954 agreement with Beijing on Tibet, when in fact Nehru 
regarded the agreement as of massive international value.  The role of Nehru’s Asian sentiment 
 Raghavan, Srinath. ‘Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute, 1948-60: A Reappraisal’, Economic and 13
Political Weekly  (2006): 3882-92; Raghavan, Srinath. War and Peace in Modern India.  
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; Hoffmann, Steven A. ‘Rethinking the Linkage between 
Tibet and the China-India Border Conflict: A Realist Approach’, Journal of Cold War Studies 8, no. 
3 (2006), 176; Hoffman, Steven A. India and the China Crisis.  Berkeley: California University 
Press, 1990
 Guha, Ramachandra, India after Gandhi : The History of the World's Largest Democracy, 14
London: Macmillan, 2007, 330
 Guha, 2007, 154; Ramachandra Guha, ‘The War That Killed Nehru’, essay based on the Ingalls 15
Lecture delivered at the Harvard-Yenching Institute on 29 March 2011. 
 Garver, John W. Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century.  Seattle: 16
University of Washington Press, 2001, 10
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seems to have been misunderstood. Guha and Garver’s contradictory claims about the impact of 
shared Asian nationalism on Sino-Indian relations are each partly right. However, they overlook the 
crucial influence this had over Nehru’s relative views of Beijing and Moscow. While Hoffman claims 
that Nehru always had a more positive view of the Soviets than the Chinese, it is very clear that his 
enthusiasm for Asian fraternity led him early on to the profound expectation that Mao and his 
colleagues would be less radical and more amenable to engagement with non-socialist actors than 
Moscow. These accounts barely explore how China fit into Nehru’s hugely ambitious international 
agenda from an early stage.  
There is a significant literature on Nehru’s foreign policy in general which has evolved to now 
combine, like Hoffman and Raghavan, an emphasis on both practical and idealist motivations. 
Certainly, there have been accounts that characterise Nehru’s policy as fundamentally realist, 
describing non-alignment as a balance of power posture.   Others have identified the evolution of 17
a realist policy to embrace Moscow and Beijing after 1954 in order to balance against Pakistan’s 
military arrangements with the US.  Benjamin Zachariah’s biography of Nehru has also portrayed 18
non-alignment in nationalist and realist terms, arguing it was a very active demonstration of 
autonomy within the Cold War.  Meanwhile, others have continued to emphasise the idealism of 19
Nehruvian foreign policy, evident in his early trust in the UN as an impartial global court, or else his 
persistent faith in the power of Indian diplomacy to persuade.  However, following new 20
assessments of Gandhian politics as a form of realism, it might now be redundant to try and 
 Rana, A.P. ‘The Intellectual Dimensions of India's Nonalignment’, Journal of Asian Studies 28, 17
no. 2 (1969): 299-312;
 Nayar, Baldev Raj & Paul, T.V. India in the World Order: Searching for Major-Power Status.  18
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002; Mastny, Vojtech. ‘The Soviet Union's Partnership 
with India’, Journal of Cold War Studies 12, no. 3 (2010): 50-90.
 Zachariah, Benjamin. Nehru.  London and New York: Routledge, 2004.19
 Mukherjee, Mithi. ‘“A World of Illusion”: The Legacy of Empire in India's Foreign Relations, 1947–20
62’, The International History Review 32, no. 2 (2010): 253-71; Kennedy, Andrew Bingham. The 
International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru: National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign 
Policy.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Page  13
disentangle practical and moral motivations.  Sunil Khilnani’s study of Nehru’s politics highlights 21
the unmistakeable interweaving of Nehruvian ideals, syncretic nationalism and hard interest within 
his foreign policy. For Khilnani, Nehru’s interest in China emerged from his enthusiasm for a 
shared Asian heritage and non-alignment he believed was the assertion of hard won 
independence. In addition, the normative language used both satisfied a sense of civilisational 
stature and was a tool to project influence.22
Two recent and specific accounts of Indian foreign policy develop Khilnani’s view of Nehru’s politics 
to explicitly merge realist and idealist factors. They also point to the exemplary function of Nehru’s 
foreign policy, the effort to pioneer a moral paradigm for others to emulate. Sinderpal Singh sees 
Nehru’s early pan-Asian thinking and non-alignment as driven by both idealism and realism. Singh 
claims foreign policy initiatives based on these influences were not only attempts to achieve a self-
interested leadership position in the wider region, but also genuine assertions of certain ideals.  23
Manu Bhagavan’s account places the whole of Nehruvian foreign policy within a broad, idealist 
campaign to construct an international regime of human rights at the UN. Bhagavan highlights the 
exemplary aspect of this campaign, a satyagraha type effort to inspire other states to transform 
themselves by linking India’s own constitution to nascent rules on international human rights. But, 
despite the grand idealism of the project, Bhagavan insists that it was conceived of in practical 
terms by the Indians involved. He cites Vijayalakshmi Pandit’s claim, shortly after the 1962 war, 
that non-alignment was a realist approach in the long run, as only by considering others’ views and 
avoiding confrontation can international stability be sustained. This in fact was Gandhi’s practical 
 Guha, Ramachandra. ‘Why Gandhi Matters’, IDEAS Centre LSE, London: 2011; Mantena, 21
Karuna. ‘Another Realism: The Politics of Gandhian Nonviolence’, American Political Science 
Review 106, no. 2 (2012): 455-70.
 Khilnani, Sunil. The Idea of India.  London: Penguin, 2003.22
 Singh, Sinderpal. ‘From Delhi to Bandung: Nehru, “Indian-Ness” and “Pan-Asian-Ness”’, South 23
Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 34, no. 1 (2011): 51-64.
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doctrine of means over ends applied to international affairs.  What is now needed is an account 24
reconciling this ambitious international agenda with Nehru’s specific approach towards Beijing.
While India’s side of the story has grown in nuance Chinese views are often under-appreciated, 
missing or dismissed. A particular shortfall is the failure to consider the peculiar impact of Beijing’s 
ideology on its India policy not just during the years of crisis but indeed from the beginning of the 
relationship. In fact, significant writers have dismissed Chinese threat perceptions exactly because 
they were framed by its ideology. Raghavan writes that in 1959 Beijing’s ideology conjured a 
‘sinister tableau’ of Indian intentions.  John Garver’s analysis of Beijing’s decision for war in 1962 25
rejected the Chinese perception that India was a threat to Tibet’s stability, as a case of 
psychological ‘projection’, shifting the blame away from the CCP.  But neither of these considered 26
the implications of this revival of ideological concerns. Chinese scholarship has not filled this gap. 
Some simply echoed Maxwell and portrayed Beijing as reacting to Indian provocations and have 
not explored how views within the PRC influenced the dynamics of Sino-Indian relations.  Others 27
have emphasised international factors and even the role of ‘imperialism’ in destabilising the 
partnership that had developed with Delhi, again ignoring changes within China.  One insider, a 28
senior CCP official in Lhasa in the 1950s, blames India’s imperial attitude towards Tibet for almost 
all problems, barely reflecting on the shifts within Beijing’s politics.  Some international relations 29
 Bhagavan, Manu Belur. India and the Quest for One World: The Peacemakers. Basingstoke, 24
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 95, 128-9, 137
 Raghavan, War and Peace, 2010, 25125
 Garver, John. ‘China’s Decision for War with India in 1962’, New Approaches to the Study of 26
Chinese Foreign Policy, Alastair Iain Johnston & Robert S Ross (ed.s), Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2005.
 Liu, Xuecheng. The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations.  Lanham, MD: 27
Lanham, MD : University Press of America, 1994; Wang, Hongwei. Ximalaiyashan Qingxu: 
Zhongyin Guanxi Yanjiu.  Beijing, 1997;
 Shang, Quanyu. ‘Lengzhan Yu Diyuan Zhengzhi Dui Zhongyin “Xiongdi” Qingyi De Shanghai’, In 28
Zhongyin Datong: Lixiang Yu Shixian, edited by Tan Zhong. Ningxia: Ningxia People's Publishing 
House, 2007; Zhang, Minqiu, Zhongyin Guanxi Yanjiu, 1947-2003. Beijing, 2004.
 Yang, Gongsu, Cangsang jiushinian: yige waijiao teshi de huiyi, Hainan, China: Hainan 29
Publishing, 1999
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theorists have concluded the PRC followed a consistently realist and pragmatic approach, but the 
narrow focus on crisis moments and the need to align with theory mean Beijing’s ideology was 
often overlooked.  Two historians have looked at f Beijing’s overall border policy and largely 30
reiterate the image of a practical, restrained attitude. This claim, as with the theorists’, overlooks 
Beijing’s ability early in the 50s to be as duplicitous over the border as India was. However, they do 
critically highlight the ideology underlying Mao’s sense of himself as a benign hegemon bargaining 
away territory to serve the wider revolutionary cause.  So China’s impact on the Sino-Indian 31
relationship from 1949 is under-explored and where Beijing’s attitude has been analysed the 
function of its ideological world-view has not been fully considered.
The wider historiography on the PRC's early foreign policy suggests that better incorporating 
Beijing’s ideology into analysis of Sino-Indian relations will bear fruit. The central debate in this 
literature revolves around the balance between ideational and nationalist or security concerns. The 
power of Chinese nationalism is undisputed and has been a crucial variable within Beijing’s shifting 
engagement with the outside world. Michael Hunt has shown that this produced a complex tension 
between the desire for autonomous isolation and cosmopolitan dependency.  Chen Jian has 32
explicitly blended ideology and nationalism and demonstrated the critical importance of the concept 
of the PRC as a nation of liberated people, who have ‘stood up’ against both international and 
domestic oppressors, thus making the ‘continuous revolution’ crucial to the CCP’s ongoing 
nationalist and Marxist legitimacy.  Discussion of the Sino-Soviet relationship especially continues 33
to centre around the dichotomy of nationalism and ideology. The most recent account asserts the 
 Fravel, M. Taylor. Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial 30
Disputes.  Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008; Hyer, Eric. The Pragmatic Dragon: 
China's Grand Strategy and Boundary Settlements.  Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015.
 Zhihua Shen, Julia Lovell. ‘Undesired Outcomes: China's Approach to Border Disputes During 31
the Early Cold War’, Cold War History 15, no. 1 (2015): 89-111.
 Hunt, Michael H. The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy.  New York: Columbia 32
University Press, 1996.
 Chen, Jian. Mao's China and the Cold War.  Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 33
2001; Other scholars have shown that the early CCP long imagined a future Chinese state defined 
by its class characteristics, see Meisner, Maurice J. Li Ta-Chao and the Origins of Chinese 
Marxism.  Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967.
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primacy of national interest factors in the birth and death of the Sino-Soviet alliance.  However, 34
many others have regarded ideology per se, or else competition for authority over ideology, as the 
root cause of the Sino-Soviet split.  And indeed, Jeremy Friedman’s account of the post-split Sino-35
Soviet competition within the Third World in the 1960s, suggests that the struggle to define the 
path to world revolution was central to Moscow and Beijing’s estrangement.  Therefore, any 36
serious analysis of Beijing’s relations with Delhi in the 1950s and the war needs to rigorously 
consider the role of the CCP’s ideology.
There are threads in the literature which give India a more important place within Beijing’s foreign 
policy than implied by narrower studies on Sino-Indian relations. For example, discussion of the 
splintering of the Sino-Soviet alliance often makes the Sino-India border dispute from 1959 a 
central factor.  Two Indian authors have regarded the Chinese 1962 attack on India as a direct 37
attempt to derail Moscow’s foreign policy.  Niu Jun’s account of the oscillations in Beijing’s foreign 38
policy and attitude to Moscow between 1959-1962 also gives India a central role.  What is under-39
appreciated is the way in which Sino-Soviet views of India diverged earlier, and underpinned more 
 Shen, Zhihua, and Xia, Yafeng,  Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945-1959: A New 34
History, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015; Other accounts had already emphasised national 
interest, see Radchenko, Sergey. Two Suns in the Heavens : The Sino-Soviet Struggle for 
Supremacy, 1962-1967, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2009 
 Luthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-Soviet Split : Cold War in the Communist World.  Princeton, N.J. : 35
Princeton University Press, 2008; Li, Danhui, and Yafeng Xia. ‘Competing for Leadership: Split or 
Détente in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1959–1961’, The International History Review 30, no. 3 (2008): 
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profoundly than realised, the fracturing of the alliance. Liu Xiaoyuan has recently indicated the 
importance of India to the radicalising world view of officials in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (CMFA) in the second half of the 1950s, an important prefiguring of the future ideological 
disputes with Moscow.  There is also a neglected, older literature on the competition between 40
Moscow and Beijing for influence over the CPI in the 1950s, which although problematic, highlights 
the importance of Beijing’s ideology for its India policy.  So, there is good reason to try and place 41
Sino-Indian relations within the context not only of Beijing’s ideology throughout the 1950s but also 
to examine how the PRC’s often tense alliance with Moscow influenced the relationship with India.
India’s central place in debates on the nature of the PRC’s moderate turn after the Korean War 
also justifies placing Chinese attitudes to Delhi more broadly within Beijing’s overall foreign policy.  
Argument continues over whether this was a genuine shift to inter-state diplomacy or whether the 
cooling of support for overseas revolutionary activity was simply a tactical expedience. Most agree 
however that Beijing regarded Delhi as the gateway to a broader diplomatic engagement with non-
socialist Asia. Some Chinese historians stress both the sincerity of Beijing’s moderate approach 
and rhetoric of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Panchsheel) and the Asian identity that 
was asserted to complement this new posture, suggesting that this also implied a minor push for 
independence from Moscow.  One historian has emphasised that it was shared security concerns 42
that drew China and India into a fruitful partnership in the mid-1950s.  However, others have 43
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explicitly emphasised the tactical nature of this turn and argued that it was underpinned by the 
consistent prioritisation of class factors. Chen Jian, for one, explained that Beijing was ideologically 
incapable of applying Panchsheel to relations with the imperialist US, though it could guide 
relations with the USSR.  Yang Kuisong showed that the revived ‘intermediate zone’ concept was 44
moulded by the ideology of class struggle and that Mao always thought in terms of ‘supra-national 
class relations and benefits’.  There are also some historians who have drawn attention to an 45
even earlier turn towards India, one explicitly arguing that this was justified on ideological 
grounds.  This claim suggests that the debate over the sincerity of the moderate turn is misplaced 46
and that Beijing’s ideology clearly did not preclude pragmatic engagement with the non-socialist 
world. But none of this literature addresses the ways in which the ideological compromises that 
were necessary, at least in public, for cooperation with India actually influenced Mao to shift back 
to a more radical position, when he decided that these implied too many risks for Tibet, China and 
the Socialist Bloc.
So this thesis will explore more fully the place China occupied in Nehru’s overall policy and also 
study more closely the impact of Beijing’s concerns.  However, it will also draw on new trends in 
the study of international history. The concern to ‘de-centre’ and globalise the Cold War affords the 
opportunity to place the periphery within the main focus of study.  Of course, the PRC and India 47
were two of the most central of the mass of states jostling to assert a role within the confines of the 
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bi-polar system. Delhi and Beijing’s awareness of their value as critical swing states in the Cold 
War had a major influence on how they viewed each other. Tony Smith has argued that ‘pericentric’ 
states not only attempted to overcome, moderate and challenge the logic of the Cold War, but in 
fact were most successful in their efforts to expand, intensify and prolong it.  This framework 48
suggests how profound the tension between the PRC and India became when these two 
subsidiary powers found themselves in stark opposition in terms of their efforts to blunt or sharpen 
Moscow’s appetite for Cold War. De-centring also permits the historian to unearth the impact of 
individuals or groups that may, in the language of South Asian studies, be considered subalterns. 
Important new histories have shown how the Cold War was experienced, fought, and exploited by 
surprising local actors.  Hajimu Masuda has argued for the profound role of public opinion in 49
creating an imagined Cold War, rather than that an objective global confrontation created this 
widespread common mood.  Such perspectives suggest new insight might be derived from 50
considering the impact of Indian public opinion more closely. While, the public’s hostility and 
opposition to concessions to China after 1959 was undoubtedly tinged by anti-communist 
paranoia, Indian diplomats then, and historians since, have dismissed Chinese sensitivity to the 
media storm and public uproar and only emphasised the constraint placed on Nehru.  What is 51
missing is a sympathetic discussion of how the Chinese perceived this popular excitement to be a 
threat.
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Methodologies drawn purely from Cold War history do not exhaust the new tools available for 
working with the history of Sino-Indian relations. One important way in which the Cold War’s 
peripheries became central was through the major historical process referred to as decolonisation. 
The importance of composite approaches reconciling Cold War and anti-colonial or post-colonial 
themes is suggested by Odd Arne Westad and Noam Chomsky who have both described a 
common Asian view of the superpower contest as the continued intrusion of colonial domination.  52
Indeed, the Cold War could only become global because of the proliferation of new nation-states 
and aspirants to statehood in Asia and Africa through the 1950s and 60s.The history of Sino-Indian 
relations in this period might then benefit from insights derived from debates about the nature of 
Asian nationalism. A key questions is how innovative and indigenous Asian nationalisms are and 
whether they can avoid the conflicts of Europe. If Asian nationalism is simply the rejection of 
European imperialism’s claim to superior civilisation as the justification for its rule, then 
collaboration might be possible.  But if it true that, for instance, Indian nationalism is less a 53
product of indigenous innovation and more a consequence of the colonial context in which it 
emerged, then not only is the nationalist assertion of a unique modernity challenged but so too is 
the possibility of intra-Asian cooperation.  Hence, the importance of efforts to intellectually 54
‘provincialise’ Europe.  By displacing the intellectual hegemony of Europe, Asian nationalists claim 55
their civilisational right to self-government, and propose a new form of nation-state less prone to 
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European style contention. Such concerns meant that it was in no way ordained that the new 
states would meekly accept their place in the existing international structure.  56
The broader quandaries facing independent Asia in the post-war world enriches an understanding 
of how India and the PRC perceived each other. Mark Mazower showed how Indian leaders initially 
challenged the absolute sovereignty implied by the nation-state system.  The highly confused 57
historiography on subsequent Third World efforts to collectively resist the Cold War system has 
obscured the picture of Beijing and Delhi’s overlapping and ultimately conflicting interactions with 
these efforts. All too many accounts of the Afro-Asian Conference (AAC) at Bandung in 1955 have 
suggested that this was the origin of the Non-Aligned Movement, established in Belgrade in 
1961.  Only very recently have scholars rebuked this woeful error showing how riven by Cold War 58
alignment Bandung was, no matter how much participants shared anti-colonial sentiments.  Itty 59
Abraham demonstrated that Nehru, having accepted the nation-state system was trying to 
encourage the PRC, at Bandung and through the mid-1950s, to follow suit.  Nehru's vision of 60
Asian independence in the international system through the practice of non-alignment was rejected 
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by the majority of participants at Bandung, and so he moved to find a narrower circle of like-minded 
resisters.  But Nehru’s insistence on the possibility of non-alignment, as his answer to the threat of 61
Cold War domination, not only disrupted relations with the US,  but also the PRC, as its 62
underlying definition of itself as a nation of liberated people re-emerged, and Beijing sought to 
encourage the Afro-Asian world to a more revolutionary stance.  So Sino-Indian relations can be 63
usefully understood as both a clash of visions for Asia, but also the collision of decolonisation and 
the Cold War.
The intersection of approaches related to displacing Europe’s intellectual hegemony with the 
growing body of literature on economic development as an historical process provides another 
completely novel perspective on Sino-Indian relations. Historians of the Cold War increasingly 
place economic development at the heart of that global contest.  Furthermore, many studies place 64
Third World states, like India, at the centre of the developmental battle.  In India’s case, the 65
literature has long shown the importance of economic development to Delhi’s sense of the state’s 
independence, unity and political legitimacy,   and it has also long been noted that economic 66
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policy was at the heart of Nehru’s foreign policy.  The link lies in the mirror image that Nehru’s 67
domestic policy formed of his non-aligned international policy. Francine Frankel argued that 
Nehru’s development model sought to merge Soviet planning and social progress with the 
democratic, pluralist politics that he desired for India.  Although India’s rural development 68
programmes are now regarded as more the product of transnational exchanges than being purely 
indigenous in origin, nevertheless, it remains clear that Delhi regarded these as having very 
particular domestic political value.  One local inspiration for rural development seems to have 69
been the Indian state’s encounter with CPI programmes while suppressing the Telengana 
insurrection.  The latest literature now shows how India’s development experiments even 70
exercised a profound influence over Moscow, thus inverting assumptions about influence flowing 
from Cold War centres to the periphery.  The importance of economic development and the 71
politics surrounding it has been well attested by historians of Mao’s foreign policy. Chen Jian has 
shown the clear links between Mao’s action in the international sphere with his domestic policies. 
And Mao’s evolving attitude towards development from the mid-1950s was at the heart of his 
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changing view of the USSR, which ultimately contributed to the split with Moscow.  These 72
perspectives can now be deployed to examine how the concept of development powered the 
dynamics of Sino-Indian relations in the 1950s.
Although Delhi and Beijing’s relations have been considered in light of their competing imperial 
ambitions, the collaborative perspective remains under-explored. Whether we use John Darwin’s 
definitions of empire or apply the concept of ‘internal colonialism’, Sino-Indian efforts to tie their 
peripheral zones, inherited respectively from the Qing Empire via the Republic of China or British 
India, were undoubtedly imperial schemes.  Nehru’s own view that the conflict with Beijing 73
emerged as each ‘filled out their borders’ indicated the competitive nature of these projects.  74
While accounts like Garver’s rightly illustrate this contest as as a source of distrust, the very real 
imperial cooperation that occurred has been overlooked. Furthermore, the consensus in the 
narrower historiography on Tibet is that India was not materially aiding the Tibetan rebels before 
1962.  In fact, major histories of modern Tibet highlight a degree of real accommodation that 75
existed between Tibetans and the CCP in the 1950s, even after the 1959 rebellion.  This Tibetan-76
 Shu, Guang Zhang. ‘The Sino-Soviet Alliance and the Cold War in Asia, 1954–1962’, In The 72
Cambridge History of the Cold War, edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), 
353-75. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; Shen, Zhihua, Chuzai shizi lukou de 
xuanze: 1956-57nian de Zhongguo ]Decision at the Crossroads: China in 1956-57], (Guangdong:  
renmin, 2013)
 Darwin, John. After Tamerlane : The Global History of Empire.  London: Allen Lane, 2007, 491; 73
Scott, James C. The Art of Not Being Governed : An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia.  
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009, 3
 Ramachandra Guha, ‘The War That Killed Nehru’, essay based on the Ingalls Lecture delivered 74
at the Harvard- Yenching Institute on 29 March 2011. 
 Knaus, John Kenneth. Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival. 75
1st ed. ed.  New York: New York : Public Affairs, 1999; Goldstein, Melvyn C. A History of Modern 
Tibet. Volume 3, the Storm Clouds Descend, 1955-1957.  Berkeley University of California Press, 
2014; Chen, Jian. "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and 
the Soviet Union." Journal of Cold War Studies 8, no. 3 (2006): 54-101.
 Tsering, Shakya. The Dragon in the Land of Snows : A History of Modern Tibet since 1947. 76
History of Modern Tibet since 1947.  London: Pimlico, 1999; Goldstein, Melvyn C. A History of 
Modern Tibet. Volume 1, the Demise of the Lamaist State, 1913-1951, Berkeley, Calif.; University 
of California Press, 1989; Goldstein, Melvyn C. A History of Modern Tibet Vol. 2, the Calm before 
the Storm, 1951-1955, Berkeley, Calif. ; London: University of California Press, 2007; Goldstein, 
Melvyn C. A History of Modern Tibet. Volume 3, the Storm Clouds Descend, 1955-1957, Berkeley 
University of California Press, 2014.
Page  25
CCP cooperation suggests that there was a degree of Indian collaboration with Beijing’s presence 
in Tibet. It is clear that Tibet was a central factor within Beijing and Delhi’s respective attitudes 
towards each other.  But what needs to be better understood is the blend of contest and 77
cooperation that existed, not just regarding Tibet, but their respective imperial interests more 
broadly. If India was not aiding the Tibetan rebels then why was Beijing so suspicious? It has been 
made clear that, although the CCP had some success in consolidating Tibet, ultimately it was the 
radical social transformation of some Tibetan areas that provoked pan-Tibetan resistance.  This in 78
turn undermined Sino-Indian relations. Some accounts imply that it was the contrasting methods of 
integrating the peripheral zones that led to disputes between Beijing and Delhi.  Wang Lixiong, a 
Chinese dissident intellectual, has argued that the key problem for the PRC’s troubled integration 
of Tibet was national sovereignty. If a more indirect, traditional form of rule, what he calls ‘Oriental 
Diplomacy’ had been maintained by Beijing, Tibetan stability would have been better assured.  79
But in contrast with Delhi, Beijing could not accept this. While Nehru believed that tribal peoples 
must preserve their traditional lifestyles, the CCP preferred revolutionary integration of imperial 
territories.  Furthermore, complete integration of Tibet was critical to the CCP’s claims to 80
legitimacy.    As a result it seems misguided to have expected Beijing to maintain indirect rule, or 81
‘empire-lite’ in Tibet, or anywhere else.  So, the complex mix of collaboration and conflict between 82
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Chinese and Indian imperial practice and how this impacted their diplomatic relationship must be 
re-examined. As with Sino-Indian relations in general, the impact of Beijing’s peculiar ideological 
approach is missing from studies of the interaction between their imperial projects.
The first major contribution that this thesis makes is to place Beijing and its ideology at the heart of 
the story. The critical dynamic in Sino-Indian relations through the 1950s was the effort by the CCP 
leadership to reconcile itself to a worldview prioritising the nation and suppressing therefore its 
ideological understanding of class confrontation as the vital force of history.  Like Douglas 
MacDonald, this thesis abjure’s the pejorative treatment of ideology.  Instead, it will show how 83
important Beijing’s ideology was to relations with India, and in turn how central was India to shifts 
in Beijing’s worldview through this period, with profound consequences especially for relations with 
Moscow. So the argument follows those who have already emphasised Beijing’s reservations 
about inter-state diplomacy. At the same, while Beijing’s actions need more foregrounding, not 
everything was about ideas. For instance, the decision by Chinese leaders to match Indian silence 
about the border guaranteed future trouble. But Beijing’s ideology was the crucial variable. The 
decision, with Soviet support, to shelve revolutionary rhetoric and engage non-socialist Asia and 
India under the Panchsheel rubric was a vital step. But the underlying utopian visions meant this 
inter-state diplomacy and related compromise in Tibet were always fragile. However, the particular 
importance of Beijing’s ideology was the way this framed perceptions of India’s domestic 
conditions, confirming the PRC’s radical instincts. Beijing’s understanding of, and most vitally its 
response to, the links between intensifying class confrontation in India, media and public hostility 
towards China, and an Indian threat to Tibet and the border only makes sense from a worldview 
based on transnational class antagonism. The resulting diplomacy as struggle profoundly disrupted 
relations with India. The re-definition of the Indian state as an object of class struggle then severely 
strained relations with Moscow, and underlay the negative trajectory in Chinese perceptions of the 
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Soviets from incompetence, to weakness, to betrayal to outright enmity. As Nehru came to be 
viewed as an active opponent of historical progress through his sham non-alignment and delusory 
domestic politics, Moscow’s endorsement of him looked ever more like pure treachery. Most 
crucially of all, suddenly, confrontation with India was of great practical use within the frame of 
Mao’s ideology. It would intensify the class struggle in India and maybe trigger revolution and it 
would expose Soviet hostility to Beijing discrediting Moscow’s claims to leadership of the socialist 
camp.
This thesis also makes a major contribution to the debate on the nature of Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
foreign policy by placing his China policy within a much broader political project. For Nehru, as for 
Mao, ideals often defined the national interest. Nehru’s attempt to socialise the PRC by supporting 
its case at the UN and accepting its rights in Tibet all aimed at socialising Beijing to the 
international system system. In other words to accept the nation state rather than class as the 
operating principle of foreign policy. If the PRC could also thereby ease its dependence on Moscow 
the overall tension of the Cold War would be reduced and Delhi's widest interest served. Nehru 
believed positive relations with China were an exemplary demonstration of the feasibility of non-
alignment, and had the practical effect of buttressing his domestic development agenda and 
diminishing security concerns regarding Tibet and the border.  Nehru thought that China’s 
encounters with colonial power made it more sympathetic to the independence imperative 
underlying non-alignment, and more inclined to moderation.  Hence, the 1954 agreement with 
China on Tibet was welcomed most of all for its international value, and the apparent turn towards 
the Socialist Bloc following the US move towards Pakistan was more a result of this consistent 
agenda than a response to the changed power balance in South Asia. The reversal of Nehru’s 
assessment of Moscow and Beijing’s relative moderation in the latter half of the 1950s did not 
fundamentally affect his formal approach to China because of his commitment to non-alignment. In 
fact, as conflict grew, Nehru appealed to Beijing to protect relations in the interests of preserving 
Indian non-alignment. Even though Nehru realised that Beijing had replaced Moscow as the more 
radical communist power he failed to see that the Chinese had come to see non-alignment as an 
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ideological affront, but even more fatefully Nehru believed that the manifest virtue of non-alignment 
meant India was beyond suspicion. This combined with Nehru’s belief that limited wars had 
become virtually unthinkable in the nuclear age to handicap Indian strategic thinking once Sino-
Indian relations became securitised after the failure to resolve the border in 1959-60.  Nehru’s 
long-term failure to craft a Tibet policy that genuinely reassured Beijing of India’s disinterest and his 
consistent public assertions that the border was settled also provoked both Beijing and his own 
population constraining his own ability to compromise once relations collapsed.
This thesis also argues that Sino-Indian relations between 1949-62 was not just a Cold War story 
but also crucially a story of the rise of Asia within the context of that global confrontation. Both Mao 
and Nehru were sceptical of the European nation-state system which their new states were 
expected to join. Furthermore, both were protagonists in the project Chakrabarty describes as the 
provincialisation of Europe. ‘Mao Zedong Thought’, international class struggle, Nehru’s syncretic 
development policy and non-alignment were all products of intellectual resistance against the 
constraints of European ideas and underpinned the emphasis that Delhi and Beijing each placed 
on their political relations. Both pushed their respective ideals as hard as they did because these 
were imagined to be intimate expressions of a unique Chinese or Indian position in the world and 
the route to achieve the grandest national goals, indicating how limited is the conceptual division of 
ideology and nationalism, or idealism and realism. Beijing’s attitude towards Panchsheel illustrated 
this merger: for ideological reasons the Five Principles could not be applied to the USA, but 
simultaneously, Beijing showed that it could consider adhering to this framework for relations with 
the USSR revealing its underlying resistance of Moscow’s authority despite the rationale of an 
international socialist hierarchy. Similarly, Nehru’s commitment to non-alignment was no doubt 
linked to his conviction that this was a contribution to world peace, but, in addition, to retreat from 
this policy would be to retreat from the nationalist idea of India as exceptional with a unique 
historical contribution to make. The final consequence for Sino-Indian relations of the interplay of 
Asian nationalism and Cold War forces, emerged in the shape of a pericentric encounter between 
India’s profound attempt to use non-alignment to dismantle the logic of the Cold War and Beijing’s 
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counter-effort to assert the unavoidable reality and benefits of confrontation. Delhi and Beijing 
collided as they each sought to challenge in very different ways the intellectual hegemony of the 
Cold War system.
A fourth contribution made by this thesis is to show that the interwoven links between Delhi and 
Beijing’s imperial projects were as much examples of ambiguous cooperation as of straightforward 
contest. On independence, Delhi and Beijing were faced with the challenge of how to integrate 
coveted zones into the nation-state but also how to manage competing claims and interests. The 
collaborative nature of what followed has been far less remarked upon than the conflictual 
elements. Nehru believed that Asian states ought to assist each other with the consolidation of 
their new territories, and he quickly cooperated with Burma to that end. In his effort to socialise 
Beijing, Nehru tried to fashion an imperial concord in which both would agree to a system of local 
autonomy and limited central sovereignty across Tibet and the Himalayas. Beijing acquiesced in 
this to some extent and was happy to seek Indian assistance for the stabilisation of Tibet. However, 
besides the conventional clash over territory and borders, the possibility of sustaining this 
understanding was foiled by the intrinsically different and ideological attitudes towards 
consolidating state control over peripheral zones. Again then Beijing’s ideology was crucial to the 
shifts in relations with Delhi. Initially these differences performed an important function in 
convincing Beijing that Delhi was unreliable and that moderate compromise with it was dangerous. 
Then, as the Chinese leadership's faith in the power of revolutionary social change as a nation-
building tool revived, Nehru’s notion of an imperial compromise and zone of limited sovereignty 
across the Himalayas became simply unworkable. 
Finally, this thesis will argue that economic development has been a totally overlooked but crucial 
element of Sino-Indian relations in this period critically impacting mutual perceptions. Nehru 
believed that a shared thirst for economic advance provided ground for Beijing and Delhi to 
develop diplomatic relations and overcome their apparent ideological differences. He was also 
convinced that relations with communist China were justified by the opportunity that this afforded to 
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learn from its development experiments. However, very soon Nehru also contracted an acute 
sense of being in a contest with China to provide a developmental model for Asian modernity. One 
consequence was that Delhi tried to actively promote its own programmes in order to compete with 
China. Another result was an anxious Nehru put undue pressure on his own planning bureaucracy 
to match China, ironically at a time when Chinese planning itself was in turmoil. When Sino-Indian 
relations turned hostile, a key element of Nehru’s dismay, which underpinned his efforts to salvage 
an understanding with Beijing, was his conviction that a rupture would empower his domestic 
opponents’ attacks, not only on non-alignment, but also against his hybrid development model. 
Meanwhile, Beijing’s attitude towards India was also fundamentally moulded by perceptions of 
Delhi’s development policies. In fact, well before relations began to corrode, Chinese analysts were 
forecasting trouble based on their assessments of the Indian Government’s failure to overcome 
reactionary opposition to progressive domestic reform. Furthermore, these perceptions of India’s 
misguided development experiment contributed to the increasingly negative assessment of 
Moscow whose indulgence of India’s dubious economic model served only to underline the 
corruption at the heart of the capital of global revolution. It was analysis of India’s economic policy 
that led Beijing to re-define Nehru’s government as profoundly hostile to the Indian people and to 
China.
These arguments are supported by extensive research in the major Chinese and Indian archives of 
diplomatic documents. Much of my material from the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’s archive 
(CMFA) has not been used before for the study of the history of Sino-Indian relations. The majority 
of these documents are communications between senior diplomats in Beijing and abroad recording 
discussions with foreign counterparts. Besides simply revealing hitherto unknown episodes the 
main value of these files is to show how Beijing justified its actions. Beijing’s handling of relations 
with India at various times of crisis has thus become much clearer. Documents containing 
communications between CCP officials in Lhasa and Beijing have also illuminated how India’s 
attitude towards Tibet was viewed. Official analyses of Indian politics and economy have also been 
given an unprecedented insight into Beijing’s changing ideological understanding of India. Chinese 
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documents also shed light on Nehru’s diplomacy not revealed in the Indian material. Shen Zhihua’s 
unpublished collection of Soviet documents (translated into Chinese) on the acute phase of Sino-
Indian conflict from 1959 has also added to a grasp of Moscow’s function within this dynamic.
Documents used from the Ministry of External Affairs available in the National Archives of India 
have included the regular embassy reports from key overseas capitals. The reports from Beijing 
and Moscow have been especially useful in building up a picture of Delhi’s shifting view of the 
Sino-Soviet alliance through the 1950s.  Papers accessed in the Nehru Library have perhaps been 
even more valuable. Collections of key diplomatic figures such as Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Subimal 
Dutt, TN Kaul, KPS Menon, RK Nehru and Apa Pant inter alia have all been consulted. In particular 
Pandit’s files for the early 1950s have provided a firm base for establishing the foundations of 
Nehru’s approach to China. The Apa Pant papers covering his time when he was P.O. in Sikkim 
and tasked with monitoring events in Tibet, are a crucial counterpoint to Pandit showing the more 
ambiguous side of Delhi’s attitude towards Tibet. The still expanding collection of Selected Works 
of Jawaharlal Nehru and the complete Jawaharlal Nehru Letters to Chief Ministers provide an 
unparalleled and under-utilised resource for the study of all facets of Nehru’s politics. Both are 
useful for way they allow the comparative study of Nehru’s diplomatic and domestic concerns, 
putting his attitude towards China in a wider frame. The Selected Works peculiar value is that they 
sometimes allow analysis of the differences in Nehru’s public rhetoric and private views. Neville 
Maxwell’s recent partial release of the Indian military’s study of the 1962 war, the still classified 
Henderson-Brooks Bhagat Report, permitted the novel opportunity to reconsider his conclusions 
within a broader documentary context. Finally, various memoirs of Indian diplomats have afforded 
additional insight into thinking within Delhi at key moments. The Public Record Office in Kew has 
also revealed documents covering conversations between London and Delhi that have given great 
insight into Indian attitudes towards Beijing in the early 1950s.
Chapter one of the thesis discusses Delhi and Beijing’s respective dilemmas related to the 
prospect and process of diplomatic recognition. On the one hand, India and the PRC seemed to be 
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arraigned against each other due to Beijing’s proximity to the USSR and positive view of the 
Communist Party of India’s violent insurrection against the Indian state. Yet this deep suspicion, 
and mutual ignorance, was overcome for reasons that related, on either side, to profoundly 
important imperatives for both the Indian and Chinese leaders. Nehru believed the emergence of 
the PRC reflected the general rise of Asia, of which Indian independence was also a part. 
Furthermore, Nehru believed that, internationally, communism was a threat countered better 
through engagement rather than isolation. Beijing believed it could use diplomatic relations with 
India to secure certain immediate interests. But, in addition, and despite the central value placed 
on the new alliance with Moscow, a diplomatic relationship with India served to provide something 
of a balance to over-dependence on the Soviets.
Chapter two explores this ambiguous relationship in face of the challenges posed by the Korean 
War and Tibet. The Korean War tested Nehru’s conviction that China could be socialised and that 
the UN could be a source of impartial justice. Indian and Chinese differences over the political 
future of Tibet also strained relations. Delhi attempted to reassure Beijing of its disinterest in Tibet, 
but was unable to eliminate all provocations. Beijing, for its part, sought to win Indian assistance for 
the stabilisation of the region. Meanwhile, both avoided frank discussion of the border, in order to 
consolidate their position in the border zones, and also to derive international benefits from a more 
stable relationship. Beijing in fact moved to secure a major breakthrough in Sino-Soviet relations 
with India. The real cooperation that developed was shown by India’s supportive attitude regarding 
the US sponsored Japanese Peace Treaty and a flurry of cultural and other exchanges.  But the 
ambiguities underlying much of the positive rhetoric were significant. The Socialist Bloc still hoped 
its Indian class allies in the CPI would overthrow the Congress Government one day, even while 
Moscow and Beijing themselves disagreed over the CPI’s tactics. Simultaneously, Nehru’s friendly 
policy disguised the hope that a less obdurate PRC would loosen its commitment to the Sino-
Soviet relationship.  Both Delhi and Beijing also perceived the other as making significant 
challenges to their domestic legitimacy. Most profoundly, closer contact  with the Chinese led the 
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Indians to reassess the PRC’s Asian character, its potential moderation and therefore the 
possibility of drawing Beijing away from Moscow to defuse the Cold War.
Chapter three covers the period of China’s moderate turn after the end of the Korean War until the 
reappraisal of Beijing’s international priorities caused by the Hungarian crisis of 1956. Nehru 
credited his own policy for the positive Sino-Soviet interest in non-socialist Asia, and contrasted 
this with an increasingly aggressive US attitude. But this period also saw a subtle shift in the 
balance between Moscow, Beijing and Delhi. The new emphasis on inter-state rather than party 
relations threatened the logic of Beijing’s relations with Moscow. Furthermore, Nehru’s assumption 
that the PRC was the more moderate partner was also increasingly challenged. A new level of 
Indo-Soviet economic relations developed, and Nehru’s sense of a contest with Beijing intensified. 
And while Beijing welcomed increased Soviet aid, Mao grew wary of over-dependence and the 
implications of Soviet support of non-socialist development in Asia. The Sino-Indian agreement on 
Tibet left many crucial issues unresolved. The agreement included the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, implying absolute respect for sovereignty and non-interference, but specific 
sovereign boundaries were not made clear. Nehru’s insistence on Tibetan autonomy, admittedly 
Beijing encouraged Delhi to expect this, and also his notion that Beijing in return would respect 
Delhi’s primacy over Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, contradicted Panchsheel’s expression of absolute 
sovereignty.  For Mao, partnership with India served stability in Tibet, and similarly, moderation in 
Tibet served the partnership with India. This equation was linked to the international meaning of 
Panchsheel, which bolstered Beijing’s projection of a new moderate image in Asia. However, 
differences over the applicability of the Five Principles disrupted the Sino-Soviet-Indian triangle. 
Delhi thought they should be universal. Beijing disagreed with Moscow that these could be applied 
to the US, while Moscow rejected their relevance to the Socialist Bloc. Although the crises in 
Eastern Europe in 1956 led Mao to uphold the principle of a Socialist hierarchy, he continued to 
resist Delhi and Moscow’s attitude to the US, presaging future friction.
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Chapter four explores the growing tension after 1956 between two world-views: one privileging the 
political dynamism of class conflict, and the other the centrality of the nation to historical progress. 
Mao’s increased tendency to assess international and domestic politics from a class perspective 
brought a new pungency to Beijing’s analysis of the politics of Indian economic development. This 
came to be seen as an important barometer for the possibility of continued cooperation with Delhi, 
and also a crucial exhibit in the disagreement with Moscow over the feasibility of Khrushchev’s 
1956 ideological innovation of ‘peaceful evolution’. The intensification of political confrontation 
within India in 1958 was then welcomed by Mao as proof of his ideological convictions. Nehru 
found himself trying to contain this polarisation, as crucial to his rejection of the logic of the Cold 
War as his international policy of non-alignment. Mao also increasingly espoused a confrontational 
rhetoric in the international sphere, encouraging national liberation movements to radical action, 
while India’s international posture appeared more and more conservative. Growing instability in 
Tibet gradually exposed the unsustainable ambiguity of Delhi and Beijing’s approach to the border 
in 1958, but before rebellion broke out in Lhasa in March 1959, the possibility of a national 
compromise remained. But Mao’s decision to fully switch to class politics to deal with Tibet, and 
test the loyalties of the Indian Government and Nehru, completely disrupted relations with India, 
and Moscow. Mao did not want a break with Delhi per se, he only wanted to identify and confront 
his class enemies in India. The Indian Government however only interpreted this as a shocking 
show of hostility from Beijing.
In Chapter five the course of Sino-Indian relations is traced until 20 October 1962, when the PLA 
launched its massive attack at points thousands of miles apart on the border. By re-examining the 
standard assumption that the Government of India pursued an irrational, reckless and obstinate 
border policy a new assessment of that final decision for war by Chairman Mao becomes 
necessary. While Delhi’s diplomacy was to a great extent driven by a profound distrust of Beijing, 
Nehru was not at all fixed on confrontation and he pursued a parallel private diplomacy to salvage 
relations. Meanwhile, Chinese diplomacy only further provoked Indian distrust, because it aimed at 
exacerbating what was perceived as a brewing revolutionary situation within India. In addition, 
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Beijing’s sense that India was both collaborating with world imperialism and encouraging the USSR 
to do so also, made it a dangerous enemy. India meanwhile regarded Beijing as the major threat to 
the possibilities of detente that had been emerging between the superpowers. There was also a 
spiralling imperial dilemma between China and India as each responded to the other’s more 
assertive position in Tibet and the region more broadly, and China found new common ground with 
important Indian neighbours in opposing Indian chauvinism. In this context of imperial anxiety, 
Delhi pursued its Forward Policy on the border to prevent further transformation of the status quo 
and gain new leverage both with Beijing and the Indian public. But this cautious approach 
foundered in the summer of 1962 not on public opinion but on a new hostile mood in Beijing closely 
linked to the perception of intensifying class confrontation in India.
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Chapter One – Dilemmas of Diplomatic Recognition 
Introduction
In April, 1950 the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India formally agreed to an 
exchange of Ambassadors and established diplomatic relations.  The process, while slow and 
subject to delays, had been surprisingly smooth. In many ways a gulf stood between them. Beijing 
had aligned with Moscow and signed a treaty granting major aid and military guarantees. Beijing’s 
new allies had been hurling abuse at the Indian Government since 1947, disparaging Indian 
independence as sham, and encouraging India’s communists to rebel. The Chinese communists 
had joined in and also offered rhetorical support to the Communist Party of India (CPI). 
Simultaneously, Nehru had only recently visited the world capital of imperialism, Washington, DC, 
and had swapped British rule for a close relationship with London via the Commonwealth. Not only 
was Nehru currently crushing a communist uprising in South India, but in 1947 he had tried to 
recognise Tibet as an independent state.
Against this backdrop, Indian and Chinese leaders put aside the various risks they imagined 
lurking behind a diplomatic relationship with the other, and moved to exchange embassies. Why 
and how they did this revealed fundamental characteristics of the way in which they perceived the 
international system, and each other. Strikingly, given the apparent antagonisms, both Delhi and 
Beijing decided that, on balance, critical interests would be served by establishing diplomatic 
relations with the other. Furthermore, in very important ways Indian and Chinese leaders both 
imagined that their new state’s independence  of action would be increased.
Page  37
Nehru did not share the widespread view of international communism as a threatening monolith. 
His positive view of Asian nationalism inclined him to discount fears that the PRC was simply 
Moscow’s vassal. In fact, he regarded the PRC as potentially a pillar of Asia’s resurgence. Nehru 
was no fan of communism, but he disagreed with the US about how to respond to it in the 
international sphere. Firstly, Asian independence movements had to be supported wholeheartedly, 
to forestall their corruption into communism. Secondly, communist China should be soothed 
through engagement not embittered by isolation. India was anyway too fragile to allow an 
unfriendly relationship with its large neighbour, Nehru believed
While Mao and other leaders regarded the USSR as the fulcrum of their foreign relations and the 
indispensable guide for domestic development in critical fields, Delhi offered a slight counter-
balance in a number of ways. Mao’s CCP had a history of independence from the CPSU and in 
particular, during the civil war, had developed its own strategic view of international politics, the 
‘intermediate zone’, which placed China and Asia in the frontline against US imperialism, not the 
USSR. That Stalin’s ‘two-camps’ theory had now displaced the language of Mao’s ‘intermediate 
zone’ cannot have meant the basic independence of thought had gone.  The Chairman’s 84
resistance of Stalin’s total dominance was shown by the way in which Beijing tried to use talks with 
India to pressure Stalin into signing a favourable treaty. In addition, there was some tension 
regarding revolution in Asia. Like Moscow, Beijing recognised that India’s huge population had 
massive revolutionary potential, so diplomatic relations would improve the CCP’s influence. 
The process of establishing diplomatic relations revealed dramatically different approaches to 
diplomacy. Beijing used the actual negotiations to support immediate needs related to Tibet, the 
ongoing confrontation with the Guomindang (GMD), and the desire to display loyalty to the 
Socialist Bloc and demonstrate a differentiated view of the UK and India. Delhi sought no quid pro 
 Niu, ‘Chongjian “zhongjian didai”’, 240-284
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quo as Beijing did. India was driven by a broader desire for a system of international justice under 
the United Nations, which, it was believed, recognition of the PRC as the successor to the Republic 
of China, would assist with. Therefore, when China’s skepticism of India was confirmed by 
evidence of its subversive activity in Xinjiang, Beijing still considered that it had got something out 
of India. India, for its part over-estimated its ability to breach the gulf of ideology and find common 
ground on the issue of economic development and universal justice.
Nehru did not grasp the different conception of national independence prevailing in Beijing and 
Delhi. The PRC’s founding had symbolised that the ‘Chinese people have stood up’. Modern India 
and China each have problematic historical narratives based on the nation-state. Both of these 
included a sense of colonial oppression that provided common ground, but the Chinese nation was 
an oppressed class, not simply an oppressed nation.  This difference overrode the common anti-85
colonial identity because class analysis dominated not just the PRC’s domestic but also its 
international politics. It was an insurmountable obstacle for leaders in Delhi, who were sincerely 
regarded as class enemies in Beijing. Nehru’s insistence on viewing international politics from the 
perspective of Asian nationalism, and assumption of sympathy on national grounds, blinded him to 
Beijing’s class antipathy.
Recognition - the view from Delhi
The PRC was more enthusiastic than India about establishing diplomatic relations.  There was a 86
significant delay between the PRC’s first proposal to India of mutual recognition, on 2 October 
1949, and India issuing a formal agreement. India’s ambassador in Nanjing, KM Panikkar, had lost 
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Page  39
his diplomatic status once the Communists arrived, but he received the 2 October note. In his 
memoir, Panikkar writes that, Nehru replied two days later in ‘friendly terms, indicating that there 
would be early recognition and exchange of representatives.’ In the meantime, Panikkar returned 
to India believing he could not be present until relations were formally established, which he 
thought would take two to three months.  However, it was only three months later, on the 30 87
December, that India formally agreed to begin the process. Nehru wrote that Zhou had ‘conveyed 
the desire of your Government to establish diplomatic relations with India on the basis of the 
principles of equality, mutual interests and mutual respect for territorial and sovereign rights.’ Nehru 
declared that his Government had ‘decided that they should accord recognition to the PRC’ and 
that they wished to ‘enter into diplomatic relations with your Government.’  The Indian delay 88
requires explanation.
Existing ties to the Guomindang (GMD) Government naturally created a dilemma in Delhi. Partly 
the Indian Government faced the dilemma of when to transfer relations between competing sides 
in an ongoing civil war. Delhi was cautious while it appeared that the GMD would fight from the 
South-West as they had in the war, and Panikkar himself advised waiting until GMD authority 
‘ceased to function’.  Appreciation of Jiang Jieshi’s support for the Indian freedom struggle 89
compounded Indian discomfort.  90
Furthermore, the spectre of communism in Asia loomed over Indian calculations. Delhi shared 
Anglo-American concerns about the spread of communism and the effect of the CCP’s victory. On 
11 November, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin reported to London on American talks with 
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Nehru in the US, ‘when Pandit Nehru arrived in the United States he was ready for precipitate 
action with regard to the recognition of the Chinese Communist Government but in later 
conversations with the State Department he showed signs of cooling and had evidently been giving 
consideration to the effect on Burma.’ Bevin went on that, ‘The situation in Burma too was causing 
grave concern and I was worried at the possible repercussions in Burma when recognition of the 
Chinese Communist Government was announced.’  Not only did Nehru sympathise with the 91
West’s anxiety about the communist threat to Asian stability, but he even turned down Malay 
requests to help coordinate against the restoration of British control.92
Concerned as the Indians may have been for the influence of communism in South East Asia, it 
was the insurgency in South India that added to Delhi’s hesitation to recognise the PRC.  The 93
Communist Party of India (CPI) had flopped in the final stage of India’s independence struggle and 
Congress had been able to dismiss them as anti-national. But overseas support made the 
insurgency a threat. Indeed, CPI leaders corresponded warmly with Mao in 1949 warning him that 
Nehru was a hostile figure similar to Jiang Jieshi.  Since 1947 and the foundation of the 94
Cominform the Soviets had turned against India’s National Congress.  Some evidence even 95
suggests that Moscow ferried instructions to various Asian parties to launch insurrections in 
1948.  But China’s rhetorical support at least was clear. In late 1949, Liu Shaoqi had announced 96
‘a call for all workers and proletariats from Indochina, Burma, India, Indonesia, and Malaysia to 
publicly fight against imperialist [sic] through armed conflict.’  Such language and evidence of 97
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Chinese infiltration, led India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB), under Director BM Mullik, to increase its 
vigilance regarding Chinese communism.  Mullik, a powerful figure close to Nehru, would continue 98
to act on an underlying distrust of China up to the 1962 war, monitoring Chinese subversion and 
activity within India and at the border. 
Beside the danger Chinese communism posed to Asia and India, Delhi was also concerned that 
the PRC would threaten Tibet’s de facto independence. Bevin had written that, ‘the position of Tibet 
was one of great concern to India…Pandit Nehru would welcome unilateral declarations of interest 
in Tibet by the Great Powers.’  It seemed that Nehru hoped the powers could endorse Tibet’s 99
ongoing separation from China. The invitation given to a Tibetan delegation to attend the 1947 
Asian Relations Conference in Delhi sponsored by Nehru showed that Tibet was regarded as an 
independent entity.  John Garver regards Tibet, and other areas of Asia, as ‘conflicting spheres of 100
perceived national greatness’, zones central to India and China’s nationalists’ sense of their 
historical glory. India and China would rather exclude each other from these areas, in order to add 
lustre to their own image.  With a dynamic new regime in Beijing, Nehru wondered whether the 101
recent separation of Tibet, a symbol of India’s cultural radiance, could be maintained; and it was 
another reason to hesitate before welcoming the PRC onto the world stage.
However, despite concerns over communism and Tibet, Nehru’s sense of Asian renewal meant he 
saw the PRC quite positively and dismissed fears of a monolithic international communism. At the 
end of 1948 Nehru wrote, ‘It is natural that the Soviet Union should rejoice at the victory of the 
Communists in China. But from reliable sources, it appears that the Soviets have thus far not given 
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any direct help to the Chinese Communists.’  In December he added, ‘The Chinese Communists 102
appear to pursue a line of their own to some extent and do not blindly imitate the Soviet 
Communists.’  In April 1949, as a CCP victory appeared inevitable, Nehru pondered the future of 103
communist states: ‘Will they function like Yugoslavia, that is to say, will their policy generally, 
though communist, be governed by nationalist considerations also or will this policy be entirely 
subordinated to Soviet policy?’  Nehru’s faith in the CCP’s desire to resist Moscow was shown by 104
an effort to establish a channel to Yan’an in October 1948 to discuss future relations.  Nehru own 105
nationalism meant he privileged the PRC with the same motive force, expecting it to form a 
bulwark against colonialism and a pillar in Asia’s revival.
For Nehru, China’s independence was important in isolation but even more so because it belonged 
to the decolonising trend trend he sought to encourage. Nehru strove to support all new post-
colonial states because this was the basis of international justice and stability. This support was 
partly due to Nehru’s visceral attachment to Asian solidarity, but also because that solidarity 
provided a surer defence of India’s own independence.  So it was that India supported the PRC 
despite its communism. Nehru’s less ambiguous support for Sukarno’s attempts to unshackle 
Indonesia from Dutch control, illustrated by the January 1949 conference in Delhi to support 
Indonesian nationalism, made clear his sense of the relationship between Asian independence and 
international peace:
We meet today, because the freedom of a sister country of ours has been imperilled and a 
dying colonialism of the past has raised its head again and challenged all the forces that are 
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struggling to build up a new structure of the world… The United Nations – symbol of One 
World that has become the ideal of men of thought and goodwill – has been flouted, and its 
expressed will set at nought. If this challenge is not met effectively, then indeed the 
consequences will affect not merely Indonesia but Asia and the entire world. That would 
represent the triumph of the forces of destruction and disintegration and the certain sequel 
would be ceaseless conflict and world disorder.106
The profound significance of resistance against colonialism made friendship with new Asian states 
critical, even if they were communist. In December, Nehru wrote, ‘With the Republic of Indonesia, 
we have been in the most intimate contact for the past three years. I look forward to this friendly 
cooperation with the Indonesia State as of high importance, not only for our respective countries, 
but for Asia.’  So Nehru gave forthright support to Indonesia. But he also set aside his 107
ambivalence regarding China because of this larger interest, against the instincts of conservatives 
like his deputy Vallabhhai Patel and head of the Foreign Service GS Bajpai.  Thus, on 31 108
December, a day after writing to Zhou in response to the call for the establishment of relations, he 
wrote to his Chief Ministers: ‘The problem of China has troubled us greatly. The position now is that 
practically the whole of continental China is under the new regime, which is predominantly 
communist. China has a strong centralised government and no country can ignore it for long. After 
full thought and frequent consultations with other countries, we have decided to recognise this new 
Government of China, as from today.’109
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Nehru was anti-communist but he insisted on his own approach to the problem. Early in 1949 Delhi 
had rejected various proposals for an anti-communist alliance in East Asia.  Instead, Nehru 110
believed that by supporting the goals of Asian nationalist movements, such as Indonesia, the 
communist threat could be defanged. In late 1948 Nehru had explained his support for Sukarno in 
these terms.  Nehru was not going to submit his convictions to external influence when he 111
regarded foreign policy as the mark of an independent state. He once asked: ‘What does 
independence consist of? It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. That is the 
test of independence. All else is local autonomy.’  In light of this belief Nehru was always likely to 112
pursue his own approach to countering the international threat of communism.
Therefore, Nehru fundamentally disagreed with the US approach to communist China. His October 
1949 trip to the US was not a success. Acheson called Nehru ‘one of the most difficult men with 
whom I have ever had to deal’, and Nehru thought Truman and Acheson ‘mediocre’ and ‘equally 
mediocre’. Nehru severely critiqued US support for France in Indochina and hostility towards 
Russia. He argued China should not be helped to develop, or else it would only draw closer to the 
USSR.  While Acheson pleaded with India to delay recognition of the PRC, Nehru defended the 113
moderation of China’s revolution, claiming it was simply ‘agrarian’.  Just as support for 114
Indonesian nationalism would defuse the communist threat there, so the PRC should be 
encouraged to join the community of nations as a contented partner. Unlike the Americans, Nehru 
set aside his fears about communism in the belief that a respected China could support 
international stability. Nehru’s anti-colonialism prevailed over the Cold War mind-set, privileging the 
value of any individual state’s potential contribution to world peace when fully independent over 
fear of what disruption they might cause by their communism. 
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India’s leaders also sought a cooperative relationship with China because they did not want to 
complicate the wider security challenges they already faced. The British withdrawal from India had 
not immediately delivered a brood of Balkanised squabbling states, as many continued to predict in 
1949. However there was a feeling of contingency to the new Indian state, described by a major 
historian as ‘an unnatural nation’.  Balkanised it was not, but the British had bequeathed India a 115
bitter, resentful and divided twin. Contesting the legacies of the British parent, Pakistan had 
challenged India by encouraging princely states such as Hyderabad and Junagadh to resist 
incorporation and also by confronting India over control of the strategically vital Kashmir. 
Furthermore, the rioting and mob murder of partition had left open wounds which kept popular 
feeling in each country at a sensitive peak, not least because a significant minority population 
remained on both sides of the borders, a ready scapegoat or cause of fear. That this tension 
undermined India’s security is obvious simply by considering Kashmir, but the Bengal border crisis 
that began in February 1950, while India was engaged in establishing relations with China, further 
underlined the vulnerability.  116
Despite the independence mind-set that existed in India, coordination with Western policy was 
obvious. American and British appeals for delay in recognising the PRC had clearly had some 
effect. Nehru generally welcomed constructive relations with London and had explained within 
India that cooperation with the Commonwealth was essential to forestall India’s isolation.  British 117
views on how to respond to the PRC were fairly close to Delhi. London was thinking in late 
November about recognising the PRC and Bevin thought the UK would have to work with India to 
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minimise any damage in SE Asia.  Furthermore, even before the formal emergence of the PRC, 118
Panikkar had discussed with British and Commonwealth diplomats in China the possibilities of 
using economic development aid to blunt the communist threat in the region.  So Western views 119
clearly influenced the timing of Delhi’s recognition of the PRC. 
The Anglo-American position on Tibet also influenced Nehru.  He found Washington and London 
had no appetite for a forceful defence of Tibet’s independence and preferred to leave this to India’s 
own purview. Bevin had said in November, ‘…it would be India’s responsibility to safeguard the 
status quo in Tibet as far as this could be done by a unilateral declaration.’  So, Nehru returned to 120
India very clear that they faced the Tibet question alone. He indicated to his Chief Ministers that 
India’s ambitions had softened:
Our policy has been rather vague about Tibet. It has been an inheritance from British days. 
We have recognised the autonomy of Tibet under some kind of vague suzerainty of China. 
Strictly speaking, in law, we cannot deny this suzerainty. We would like Tibet to be 
autonomous and to have direct dealings with us and we shall press for this. But is clear that 
we cannot bring any effective pressure to change the course of events in Tibet.
Direct relations with the PRC would help Delhi ‘press’ for Tibetan autonomy, Nehru argued. In the 
meantime, he also made it clear that ‘with the development of the China situation’ Nepal, Bhutan 
and Sikkim were going to have accept Indian authority.  As a result India did not support Tibet’s 121
campaign at the UN in late 1949.122
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Unsurprisingly, Delhi hesitated for three months over abandoning an Asian ally in the Nanjing 
Government. Beijing seemed as hostile towards Delhi as Moscow and similarly supportive of 
India’s own insurgent communists, at a time when communism was spreading through Asia. Nehru 
also paused in order to ascertain if some move could be made to buttress Tibet’s separation from 
the PRC. But Nehru’s broadest international goals led him to argue with the US not to isolate 
Beijing. Sympathy for the CCP’s nationalism meant he foresaw its moderation and disinclined him 
to perceive a monolithic communist threat. Nehru imagined the PRC could contribute to an Asian 
firewall against renewed colonialism. London also largely agreed on a policy of cautious 
engagement of the PRC. In addition, India faced myriad security problems in 1949-50 and wanted 
to ensure a friendly neighbourhood. The West’s lack of interest in Tibet led Nehru to accept 
Beijing’s broad claims while defending Lhasa’s autonomy and maximising Indian security interests 
in the north.
Recognition - the view from Beijing
India was not first priority for PRC foreign policy. On the very day that Zhou wrote to Nehru 
requesting diplomatic relations, the PRC in fact established the same with the USSR.  The CCP 123
had been lobbying Moscow to consolidate relations since 1948.  And Mao, in frustration at 124
Stalin’s skepticism, had declared in summer 1949, while Liu Shaoqi was in Moscow, that his future 
state would ‘lean to one side’ in the emerging Cold War.   Mao had decided that the USSR was to 125
be the anchor of his foreign policy and a guide to the inexperienced CCP leadership on domestic 
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policy. These decisions were the result of ideological affinity, unprecedented contacts in the civil 
war years, and the desire for security. In October 1949, Mao knew securing the relationship with 
Moscow required further negotiation to confirm Soviet material and security undertakings, and 
hopefully also to replace the 1945 Soviet treaty with Jiang Jieshi’s Republic of China.   Mao also 126
felt that an alliance with Moscow was important for domestic political reasons because it made 
clear that the possibility of an alternative form of development was not available.   This was a 127
conscious choice, not forced upon China but the result of the ideologically framed interests of the 
new state. The US had after all offered the CCP aid in June 1949 in an attempt to lure it away from 
Moscow.  China’s new leadership ignored the US, moved to cement ties with the Soviets and 128
other ‘fraternal’ Socialist states, and then approached India and others in the hope of regular 
relations.
The Soviet orientation set the basic framework for the PRC’s foreign policy and determined to a 
great extent Beijing’s attitude towards India.  Through 1947 various Soviet voices had condemned 
Nehru’s Congress as an ally of imperialism and the CPI subsequently ended its recent policy of 
cooperation of cooperation.  In December, Zhukov dismissed neutralism as an ‘imperialist 129
device’, confirming the Soviet turn against India and underlining Moscow’s embrace of Cold War 
divisions.  Stalin simply viewed post-colonial powers like India as tools of the imperialists.  130 131
Confirmation that the CCP shared this hostile view came in Mao’s reply to the CPI leader, BT 
Ranadive’s, congratulations on the foundation of the PRC:
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I firmly believe that relying on the brave Communist Party of India and the unity and struggle 
of all Indian patriots, India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its 
collaborators. Like free China, a free India will one day emerge in the Socialist and People’s 
Democratic family; that day will end the imperialist rule in the history of mankind.  132
Despite the overall strategic agreement with the Soviets, Beijing’s independent streak was 
indicated by tension with Moscow regarding the revolutionary management of Asia. Stalin had told 
Liu Shaoqi in the summer of 1949 that the CCP would be responsible for revolution in East and 
South East Asia, and this division of labour was somewhat confirmed by the Sino-Soviet treaty of 
1950.  Mao viewed the world in terms of transnational class relations, and believed that the PRC 133
had a duty to support class allies globally. Hence, he had responded extremely positively to Korean 
and Vietnamese requests for revolutionary aid.  However, by late 1949, Stalin had already gone 134
cold on Beijing’s role in Asia and began restraining the CCP’s active encouragement of Ho Chi 
Minh’s confrontation with France.  So there was some friction between Stalin’s caution and Mao’s 135
revolutionary enthusiasm.
An implicit and low-level Sino-Soviet competition to influence Indian communism provided a further 
motive for the PRC to seek diplomatic relations and an embassy in Delhi. Given Mao’s remark that 
the CPI’s victory would ‘end the imperialist rule in the history of mankind’, Soviet and Chinese 
interest in India’s revolution is no surprise. Naturally, the Soviet embassy in Delhi was providing 
guidance to Indian comrades.  The CPI’s attitude towards the CPSU and CCP fluctuated through 136
this period. While the Andhra Communists in South India were pursuing the Telengana insurgency, 
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conducting land reform and building a liberated zone in Maoist style, the CPI central leadership 
endorsed the CCP by publishing Anne Louise Strong’s positive account of the Chinese as a model 
for Asian revolution. However, Strong’s arrest on espionage charges in 1949 suggested Moscow 
disagreed and the CPI leadership responded by criticising their Andhra colleagues’ over-reliance 
on Chinese methods. Despite this, continued CCP success in the Chinese civil war obliged the 
Soviets to concede some credit to Mao, and after the Sino-Soviet treaty was signed the Cominform 
even began to promote the CCP model as applicable to India. An Andhra Communist, Rajeswara 
Rao became leader of the whole CPI in June 1950, to much enthusiasm from Beijing.  An 137
embassy in India would allow the CCP to further develop relations with the CPI.
Mao’s unequivocal priority was to achieve the security and support of an alliance with the Soviet 
Union. This was not just a question of hard interests, Beijing shared an ideology with Moscow, as 
evinced by the public skepticism of Nehru’s Government. The CCP had replaced talk of an 
‘intermediate zone’ with to Stalin’s more Manichaean language. Nevertheless, there were some 
tensions between Beijing and Moscow over Asia. Mao favoured a more confrontational approach 
by the Viet Minh for example and there was also an implicit contest to influence the CPI. However, 
relations with India made sense within the ideology shared by Moscow and Beijing. In March 1950, 
Zhou Enlai underlined to his staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the revolutionary and strategic 
importance of India: ‘Being sent to India to work is a big task, if done well then there are 900 million 
people united together.’  As Yang Kuisong has pointed out, Mao’s challenge was to use inter-138
state diplomacy for revolutionary ends.  Zhou’s comment indicated that relations with India was 139
both sensible diplomacy and good for revolution.
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The Diplomacy of Diplomatic Recognition
The process of establishing relations revealed both a difference in diplomatic methods and 
underlined certain central imperatives. Beijing’s attitude to Delhi was partly framed by the ongoing 
security threat from the GMD on Taiwan, and the persistent fear that the US might intervene. Many 
parts of China, such as Hainan, Taiwan and Tibet had yet to be liberated and there were large 
GMD armies in Burma and Vietnam. Beijing expected imperialism to focus its attacks on the PRC 
as the socialist bloc’s weakest link.  Therefore, Beijing very pragmatically gave Delhi certain 140
preconditions for diplomatic relations related to its core interests. This also revealed a sense of 
superiority vis-a-vis this specific bilateral relationship. Delhi was required to sever relations with the 
GMD and clarify its voting in certain UN bodies that had appeared to imply continued recognition of 
the Republic of China. It was only after India confirmed the break with the GMD, on the 3 January, 
that Zhou allowed talks. And he still wanted the issue of India’s UN voting cleared up.  Thus, 141
Beijing used diplomacy with Delhi to increase pressure on the GMD.
Mao’s differentiated handling of India and the UK also served other practical aims. The Chairman 
regarded India and the UK’s desire to establish relations with Beijing as beneficial to his plan to 
capture Tibet. Chinese officials had wanted to respond quickly to both British and Indian interest in 
negotiating diplomatic relations. But on 19 January 1950, Mao instead ordered his diplomats to 
advance the process with Delhi, but delay with the British.  This was partly to make clear that 142
Beijing was in no rush, and even with Delhi Mao favoured taking it slow. He pointed out that these 
states wanted to ‘drill into China’ and that US imperialism could then enter. Delay with India and 
differentiation of Indian personnel still in Beijing from Socialist diplomats also underscored Beijing’s 
 Westad, 2003, 297-301140
 CMFA, 105-00007-02, 11, 12, 38 141
 Sheng, ‘Mao, Tibet, and the Korean War’, 25142
Page  52
policy of ‘leaning to one side’.   The different pace of talks with the Indian and British was 143
designed to differentiate those states. After all, in May Beijing  would insist that the British expel all 
GMD remnants from Hong Kong.  A condition they did not impose on the Indians.144
Delhi’s very different unconditional engagement of Beijing reflected Nehru’s attitude to international 
justice and sense of India’s exemplary moral function in global politics.  India might have 145
demanded the CCP disavow the CPI, or support India over Kashmir for example, but to do would 
be a bad example to the world. This sense of justice explained Nehru’s particular support and 
respect for the UN, and submission of  the Kashmir issue to arbitration there, and also his support 
for the PRC to take China’s seat in the UNSC.  India’s response to China’s objection to its voting 146
at at the UN revealed the different attitude. Delhi simply explained that the UN body in question, 
the UNSEC, was not the correct forum for a political decision on China’s representation, hence its 
abstention.  By emphasising correct procedure at the UN, India stressed the importance of the 147
UN itself and thereby showed an exemplary commitment to the UN’s success as an impartial 
forum. Support for a system of international justice did not mean that Nehru was entirely an idealist 
however, Nehru believed this served India’s broadest interests, as did his support for Asian 
independence. Nehru’s calls for non-alignment were also related to his pursuit of international 
justice. He had pointed to the problem the NATO alliance caused for the West in giving an impartial 
and just attention to the Indonesian problem. In March 1949 Nehru said, ‘While, on the one hand, 
they wish to have Indonesian freedom, on the other, they are very anxious to have the Netherlands 
in their political grouping [and so acquiesce in Dutch colonialism].’  The logic of alliance systems 148
confounded the principles of international justice, so Nehru believed.
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So for reasons fundamental to its foreign policy approach India placed no conditions on relations 
with China. However, Delhi’s official reply to China, reflected a fundamental clash of worldview, one 
that privileged class, against another that privileged nation, as the basis of global politics. 
Regarding Beijing’s concern about GMD ‘remnants’ in India, Delhi stated it was ‘not aware’, though 
there may be ‘individual Chinese who may have served or be in sympathy with Kuomintang’. Their 
presence did not equate to recognition of them as official GMD representatives however.  The note 
added, ‘They are enjoying ordinary rights of asylum under International Law.’  It was 149
inconceivable that the PRC’s socialist allies would offer such legal protection to Beijing’s class 
enemies. Here lay a sharp difference in political culture that would cause problems in the late 
1950s.  Deeply conscious that class confrontation spanned borders, Beijing would have seen this 150
refusal to eject reactionary GMD personnel as reflecting a basic class sympathy on the part of the 
Indian Government. 
Beijing accepted India’s explanations, content that its immediate goals had been achieved, and on 
1 April 1950 the appointment of Ambassadors was confirmed.  But India was regarded with deep 151
skepticism. Liu Shaoqi had scribbled a warning to his subordinates in the margin of an Indian 
telegram regarding talks: ‘Britain wants India to come first and probe…we should be polite to 
India…and should invite Sen to Beijing…’  Clearly, Beijing agreed with Moscow that the India 152
was a tool of the West. But Mao’s suspicion went further than this. He had written in 1949 that, 
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‘[u]nder the long-standing influence of British imperialism, the bourgeoisie of India, of whom Nehru 
is the representative, have learned the ways of the imperialists…and he shamelessly holds himself 
as the pillar of the anti-communist movement in Asia…’  The Chinese expected the Indians to 153
behave like imperialists.
Beijing’s scepticism of India was quickly confirmed. The North West Bureau reported to Beijing on 
the suspicious activities of Indian, and also Pakistani, officials in the Southern Xinjiang region 
around Kashgar. For example, one Indian official, under the guise of investigating the status of 
overseas Indians, took a fifty two day tour of Southern Xinjiang, when there were only about eighty 
such individuals existing, and it was really about gathering intelligence and registering any 
Kashmiris as Indian nationals. Although these officials had tried to ingratiate themselves once the 
PLA arrived, they had continued spreading rumours about US power and Soviet manipulation of 
the world, Japan having returned to the North East and the GMD’s imminent return to the 
mainland.154
Furthermore, Delhi failed to realise that approaches to economic development formed a gulf with 
Beijing, not a field of mutual exchange. For Beijing development was a class not a national issue, 
and alignment with the Soviets was crucial. Nehru regularly claimed that development was a 
common interest across Asia, implying this united Asians against the West’s obsession with power 
politics.  Nehru explained his non-aligned policy to the US as providing the stability India needed 155
to pursue economic development.   However, India underestimated China’s different approach 156
failing to see that Beijing conversely regarded alignment with Moscow as the pillar of its 
development strategy. When Panikkar first met Zhou, their discussion centred on economic 
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problems. They agreed that they faced many similar rural problems. Zhou added: ‘There is 
something else that is also similar, that is that the agricultural products of our two countries are 
controlled by imperialism.’ They discussed India’s system of landholding and its imposition by the 
British, a link between domestic reaction and foreign oppression that Zhou would have 
appreciated, and the limited success of reform efforts so far. The Chinese Premier must have 
thought a few CCP-style ‘struggle meetings’ would have sorted out the rural elites pretty quickly.  157
The discussion clarified for Zhou that India was a target for revolution, if not an enemy, under the 
current government. By contrast, Panikkar was encouraged by the apparent common interest in 
economic issues. He met Mao a few days later and his memoir notes: ‘We talked about Asia in 
general and about the withdrawal of Europeans from the continent, but he said more than once 
that as long as European economic power was entrenched in Asia the freedom was not 
complete.’  Mao also, therefore, reinforced Panikkar’s impression that India and China shared a 158
common understanding of the importance of economic development for their mutual 
independence, entirely missing Beijing’s overwhelming focus on the Soviet model.
Conclusion
The different ways that leaders in Beijing and Delhi conceived of their new state’s national 
independence determined their key foreign policy priorities and had profound implications for their 
respective view of each other. The PRC was considered to be a nation of the Chinese people, 
liberated from their domestic and international oppressors and so combining Marxist ideology with 
nationalism. The Indian National Congress, and Nehru in particular, regarded the Republic of India 
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as the assertion of an historical Indian nation, whose identity, unity and natural ties to other Asian 
nations had been obscured by British oppression.  159
Chinese leaders’ understanding of the PRC as being largely defined by its class identity meant that 
they looked for security, and development aid and guidance, from their natural allies amongst 
those states also defined in class terms. In other words, the Soviet Union, and the Socialist Bloc it 
led. Chinese leaders did not see any security or developmental benefits to be gained from relations 
with non-socialist Asian states, who were barely regarded as genuinely independent. Instead, they 
were the target of revolutionary activity. The Chinese view of the nation was similar to the skeptical 
dismissal of the possibility of a ‘national interest’ expressed by Chomsky and Howard Zinn.  Until 160
class contradictions were eliminated, no national interest could emerge. To that end, Beijing looked 
to support class allies in Asia, such as in Vietnam and Korea, who were initiating wars of national 
and class liberation. 
However, despite these class imperatives, the nonetheless powerful thread of nationalism that 
wove through the CCP’s ideology drove it to resist total subordination to the international socialist 
hierarchy. Beijing’s engagement with Delhi was therefore in various ways an assertion of 
independence. An embassy in India would give the CCP more capacity to promote its own image 
of Asian revolution to the Indian Communist Party. Despite the fundamental skepticism of the 
Indian Government, the Chinese were very careful to focus on common interests and language. 
The Chinese used the process of recognition to serve core immediate interests related to Beijing’s 
confrontation with the GMD and fear of the US. Diplomatic relations with Delhi were also thought to 
blunt Indian opposition to a future Chinese move into Tibet. While Beijing took care, by its 
treatment of India, to underline the PRC’s commitment to the Socialist Bloc, simultaneously, by 
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differentiating India from the UK, the CCP also indicated that they retained a residual attachment to 
the theory of the ‘intermediate zone’. This revealed an independent view of international politics 
very different to Stalin’s ‘two-camps’ theory. 
Nehru related Indian independence to a resurgence of Asian statehood. This Asian myopia, 
combined with Beijing’s class allegiances, meant that Delhi placed a greater value on Sino-Indian 
relations than vice versa. Beijing had approached Delhi first, it was true, but this stemmed from an 
underlying confidence derived from the relationship with Moscow. Nehru’s sense of the profound 
significance of relations with Beijing meant that he placed no conditions on the establishment of 
diplomatic ties, underlying this basic asymmetry.
Nehru’s emphasis on nationalism as the driving force of history, and in particular on the 
reclamation of the nation across Asia, meant he was concerned with the justice of inter-national 
questions. Therefore, he was broadly motivated to support the UN’s status as a body for 
supervising global justice. So Nehru explained his recognition of the PRC in terms of justice but 
also made it clear that he would uphold correct legal process at the UN, underlining his emphasis 
on the legitimacy of the UN. By contrast, Chinese leaders, with their skeptical view of the 
composition of many states in the international system, dominated by imperialism, looked to class 
rather than national justice.
Indian leaders, not least Nehru, were definitely anti-communist, fighting as they were the 
Telengana insurgency. But Nehru insisted that he had a superior approach to the problem of 
international communism than the containment theory prevailing in Washington DC. Panikkar 
returned to Beijing in May 1950 as the newly appointed Indian Ambassador to the PRC, convinced 
that his mission was to prove to Mao that neutrality was possible.  The Indians hoped that they 161
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could thereby defuse China’s apparent acceptance of the bi-polar confrontation that was freezing 
into place, and effect a change in Beijing’s attitude towards India. Nehru assumed that an 
emphasis on a shared concern for development and Asia’s history of external subjugation would 
foster trust between China and India. However, while Beijing undoubtedly saw benefits from 
diplomatic ties with India, it was very clear that engagement with India did nothing to persuade 
Beijing that sincere neutrality was feasible. 
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Chapter Two - Cold War in Asia, 1950-53
Introduction
On 26 August, 1950 Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Indian ambassador to the US, wrote to her brother, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, in Delhi. ‘Bhai dear,’ she said, 
‘One matter that is being cooked up in the State Department should be known to you. This is 
the unseating of China as a Permanent Member in the Security Council and of India being 
put in her place… Dulles seemed particularly anxious that a move in this direction should be 
started….’162
Nehru’s unequivocal response came within the week:
‘In your letter you mention that the State Department is trying to unseat China as a 
Permanent Member of the Security Council and to put India in her place. So far as we are 
concerned, we are not going to countenance it… It would be a clear affront to China and it 
would mean some kind of a break between us and China… We shall go on pressing for 
China’s admission in the UN and the Security Council. I suppose that a crisis will come 
during the next sessions of the General Assembly of the UN on this issue. The people’s 
government of China is sending a full delegation there. If they fail to get in there will be 
trouble which might even result in the USSR and some other countries finally quitting the UN. 
That may please the State Department, but it would mean the end of the UN as we have 
known it. That would also mean a further drift towards war. India because of many factors, is 
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certainly entitled to a permanent seat in the security council. But we are not going in at the 
cost of China.’163
This exchange underlines the place of China and the UN in Nehru’s foreign policy. Nehru’s support 
for the PRC’s entry to the UN was sustained even after the war of 1962. Any argument that 
relations in this period were inherently conflicted or that India was ‘unfriendly’ to the PRC must deal 
with this fact.  Nehru’s conviction that India should not seek advantage at the UN ‘at the cost of 
China’ arose from his concern for the legitimacy of the UN in general, which he felt was the forum 
for settling the frightening conflicts and injustices he observed.  He also believed he could win the 
PRC’s trust and prevent its alliance with Moscow from further petrifying the oppositional logic of the 
Cold War’s competing camps.  These goals were at the heart of Nehru’s early foreign policy 164
when he sought to establish an alternative brand of diplomacy to the major actors in the emerging 
Cold War. Rhetorically disinterested, it was in fact conceived as in India’s ultimate self-interest, 
because a more just international order would serve the nation’s widest interests. The centrality of 
China in India’s calculations, and China’s responses to these, and how India itself responded to 
China’s initiatives is the subject of this chapter. The broader backdrop is the spread of the Cold 
War into East Asia, and beyond, as the local Korean crisis became an international war and how 
China and India strove to mitigate the risks and take advantage of the opportunities they 
encountered as the international, regional and domestic contexts were each buffeted in turn. 
Nehru placed China at the centre of a unique foreign policy driven by a sense of India’s special 
mission to counter the logic of the Cold War. He rejected the notion that different political systems 
made distrust and conflict inevitable. Nehru’s domestic policy also strove to navigate a ‘third way’ 
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between the extremes of American capitalism and Soviet socialism, and Delhi’s foreign policy 
sought to allow it to learn from Soviet, US and Chinese domestic development.  Nehru believed a 165
shared Asian perspective would help the PRC and India overcome Cold War divisions. He held 
that alliances were fundamentally destabilizing and that having the UN serve as a forum for conflict 
resolution was the only rational approach to international affairs. Indian attempts to win China’s 
faith were maintained throughout the disruption of the latter’s takeover of Tibet, and the Korean 
crisis itself was seen as an opportunity for India to play a mediatory role earning all parties’ trust. 
China was initially highly sceptical of India on ideological and strategic grounds, but gradually 
began to see advantages in closer relations. India remained an object of revolutionary interest 
nevertheless and Chinese suspicion never disappeared, partly because it consistently displayed 
suspicious behaviour. This included India’s reluctance to fully acquiesce in China’s restoration of 
control over Tibet and its ties to the West. The problem of Tibet was also that India was a status 
quo power while the CCP was committed to upturning old international agreements. However, 
more than anything else, a fundamental discrepancy over the definition of state interests and 
political methods would forever leave a gulf of misunderstanding between Indian and Chinese 
leaders. In fact, part of Nehru’s motivation for confounding the Cold War to pursue close ties with 
communist China was down to his basic understanding of politics. Nehru was influenced by his 
years of work and success under Gandhi’s tutelage. He fundamentally objected to the notion of 
inherent conflict and furthermore he believed that moral methods produce moral outcomes. 
Nehru’s counterparts in Beijing, however, fundamentally believed that conflict was not only intrinsic 
to politics but welcome, as it was only through conflict that progress could be achieved
Korea
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The outbreak of the Korean War provided a prism for observing Nehru’s China policy in action. The 
Indian Prime Minister’s response to the escalating Korea crisis was refracted through his dual 
concern for the UN and PRC. For Nehru, a PRC presence in the UN would buttress the legitimacy 
of that body and help to socialise the revolutionary Chinese state. A vital premise of the Nehruvian 
approach was that international communism should not be considered a simple monolith. Many 
regarded North Korea’s invasion of the South as a simple case of that monolith’s aggression.  166
But Nehru recognised that the war threatened to strengthen Soviet influence over the PRC and 
subvert his effort to integrate the PRC into the international system. As a result, while his response 
to the war was framed as a defence of the legitimacy of the UN, Nehru also tried to restrain Beijing 
in Korea by suggesting that this would encourage support for its case at the UN. But Nehru’s policy 
collided with China’s most intimate interests that took precedence over membership within an 
organisation that remained something of a novelty. Furthermore, the US’s apparent hijacking of the 
UN only further diminished its appeal in Chinese eyes. Even when Delhi’s perception of the UN’s 
legitimacy was challenged by its extension of the War into the North, Beijing eschewed the 
common ground with India. To Chinese leaders, events simply confirmed the US’s implacable 
hostility and they chose to use the confrontation to pursue geopolitical interests, regime stability 
and consolidation of its ideological alliance, rather than cultivate Nehru in Delhi and his vague 
appeals to international structures.
 
Nehru’s response to the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950 demonstrated the centrality of 
China to his solution for Cold War confrontation and his commitment to the sanctity of the United 
Nations (UN). At that moment, India was a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC), which was absent the USSR in protest at the GMD’s continued presence. India 
supported the Council’s vote on 25 June to condemn North Korean aggression against the South. 
Nehru said to ‘surrender’ to such aggression might lead to the ‘collapse of the United Nations 
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structure’.  On 27 June, India reluctantly supported a second resolution ‘to repel the armed attack 167
and to restore international peace and security’. Nehru explained India’s hesitation was because its 
initial inclination was to abjure responsibility and keep aloof.  Delhi’s difficulty was increased 168
because the US linked Korea to Asia broadly and increased its support for the Philippines, France 
in Indochina and appeared to commit itself to defend the GMD on Taiwan. Nehru disclaimed the 
impression that India had aligned in any way, however, and maintained there was no change to 
India’s China policy.  In fact, Nehru reiterated his opposition to isolating the PRC:169
‘If there is a possibility of resolving this conflict, it can only be done, we feel, by bringing in 
the People’s Republic of China into the United Nations. We have been trying to do so for 
some time and have pressed our viewpoint on other countries with some success… If the 
new China comes into the United Nations and the Security Council, then the USSR will come 
back to them also and the internal disruption of the United Nations will be prevented. If the 
United Nations goes, then there is no other way left to maintain world peace.’170
For Nehru the most important factor in international affairs was the credibility of the UN and this 
could only be maintained with the PRC in China’s seat.
Nehru’s prioritisation of the UN’s legitimacy led him to pursue a solution that would combine 
restoration of the UN’s authority, respect for the PRC and multilateral discussion of the Korean 
problem. On the 1 July Panikkar asked for China’s support for a strategy of ‘localizing’ the Korean 
conflict. He suggested that if the Soviets and Chinese just gave him verbal agreement to the idea 
that full discussion of the crisis could take place in the Security Council, once the PRC was 
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readmitted and the Soviets returned, then India could persuade others, and, he added, Delhi 
already had British and Egyptian support for the plan.171
Delhi did not realise the extent of the gulf with Beijing. For instance, the Chinese leadership had 
endorsed the North’s initial military action south of the UN’s artificial division of Korea.  172
Furthermore, Beijing was encouraging Kim Il-Sung’s further advance south. The Chinese were fully 
aware that the US was blocking their entry to the UN. Panikkar himself felt that Beijing was more 
worried about Taiwan than Korea.  Mao even saw the crisis as an opportunity for international 173
and domestic mobilisation to consolidate his regime, an abhorrent idea to Nehru.  The Chinese 174
solution was also distasteful. Shen Jian, the first representative of the PRC to arrive in Delhi, had 
told Bajpai and Menon on 17 July that ‘problems in Korea ought to be resolved by the Korean 
people’.  India could not agree to this as the North’s invasion was in contravention of the UN 175
settlement dividing Korea. Of course, this was also disingenuous on the part of the Chinese as 
they and the Soviets were supporting the North’s aggression. Nor did Nehru realise how little he 
had won in Beijing from his advocacy for the PRC’s right to the Chinese seat in the UNSC. Mao 
was in no hurry to claim China’s privileges at the UN.   176
India’s rejection of the third UNSC resolution on Korea on 7 July, calling for a unified command of 
UN forces under the United States, left Delhi sitting between the belligerent camps. India had now 
established a public distance from the West, as the UK had voted with the US. Privately, American 
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language regarding Korea had increasingly alarmed the Indians.  Fundamental differences with 177
the US had become clear and China policy was at the heart of this. Nehru was no communist but 
believed that integration of and engagement with the PRC was key and that meant bringing it into 
the UN. The US tendency to see international communism as a monolith meant it had no sympathy 
for Nehru’s approach.178
Important intelligence from leading Indian diplomats reinforced Nehru’s faith in Delhi’s ability to 
counter the growing polarisation. Pandit wrote in late July that Acheson had always emphasised to 
her the ‘moral tone’ that Indian support at the UN had given to the action in Korea, and that Indian 
influence in Asia was welcomed.  Furthermore, her communications with various nationalist 179
Chinese in the US confirmed how corrupt Jiang Jieshi’s clique were and that many Chinese in the 
US supported Nehru’s policy of replacing the GMD in the UN with Beijing. Such individuals had told 
her that Mao would foremost remain a nationalist and resist Soviet leadership.  180
Meanwhile, Panikkar consistently channeled moderate impressions of the PRC back to Delhi, 
justifying cautious engagement. In June, Panikkar wrote to Delhi emphasising that ‘new’ China had 
had a genuine social revolution and desired ‘undisturbed peace’ to focus, like India, on 
development. Its domestic programme was not communist but moderate, he claimed.  Nehru 181
relied on these impressions in July, when explaining how his Korea policy must be understood in 
terms of support for the UN and the PRC’s rights, and he circulated the reports from Beijing.   182
Panikkar’s reporting of his awe for Chinese development efforts and the popular enthusiasm 
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behind this seemed to bolster Nehru’s desire for friendly relations.  Nehru had bemoaned India’s 183
lack of such spirit only the month before.  In international terms, Panikkar also emphasised 184
reasons to regard Beijing as susceptible to moderation. He explained that China’s attitude was 
‘dominated by the fear of America directly intervening against her’. He did not expect the Chinese 
to intervene in Korea. Simultaneously, his reports did not dwell on evidence of Chinese aggression, 
such as its threatening military deployments near Hong Kong and Indochina. Even his remarks 
about Russian becoming ‘a common diplomatic language’, and that Port Arthur was becoming a 
‘major Sino-Soviet naval base’ were likely just to intensify Nehru’s sense of mission.  185
So in September Delhi continued to act on the premise that integrating the PRC into the UN and 
international system was the key to eliminating tensions. To this end Delhi urged Beijing to project 
a moderate image in order to rally support for its case. Panikkar and the Burmese ambassador 
jointly warned the Chinese not to alienate ‘neutral opinion’ and the Burmese suggested sending 
good-will missions to South East Asia. They pointed out that China had won the UN’s agreement to 
investigate the question of US bombing of Manchuria, so Beijing ought to temper its propaganda to 
‘draw world opinion’.  Panikkar urged a skeptical Zhou to consider that a more conciliatory tone 186
would aid India’s efforts regarding China’s UN seat.187
Nehru’s moderate centre in international affairs eroded as the Korean conflict escalated. Even 
before the Inchon Landings on 12 September he already thought the US position on the PRC, 
Taiwan and Korea was absurd. Nehru felt that US isolation was increasing, while China had begun 
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to realise India was friendly. Nehru thought the UK agreed with India on China’s entry to the UN.  188
Nevertheless the UK backed the US on Korea. Hence, after Inchon, as the US destroyed North 
Korean forces south of the 38th Parallel, Nehru found his efforts to find a reasonable peace 
thwarted by the Cold War’s harsh logic. He was already resigned to opposing the US over the 
China question at the UN.  His hopes for Chinese restraint now also ebbed. Beijing sent General 189
Nie Rongzhen to Panikkar to deliver a message of defiance for the US. The General said, ‘They 
may even drop atom bombs on us. What then? They may kill a few million people. Without 
sacrifice a nation’s independence cannot be upheld.’  On 26 September Panikkar revised his 190
earlier view and told Delhi he expected the Chinese to intervene in Korea if the US crossed the 38th 
parallel.  Nehru wrote to Zhou urging patience. To respond to US aggression would damage the 191
growing support for the PRC’s entry to the UN. Korea could be settled easily, Nehru said, once the 
PRC joined the UNSC. 192
Delhi interpreted China’s use of India as a diplomatic channel to be a sign of growing trust, but 
failed to see the peristent gulf between them. No incident captured this better than the welcome 
lunch that the new Chinese Ambassador to India, Yuan Zhongxian had with the Indian President, 
Rajendra Prasad. The lunch took place three days after Inchon, while the US was busy crushing 
China’s ally, North Korea. Prasad suddenly announced to Yuan, as they walked to the dining room, 
that US Supreme Court Judge William Orville Douglas, on holiday in India, would be joining them, 
adding that the judge disliked US policy towards China. Over lunch Yuan felt ignored until Douglas 
said he hoped they would see the US hold a ceremony of diplomatic welcome for a PRC 
representative one day. The Chinese Ambassador was so discomfited, dining with the ‘national 
official’ of an ‘enemy country’, that he barely ate, though no one noticed. The awkwardly amateur 
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diplomacy reached an exquisite pitch after lunch when they adjourned to an anteroom. Trying to 
leave to avoid further embarrassment, the ambassador was caught in a pincer by the judge and 
President, and found himself perched on a small bench with them. Yuan sat in silence as they 
made anodyne observations about world peace. Only the intervention of his colleague Shen Jian 
prevented the Americans from being included in the official photos.193
Who concocted this scheme is unclear, though Nehru had at least planned to meet Douglas in 
Delhi.  While, the Chinese would not have distinguished between a ‘national official’ and the US 194
Government, the Indians would have viewed him as a private citizen. This was the chasm across 
which Nehru was trying to reach. Nehru and Panikkar considered it their task to lead China beyond 
this narrow world view, but their faith that they could do so was perhaps also a type of ignorance 
about the nature of the beast they were dealing with. Many Indian scholars would, rather 
sanctimoniously, attribute the failures of Sino-Indian relations to incompatible world-views.  But 195
this rather casual attempt to mediate between China and the US indicated that many on the Indian 
side underestimated the differences that existed.
The limits of Indian influence were laid bare by the US disregard of Indian warnings about China. 
The US ignored a message on 2 October that China would intervene in Korea if US forces crossed 
the 38th Parallel. Panikkar told Zhou that he had pre-empted this and already passed the warning 
to the US.  However, MacArthur had been told on 27 September to destroy all North Korean 196
forces, implying freedom to go north, and the British had continued to support the US at the UN 
providing cover for such a move. Attempts to placate China by offering a neutral commission to 
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investigate the bombing of Manchuria failed.  On 5 October, Zhang Hanfu demanded the Security 197
Council condemn US aggression.  The Chinese simply saw the UN as a tool for US aggression 198
and rejected its entire legitimacy, even while the Indians were desperately trying to preserve this 
and still felt the US, though possibly guilty of infringements of China’s sovereignty in Manchuria, 
was still legitimately leading UN resistance to North Korean aggression. Beijing rejected US and 
Indian proposals of 7 October for talks in Delhi, refusing to submit to aggression and allow the 
Americans to negotiate from a position of strength.199
The US military’s entry into North Korea on 9 October was a turning point in Sino-Indian relations.  
Delhi did attempt to help the US and UK and persuade China that this was no threat to its security. 
But India’s view that US action had lost legitimacy implied an opportunity for China to cultivate 
India.  Panikkar agreed with the Chinese that the US could not be trusted and said MacArthur was 
a ‘madman.’ Zhang told him, ‘US imperialism itself is crazy’. The Indian tried to encourage Zhang 
saying the action would receive little support in Asia and that the weather would surely slow down 
the advance. Zhang was not interested in the degree of Asian support and said the weather was 
irrelevant, ‘The weather cannot solve anything, peace needs the people’s struggle, war needs the 
people to stand and fight.’  200
Chinese lack of faith in diplomacy was abundantly clear, and little effort was made to improve 
relations with India. The reality was that Delhi and Beijing were operating on the basis of almost 
irreconcilable world-views. Nehru’s priority was to harmonise international differences. Therefore, 
his key goals were to secure the UN as a body to arbitrate disputes peacefully. He wanted the PRC 
quickly brought into the UN in order to cement that organisation’s legitimacy and alleviate the 
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CCP’s intrinsic suspicions of the world. Integrating China to the international system would ease its 
dependence on Moscow and obstruct the polarisation of global politics. But despite the basic 
sympathy in Delhi for China the Korean War had expanded the void between them. Chinese 
leaders did not share Nehru’s UN concern because that body now appeared to be utterly 
illegitimate. The US’s whole response in Korea and across the region, had confirmed the CCP’s 
perception that it was an implacable enemy. Furthermore, while the US’s advance  into North 
Korea was intensely threatening to Beijing, it also presented a massive opportunity to rally all 
patriotic Chinese to the CCP’s banner, give a major boost to the regime’s consolidation and 
reassure Moscow of China’s loyalty to the Socialist Bloc. These goals vastly outweighed any of 
Nehru’s appeals,and prompted Beijing to escalate the war in turn, hubristically marching South in a 
repeat of MacArthur’s northern advance.  Nehru’s attempts to placate Beijing looked like naiveté 201
at best, or worse, confirmed that in reality, India under the Congress collaborated with imperialism. 
Meanwhile, Nehru’s blandishments about Tibet, another concern of vital ideological and strategic 
importance for Mao and his colleagues, only confirmed Beijing’s suspicions.
Tibet
The problem of Tibet added to the conflict of interests between Delhi and Beijing, complicating 
Nehru’s efforts to reassure China that India could be a trusted partner. The possibility for China to 
cultivate India, which had been created by US aggression in advancing into North Korea, was 
further undermined by the fact that Beijing launched a long-planned military campaign against the 
Tibetans just a day or two prior to MacArthur’s crossing of the 38th parallel. India would again 
frame its response in terms of the PRC’s case for China’s UNSC seat, urging that military action 
against the Tibetans damaged Beijing’s standing. So Indian policy towards Tibet was partly tailored 
towards Delhi’s policies of cementing the UN, socialising the PRC, and minimising distraction from 
the crisis in Korea. Accommodation of China with regard to Tibet was therefore not simply because 
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of India’s perceived relative military weakness, as some have argued.  But, Nehru’s policy of 202
reassuring Beijing that India had no ambitions in Tibet did aim to reduce China’s military presence 
in the region and along India’s borders. However, Chinese suspicions of India with regard to Tibet 
were not as paranoid as often suggested.  Transformation and total military control of Tibet were 203
fundamental CCP goals. Chinese fears were justified by the ambiguous and provocative 
implications of Indian policy for Beijing’s sovereignty in Tibet. The language regarding Tibet 
clashed, with Nehru using the term suzerainty and autonomy, while Beijing thought he 
acknowledged its full sovereignty. A further ambiguity was created by Delhi and Beijing’s common 
deferral of frank talks on their overlapping interests in the Himalayas, Tibet and the border while 
embarking on state-building projects in these areas.
 
Tibet was a critical region for the CCP, which was seeking to restore the outlines of the massive, 
multi-ethnic Qing Empire. Control and integration of Tibet would be a key test of the CCP’s ability 
to win over non-Han minorities. The Soviets provided a valuable guide in this field having 
converted the old Russian Empire into the USSR. The CCP wanted to secure the various minority 
peoples’ integration to the PRC through revolutionary methods, by conducting social revolution. 
Moscow agreed with this approach but urged caution nonetheless.  A clash existed therefore 204
between India’s expectation that Tibet be somewhat apart from the PRC and Beijing’s underlying 
goal to consolidate former Qing territory within the new nation-state by revolutionary means.  
Furthermore, it seemed that the new Indian state maintained a policy of interference which echoed 
the humiliating intrusion into Tibet by British India. Delhi had given brazen support to Tibetan 
separation in 1947 by inviting Lhasa to the Asian Relations Conference. The CCP saw Indian and 
British influence behind the expulsion of all Han from Lhasa in July 1949 and Tibetan resistance of 
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the PLA entering Qinghai and Gansu.  The ease with which Stalin had formalised Outer 205
Mongolia’s severance from China possibly also enhanced Mao’s anxiety about Tibet. 
Independent India’s policy towards Tibet was ambiguous and provocative. The desire to get on 
with Beijing created an imperative to accommodate it on Tibet. However, although the idea of 
Tibetan independence was dropped once Panikkar returned to China, Delhi clung to the ambition 
of limiting Chinese influence in that region.  The equivocal character of the concession to China’s 206
interests was very clear. Nehru said on 16 November 1949 that, ‘In a vague sense we have 
accepted the fact of Chinese suzerainty [over Tibet]. How far it goes one does not know.’ 
Suzerainty was an old-fashioned term implying a degree of autonomy and something much less 
than absolute Chinese sovereignty. Nehru would continue to emphasise that India’s policy was 
support for Tibetan autonomy within Chinese suzerainty throughout 1950, despite Zhou having 
rejected any limits on Chinese sovereignty.   Bajpai told the British that Delhi preferred to ‘retain 207
Tibet as a buffer’ and did not want to see ‘any increase in Chinese and still less Chinese 
Communist influence there’. However, Bajpai recognised India could not help the Lama ‘regime’ 
resist long-run ‘infiltration’ and lacked the ‘military resources’ to defend Tibet.  Delhi’s appeal that 208
Beijing settle its relationship with Lhasa peacefully means was also driven by India’s own security 
needs. Nehru wanted Beijing placated in order that the PLA’s presence would be limited and so 
threaten India less directly.  Nehru was keen to minimise defence spending in order to boost 209
investment elsewhere so an un-militarised Tibet was crucial.210
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Confused thinking in Delhi about Tibet’s relationship with the rest of China produced confused and 
contradictory policy. In January 1950 Bajpai discouraged the British from supporting the Tibetans at 
the UN and KPS Menon said India must not encourage British scheming as it would only confirm 
Chinese claims about imperialist interference in Tibet.  However, at the same time India was still 211
supplying arms to Tibet in 1950.  Hence, Nehru’s efforts to reassure Beijing were hamstrung both 212
in theory and in practice, and the sincerity of Nehru’s reassurances was quite undermined.
While India struggled to modify its Tibet policy, Mao’s commitment to a military approach and the 
utter transformation of Tibet, contradicted Indian prioritisation of Tibetan autonomy. In November 
1949, the Chairman had written to General Peng Dehuai, ‘[we should] strive to solve the Tibet 
question by the fall or winter of next year…it is impossible to solve the Tibet question without 
sending in military forces.’   On 2 January 1950 Mao wrote to his colleagues from Moscow, ‘We 213
must occupy Tibet, and transform it into a People’s Democratic Tibet.’ The military and 
transformative intention were clear: the CCP ‘ought to strive to begin militarily entering Tibet by the 
middle of May, and occupy all of Tibet before October’. Negotiations with Lhasa were not 
mentioned.  Stalin offered air support and told Mao, ‘It is good that you are preparing to attack. 214
The Tibetans need to be subdued.’  Mao’s statement that Tibet must be remade as a ‘People’s 215
Democratic Tibet’ indicated that he wished to govern the region as per the rest of China and that 
any long-term Indian expectations of moderating China’s impact on Tibet were misguided. This 
was important to Mao because the recent history of humiliation demanded ‘new’ China be a strong 
unitary state, and the claim that the Chinese people had stood up required the liberation of all 
oppressed classes. Revolutionary ideology thus served the restoration of the Chinese empire.
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Indian attempts to reassure Beijing were also undermined by the action of other parties. Isolated 
diplomatically, Lhasa sent a declaration of independence to Beijing and a delegation left for Delhi 
hoping to travel on for talks with the Chinese in Singapore or Hong Kong. The British, however, 
withdrew the visas for these places on May 6th, leaving the Tibetans in limbo in India. The Chinese 
made accusations of imperialist meddling. This charge was compounded when the Tibetans 
decided they preferred talks in Delhi.  That this was British not Indian meddling is clear from an 216
entry in KPS Menon’s diary which blamed the UK for blocking the Tibetan delegation’s departure 
from India.  In August, the US bolstered Tibetan confidence by assuring them that they would 217
support Tibet if China invaded.  So, no matter how much Delhi tried to alleviate Beijing’s 218
suspicions, it certainly looked as if powerful actors were impeding Chinese ambitions.
In May, Beijing began to combine military and diplomatic pressure on Lhasa. Chinese radio made a 
first public threat of force to liberate Tibet on 6 May and ten days later Beijing Radio accused India 
and the US of arming the Tibetans. In late May a PLA force captured the Tibetan town of Dengpo, 
within Lhasa-administered territory.  Then on 27 May conditions for talks were sent to Lhasa, the 219
gist being that if sovereignty was conceded all else could be discussed.  The fact that this first 220
threat of force came on the same day that the British cancelled the Tibetan visas suggests the 
threat was not a response to British meddling, but emerged from an existing calculus. External 
threats were not the main drivers of Beijing’s Tibet policy but a useful justification for it. In January, 
Mao had wanted the PLA to begin entering Tibet by mid-May, and have all Tibet occupied by 
October. But now diplomacy was being emphasised as well, despite the external interference. 
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Growing unease led Nehru to increasingly desperate efforts to dissuade the Chinese from military 
action and also play down the dangers within India. On 7 June the Tibetan delegation in Delhi told 
the Indians that the PLA had entered eastern Tibet.  Nehru however reported uncritically to his 221
Chief Ministers in early July that Panikkar believed Beijing ‘stood for friendship with India, and 
would respect the autonomy of Tibet’.  Privately, Delhi continued to try and reassure China that it 222
was not interfering. When Bajpai and Menon met Shen Jian on 17 July, they said they hoped China 
and Tibet could negotiate and denied reports that India had blocked the Tibetan delegation’s 
departure.  By late July Indian officials certainly were increasingly worried that China’s claim on 223
Tibet implied a wider threat to India’s interests in the Himalayas, and in particular Bhutan.  224
However, in August, while Indian diplomats continued to assure the Chinese they had no desire to 
get involved, Nehru had to admit that ‘Tibet is also no longer secure and there are rumours of a 
Chinese invasion of it.’225
Delhi’s Tibet policy continued to blur sovereignty and autonomy but now introduced a hint of 
imperial compromise. On 12 August, Panikkar told Zhang he had heard military action had begun 
against Tibet and that India was worried that ‘military action would lead to a stirring up of the border 
tribes’.  Panikkar implied an imperial compromise and an agreement not to arouse the wild clans 226
separating their territories. Delhi had pursued similar cooperation with Rangoon to discipline 
minority ethnic and geographically peripheral groups dissenting from the nation-state project. For 
example, Nehru had given moral support to Rangoon in 1949 in their suppression of the Karens, 
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and had tried to persuade the UK to unblock financial assistance for Burma to assist this 
campaign.  The Indians also announced they had only commercial interests in Tibet, derived 227
from a 1906 treaty and would like to settle any ‘misunderstanding’ with China.  India’s reference 228
to old treaty rights was provocative to the the CCP, whose revolutionary Chinese nationalism 
viewed such ‘unequal treaties’ as the great humiliating legacy of imperialism.
In late August, Beijing altered its plans and decided it was only necessary for the moment to seize 
the outer region of Chamdo by October, and then the rest of Tibet could be secured the following 
year.  Mao told Deng he foresaw ‘a few tough battles’ in the Chamdo campaign. Approving plans 229
to occupy Chamdo, Mao said this would ‘benefit the struggle to transform the politics of Tibet and 
enter Lhasa next year’. That Mao was now fully pursuing a strategy combining diplomacy and force 
was clear: ‘Britain originally did not want the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing, but now they 
allow them. If we can occupy Chamdo in October, this might spur the Tibetan delegation to come to 
Beijing for talks, to achieve a peaceful solution (of course there are other possibilities).’ The 
Tibetans were to be bullied into coming for talks.230
Despite India’s muddled policy on Tibet, it was a crucial factor behind Mao’s modified plan for 
Tibet. Some scholars suggest Mao always stressed diplomacy, but such explanations ignore Mao’s 
early, exclusively military emphasis, and later continuing use of military pressure.  More credibly, 231
the switch in Mao’s approach was due to the logistical difficulties of a march into Tibet combined 
with the growing commitment in the Korea region.  However, the Chinese belief that Panikkar 232
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had given India’s recognition to Beijing’s sovereignty in Tibet on 12 August was also an important 
factor.  Beijing did not realise Panikkar had exceeded Nehru’s instructions.  On 23 August Mao 233 234
approved plans for the occupation of Chamdo in the context of this apparent shift in Delhi: ‘Now 
India has already issued a declaration acknowledging that Tibet is Chinese territory, it [India] only 
hopes that it will be peacefully solved without resort to arms.’  Indian acknowledgement of 235
China’s primacy in Tibet meant the urgency of military action receded in Mao’s mind, a major point 
for Beijing given the military constraints they were working under.
The apparent concession on Tibet allowed Mao to be more accommodating about Delhi’s 
concerns. The Chairman explained that they should now consider more closely Indian fears and 
work to assuage those just as much as Tibetan anxieties: 
‘We are now carrying out the plan of striving for the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing and 
of reducing the fears of Nehru. After we have occupied Chamdo only leave 3,000 troops 
there for the winter, this year we will not enter Lhasa, and also disperse the main force back 
to Ganzi, so that in the eyes of the Tibetans they may feel we are adopting a measure that 
shows our benevolent intentions.’236
In the context of the growing crisis in Korea, Mao was more wary of generating additional hostility 
towards the PRC.
The fruits of a pacific approach to Tibet quickly became clear. On 26 August the Indians delivered 
an aide-memoire to the Chinese which expressed the familiar hope that military action could be 
avoided and that Tibetan autonomy and the Indo-Tibetan borders, unspecified, could be preserved. 
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But in return the Indians offered to restrain Nepal’s military support for Tibet, a point about which 
Zhou had previously expressed concern.  Mao had no intention of barracking his troops however, 237
but he was happy to use India to deliver his threats. On 29 August Mao told Zhou, ‘Please pay 
attention to the timing of the attack on Changdu. Please consider having someone in the Foreign 
Ministry leak to the Indian Ambassador [the timing of the operation] and our hope that a Tibetan 
delegation will arrive in Beijing in mid-September to negotiate.’ So Mao manipulated Delhi to 
pressure the Tibetans into coming for negotiations.238
The Indians chose not to highlight the contradictions in Beijing’s policy. Panikkar met Qiao 
Guanhua on 31 August and heard that China was happy India had no ‘wild ambitions’ for Tibet. 
Qiao said Beijing hoped to use peaceful means to ‘expel the remnants of the GMD reactionaries’ 
from Tibet’.  Talk of GMD forces in Tibet was an utter charade. Mao’s own assessments of the 239
military requirements for entering Tibet never mentioned these, because they did not exist. In 
January, he had only factored in the ‘scattered’ 6,000 Tibetan troops when he decided to reduce 
the size of his army assigned to the Tibet campaign. As with talk of peaceful measures this was 
simply diplomatic cover for military action. Qiao stressed that the Tibetan delegation in India had 
been invited to Beijing to discuss a peaceful solution and that once China’s ambassador, arrived in 
Delhi he would discuss this with the Tibetans. However, because the ambassador was delayed, 
and the PLA already had a plan to begin operations in West Xikang, Shen Jian would begin talks 
with the Tibetans in Delhi. Qiao asked that Delhi do everything it could to help the Tibetans on their 
trip to Hong Kong.  So talks could begin in Delhi but the military would already have begun 240
operations.
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The Tibetans continued to resist pressure to come for negotiations in Beijing and so on 7 October 
the PLA was ordered to cross the Drichu River [Yangtze] into the de facto Lhasa-controlled territory 
of Chamdo.  Mao wrote to his diplomats in Delhi that PLA would shortly fully occupy Chamdo, but 241
a peaceful solution remained possible. He said, ‘[i]f Tibet is willing to talk then the delegation need 
to quickly come to Beijing.’  Crossing the Drichu two days before the US crossed the 38th parallel 242
in Korea indicated on the one hand the independence of Mao’s tactics in Tibet; in other words that 
Mao’s move against Tibet was not caused by US escalation in Korea. But Mao was also 
demonstrating that he was not intimidated by the broader array of pressure being applied by the 
US in Manchuria, Taiwan and Indochina.
Beijing used Delhi’s confusion over the geography of Tibet to deflect its concern about the military 
action. To some extent, Delhi was keen to have the rumours denied, in order to preserve  Nehru’s 
friendly China policy. Hence, on 16 October Indian diplomats asked if the Chinese could confirm 
that press reports of an invasion of Tibet were ‘malicious propaganda’.  The Chinese confirmed 243
there was no invasion of Tibet, and explained they had only moved into Chamdo, as they had 
warned Panikkar they would do.  Indian diplomats were unsure whether Chamdo was Tibet, and 244
wanted clarification because the Indian government was denying the rumours. The Chinese 
realised that maps used in India showed Chamdo as within Tibet, rather than the old Qing province 
of West Xikang, hence the Indian belief that Tibet was being invaded.  The reality is that ‘Tibet’ 245
was conceived in various ways by the different parties. The Tibetans had a more maximal vision, 
and older maps from 1914 included Chamdo and Kham (now Western Sichuan). One Tibetan map 
showed what Tibetan officials considered de facto Lhasa-controlled territory between 1918 and 
1950, which included Chamdo, and a small part of Kham. However, a GMD map from 1914 
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showed Chamdo and Kham as outside Tibet. Hence, when the PLA entered Chamdo in 1950 it 
was viewed as an invasion by the Tibetans, and therefore the Indians also, while the Chinese 
believed this was part of the Qing province of Xikang, and so did not count as Tibet.246
Insensitivity to the ethnic, cultural and religious ties across the sub-divisions of Chinese 
administration would persistently disrupt Beijing’s Tibet policy in the 1950s.  Mao chauvinistically 
assumed that the borders between China and Tibet should be based on the old Qing administrative 
divisions, irrespective of ethnic realities on the ground.  Thus CCP action ignored ethnic 247
sentiments and provoked reactions across the Tibetan plateau, and in India where there was much 
sympathy for Tibetans. That the Tibetans themselves had a different conception of what the 
boundaries of Tibet should be was evinced by their requests in 1947 and 1949 that India return 
certain territories.   Also Lhasa would ask the CCP in 1952 to return to Lhasa the formal 248
administration of Chamdo and other areas.   Melvyn Goldstein has written that Beijing’s 249
differentiation of ‘political’ and ‘ethnographic’ Tibet was a major cause of instability amongst 
Tibetans broadly, as it failed to realise that action against ethnic Tibetans anywhere would have 
repercussions within ‘Tibet’.  This would become most obvious later in the 1950s once CCP 250
reforms began in outer Tibet but at this point military action against Chamdo alarmed both Lhasa 
and Delhi.
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India’s priority remained the legitimacy of the UN however, just as it did within the context of the 
Korean crisis, but its language about Tibet was often provocative. On 16 October, KPS Menon in 
Delhi, argued that China must not damage its case at the UN by giving the world the impression 
that it was threatening Tibet into negotiations.  Menon repeated this argument on the 18th and 251
then said, provocatively, that India only wanted to maintain its previous relations and see that 
Tibet’s ‘autonomy within the framework of China’s sovereignty’ be maintained. He denied there was 
any external interference in Tibet that justified a military intervention. Negotiations for a peaceful 
settlement should be the goal as military action created opportunities for those countries ‘who are 
not friendly to China’.  A few days later, Panikkar cynically recommended that China delay its 252
action in Tibet until after the UN vote on PRC membership. Zhang replied that Tibet and the UN 
were separate issues. The PRC leadership at this point prioritised the quick consolidation of control 
over Tibet and cared not a whit that this obstructed one of India’s major foreign policy goals, 
namley securing the PRC’s UN admission to prevent the further polarization of world politics.253
By the time Delhi had clarified the geography of Chamdo and Tibet Mao had achieved his 
immediate goals for Tibet. On 24 October, the Indians asked that China limit the use of the military 
to West Xikang, to facilitate honest talks, although they had already heard the PLA had gone 
beyond Xikang.  Indeed it had. Zhou updated ambassador Yuan on the 25th that the PLA had 254
‘liberated’ Chamdo by the the 19th and on the 21st 3,000 enemy troops were destroyed. The PLA, 
Zhou said, had now entered Tibet.  The Tibetan delegation had now left for Beijing.  Also, 255 256
although Beijing did not know this, the US had decided that real assistance to Tibet was now a 
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dead issue.  This was the harvest Beijing gathered in from military action in the Tibetan border 257
lands. The cost was Indian good will. Nehru told his sister he felt ‘hurt’ and betrayed over the 
developments between China and Tibet.258
India lodged a formal protest with China on 28 October regretting that it had not been informed of 
the PLA’s instructions to enter Tibet. Delhi argued genuine negotiations were impossible while one 
side feared ‘duress’ and an invasion at this time of international tension was ‘deplorable’ and in no 
one’s interest.  China’s sharp response was deliberately offensive. Zhang told Panikkar China 259
was shocked at use of the word ‘invasion’ and said in fact there was evidence of foreign 
intervention in Tibet and deliberate delay of Tibet’s delegation. Panikkar repeated that India’s 
concern was the international situation and unrest among ‘border tribes.’  A Chinese note 260
reiterated that the Tibet and UN issues were unrelated, thus squashing India’s argument for 
restraint. It concluded that if India viewed the situation as ‘deplorable’ then it must be influenced by 
outside forces.   261
This slur on Indian independence was an insult to Delhi’s leadership which believed its foreign 
policy to be the manifestation of its autonomy. In reply, India said it had urged Tibet to join talks 
with Beijing and had always prioritised global tensions. Delhi had thought China wanted a peaceful 
settlement, hence its shock at the military action. Now, India would no longer be able to ‘advise the 
Tibetan delegation to proceed to Peking’ it was announced.  In other words, India withdrew 
cooperation over Tibet. Delhi thought it sounded reasonable by saying that its interest was always 
in reconciling the ‘legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy within the framework of Chinese 
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suzerainty.’ Having used the word sovereignty on 16 October, the switch back to suzerainty added 
to the provocation. Beijing rejected the idea that Tibet had anything to do with international tension, 
as it was simply a domestic issue. 262
There was now major disquiet within India regarding India’s China policy. Nehru’s only equal in the 
Congress, Sardar Vallabbhai Patel, condemned Beijing’s ‘perfidy’ and called for an end to support 
for the PRC at the UN, a build up of the military and an alliance with Burma to deter China. He 
concluded that Beijing’s cancellation of Tibetan autonomy meant it could not be trusted.  On 16 263
November questions were asked in Parliament about frontier defence.  Figures in the Indian 264
Home Ministry were very concerned about a Sino-Soviet plot to take over Asia starting with Tibet 
and discussed this with the British, who themselves had just published a new strategic 
consideration of Bhutan and the Himalayas.   265
However, Nehru had no intention of changing course because he regarded Beijing’s ‘foolish’ 
behaviour as proving his view that it was isolation and fear that drove it to extreme measures. 
Nehru’s priority remained the socialisation, integration and pacification of the PRC. He rejected an 
offer of US ‘help’ regarding Tibet as fundamentally damaging to ‘our cause’.  Nor was Nehru 266
swayed by the PLA’s entry of Korea or Panikkar’s description of the ‘war psychosis’ in China.  267
Therefore, as the Chinese were reassured, no formal support was given to the Tibetan campaign 
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at the UN.  India’s representative in New York was instructed that Korea remained the priority, 268
and so nothing should be done to ‘embitter’ Beijing.   Nehru believed the conflict in Korea and 269
‘bombing of Manchurian towns’ had created in China a temper of ‘fear and apprehension and 
resentment against those real or fancied enemies, and this had led possibly to a change in policy 
[in Tibet] or to a speeding up of what might have taken much longer to develop.’    Nehru was 270
wrong of course. As seen above, Mao had always intended to send the PLA into Tibet, and only 
slowed down his plans due to logistical challenges and India’s recognition of Chinese rights.
Nehru’s understanding of the function of fear in international relations underpinned his non-
alignment and China policy. He believed fear begat fear, and alliances only added to the sum of 
insecurity in the international system. So, despite intelligence showing the PLA advancing through 
Tibet towards Assam and Bhutan, and Patel’s call for an alliance with Burma to deter Chinese 
adventurism, Nehru maintained his principle of non-alignment.  India’s ambassador in Burma, MA 271
Rauf, told Nehru the ‘main spring’ of Burmese politics was fear of China.  Nehru’s response was 272
to downplay the Chinese threat, although he added they might impress on Beijing that any attack 
on Burma would be ‘deeply resented’. He preferred a treaty of friendship with Rangoon because a 
military alliance make China ‘distrust India’, and undermine therefore Delhi’s influence over 
Beijing.273
Nehru did make some concessions to Patel’s approach however. One element of Delhi’s appeal for 
restraint in Tibet had been that they ought collectively avoid action that destabilised the Himalayan 
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region. Nehru had warned Panikkar of the negative consequences for ‘our border States’ of a 
Chinese invasion of Tibet.  But once the PLA entered Tibet Delhi moved to cement its influence. 274
Nehru wrote in December to the Chief Ministers that Indian defence included Bhutan and Sikkim as 
‘protected states’, and even Nepal, despite its independence. In fact, on 5 December, after China’s 
military ambitions in Tibet became clear, Indian signed the treaty converting Sikkim into a 
protectorate.275
Nehru’s desire to continue to placate Beijing was made easier by China’s rapid return to a more 
friendly tone. This occurred despite hard evidence of Indian subversion in Tibet and was because 
Beijing wanted to focus on its major enemy, the US. In mid-November, a Chinese note cooly 
explained that the Indians were confused about autonomy and sovereignty and that friendship 
depended on recognition of China’s territorial integrity. But no mention was made of two Indian 
spies apprehended during the Chamdo campaign, nor any other recent subversive activities by 
India.  Instead, on 23 November, Zhang announced to Indian diplomats that relations remained 276
friendly despite recent disturbances. He explained that Beijing’s chief concern was ‘armed 
intervention’ by the US in Korea and Taiwan.  China’s desire to placate India was made 277
abundantly clear by Beijing’s effort to defuse an incident in Lhasa in which in-cautious local CCP 
officials had forced an entry of India’s mission in January 1951. Although Beijing was clear that 
they were in the right (in principle), as the mission was a product of an unequal treaty, they 
nevertheless made great efforts to soothe Indian outrage.278
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While Beijing was resolute in its ambition to control and transform Tibet, Delhi’s views were 
ambiguous and contradicted Chinese goals. India prioritised the socialisation of the PRC and did 
not want to provoke it needlessly over Tibet, aware it was too weak to do so anyway. But having 
dropped support for Tibet’s independence, Delhi still wanted to maintain some influence and limit 
the CCP’s impact. This aim was at odds with Mao’s ultimate ambitions. Furthermore, the attempts 
to reassure Beijing were undermined by India’s inability to project total disinterest and by actions of 
the Tibetans and the intermittent support they received from the West. Obliged to slow down the 
seizure of Tibet, Mao also came to see advantages in reassuring Delhi about Beijing’s limited 
plans. The Indians seemed to have conceded China’s sovereignty and had begun cooperating to 
urge the Tibetans to negotiate. But, as a result, Delhi was doubly shocked by the PLA action in the 
Tibetan borderlands. Delhi reacted as it had to the Korea crisis pleading with Beijing to consider 
how aggression damaged its case for China’s seat at the UN. But again Beijing had little sympathy 
for Nehru’s grand visions when critical interests were at stake. Nehru came under huge pressure to 
change his China policy and Delhi did move to tighten its influence over the Himalayan border 
states. However, the logic of Nehru’s foreign policy rejected any major change. He believed 
Chinese aggression was caused by fear and isolation and he did not want India to compound this. 
To oppose Beijing over Tibet would be to lose India’s ‘ameliorating influence’ over China.   Even 279
though the Chinese soon showed how limited was that influence, ignoring Delhi’s appeals and 
marching across Korea’s 38th parallel, Nehru refused to give up his view. He dismissed calls to 
‘brand China an aggressor’ and blamed the US for scuppering Indian efforts to encourage Beijing 
to talks.280
The border problem
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In March 1951, the Indians tried to realise a return on their cooperation over Tibet and proposed an 
understanding on the Sino-Indian border. Zhou had asked Delhi to encourage the Dalai Lama to 
stay in Tibet to aid its ‘peaceful’ liberation and stabilise Sino-Indian relations.  The Indians said 281
they would help with the Dalai Lama. In Beijing, TN Kaul explained that Nehru wanted China to 
confirm the border in return: ‘The China-India border ought to follow the McMahon Line, in this way 
then there can occur no problems. But China has some maps, including some published in 1950, 
which take certain parts of India and draw them within Tibet’s borders’. Kaul added that this would 
deny the UK or US the opportunity to foment trouble.282
Beijing made no response because it wanted first to consolidate its position in Tibet and deal later 
with territorial claims and India’s influence in the Himalayas from a position of advantage. After all, 
it was only in May that Beijing signed the 17 Point Agreement with Lhasa, agreeing Tibet’s 
submission to Beijing.  By mid-June, the Chinese were researching the history of Tibet’s borders, 283
external relations and British intrusion.  London noted that the Soviet media’s discussion of 284
British depredations on Tibet, including Ladakh, Bhutan and Sikkim had ‘a particularly sinister slant’ 
and implied ‘Soviet sponsorship’ of claims on Indian territory.  Beijing noticed that India had 285
blocked Tibetan merchants from entering Bhutan, and were proposing to station troops there, as 
they foresaw a PLA strike.  Although India had placed tariffs on the wool trade with Tibet, Beijing 286
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deferred action until better local administration was set up.  Efforts by Delhi to undermine trade 287
contradicted assurances that its interest in Tibet was purely commercial, and seemed designed to 
destabilise.  But Chinese policy was to avoid confrontation while securing a foothold in Tibet. 288
Mao explained that the CCP priority in the region must be the development of agricultural and 
logistical infrastructure.  289
Delhi soon dropped its attempt to confirm the McMahon Line. In February 1952, Panikkar 
suggested an agreement over respective interests in Tibet, but made no mention of the border. He 
said India was could accept the changes in Tibet but hoped ‘both sides interests can be protected 
through talks’. India’s interests were explained to be its mission in Lhasa, various trade agencies, 
post and telegraph facilities, a ‘small military escort’ at Gyantse, and certain ‘rights’ for traders and 
pilgrims.  Panikkar had persuaded Nehru that avoiding discussion of the border was the wisest 290
policy, because they could then take Beijing’s reciprocal silence to imply acceptance of Delhi’s 
public statements that the McMahon Line marked the frontier. Others had suggested India should 
insist on conceding Tibet in return for confirmation of the border. But, the key point about 
Panikkar’s approach, which Nehru persisted with, was that it would give India time to consolidate 
the border areas.  Nehru’s overriding concern to avoid friction with China added to the appeal of 291
Panikkar’s strategy.
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Nehru’s border policy functioned by avoiding the topic with the Chinese and then projecting public 
certainty within India that the border was settled. Since 1950 Nehru had been declaring that China 
acknowledged the border was settled. On 31 December he told his Chief Ministers that ‘our 
ambassador in China as well as the ambassador for Burma have been assured that China has no 
territorial ambitions.’ He said he had responded to concerns about Chinese maps showing territory 
down to the Brahmaputra River as Chinese by stating in Parliament that, ‘our maps show that the 
MacMahon Line is our boundary and that is our boundary – map or no map. The fact remains and 
we stand by that boundary and we will not allow anybody to come across that boundary.’ He 
pointed out that the Chinese had assured them that these were old maps in need of revision.  292
That Beijing did not reject such public claims did not, though, amount to acceptance. An assurance 
that Beijing had no territorial ambitions meant little, as there was no way of knowing if this 
assurance was offered on the basis of de facto or what was privately considered to be de jure 
borders. Beijing’s attitude towards India’s mission in Lhasa should have made Nehru more 
cautious as this was another product of the ‘unequal’ Simla Treaty of 1914. Furthermore, Lhasa’s 
demands in 1947 and 1949 that Delhi return territory seized by the British, should also have 
induced more circumspection.  Finally, the whole policy depended on rapid consolidation of the 293
Indian state’s control of these border areas but progress was awfully slow.294
Beijing continued to secure its position and avoid responding to Panikkar’s suggestions for an 
agreement on Tibet. In February, Zhou explained Beijing’s policy to his top official in Lhasa, Zhang 
Jingwu. He foresaw negotiations to settle Indian and Nepalese interests but preconditions were 
necessary. The PLA must first reach the southern borders of Tibet, a Military-Political Committee 
must be set up and new Tibetan foreign affairs organs must be established. Furthermore, research 
into the local history of foreign relations was required. India’s military and other rights would end 
but it would be permitted to keep its office in Lhasa and commercial interests could be maintained. 
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The rather alien issue of pilgrimage also needed research.  Beijing wanted a more robust posture 295
in Tibet prior to negotiations with India.
Indian suspicion of Chinese delays accumulated was compounded by a growing distaste for 
Chinese politics. Menon perceived a ‘cunning’ attempt to manipulate and take advantage of India 
by requesting Delhi’s assistance with the transshipment of grain from Calcutta to Tibet while 
refusing to discuss other issues. Menon thought they should withhold cooperation until Indian 
interests were accommodated. He was also concerned with Chinese irredentism.  Meanwhile, 296
the increasingly belligerent tone of Beijing’s propaganda and ruthless domestic campaigns and 
purges dismayed Panikkar and seemed to presage more international conflict.  Moreover, India 297
was not exempt from this propaganda and Delhi complained about the characterisation of Indian 
elections as unfree and reports of thousands of communist prisoners in Indian prisons.  298
In mid-1952 Beijing decided to seek a limited settlement with India. However, although the Chinese 
appreciated the potential Indian contribution to Tibetan stability they remained deeply suspicious. 
In April, the North West Bureau had told Beijing it had arrested Indian spies planning on 
assassinating Chinese officials.  However, India was crucial to Tibet’s economic health. Beijing 299
was buying all of Tibet’s wool, but this could only be transported out of Tibet via India.  Despite 300
Menon’s suspicions, Delhi agreed to transship Chinese rice to Tibet.  Although Zhou still wanted 301
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to expedite the CCP’s assumption of formal control over Tibet’s foreign relations, he explained to 
Zhang Jingwu that it was now in Beijing’s interest to exchange consulates in order to facilitate vital 
trade and to reassure India.  As a result, on 14 June Beijing proposed that India’s mission in 302
Lhasa should become a consulate and China should receive a consulate in Bombay in return. 
Zhou’s note also said British aggression had scarred Tibet and ‘privileges that arose from the 
unequal treaties between the British government and the old Chinese government were no longer 
in existence, and therefore, the relations between the new China and the new government of India 
in Tibet, China should be built up anew through negotiations.’ The Indians accepted the consulate 
exchange and it was agreed that other issues, such as trade agencies, could be discussed once 
the consulates were established.   But no one queried whether the ‘scar’ of British imperialism 303
ran across the Sino-Indian border.
Ambiguous language and deferral of concrete issues allowed Beijing to remain flexible. Saying that 
Sino-Indian relations in Tibet  would be ‘built up anew’ gave leeway to abrogate the old 
arrangements, including the border treaties imposed by the British, and yet was not explicit enough 
to worry Delhi. Beijing avoided firm concessions of any sort, for instance they ruled out requesting 
a trade agent for Sikkim to avoid giving recognition of India’s claim on that territory.  The indirect 304
language served Beijing’s relations with Lhasa also. Tibetan leaders had notified Beijing of their 
territorial claims against India, including Sikkim and Bhutan, and also announced that Lhasa 
wanted to directly administer Chamdo again. Beijing reassured Lhasa that new China had the 
strength to revise the old treaties, but needed time.  In November, Lhasa announced that they 305
also wanted Tawang, south of the McMahon Line and occupied by India only in 1951, restored. 
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The Chinese regarded this as a deliberate test of Beijing’s legitimacy and stalled by saying they 
were still researching the history.306
Despite the implications of Zhou’s remarks that the ‘privileges’ derived from the old treaties had 
been cancelled, Delhi sought no clarification. In late July, Nehru briefly considered a direct 
approach about the border but quickly reverted to the policy of silence.  He continued also to 307
project public certainty. In August, Nehru wrote to his Chief Ministers that his Tibet policy was to 
give up less vital interests in order to secure good relations with China but that the main interest 
was to secure the border. He said he had made clear several times in Parliament that India 
regarded the McMahon Line as the inviolable border, so there could be no further question on 
that.  So a reckless policy continued despite China’s disparagement of the old treaties on which 308
the McMahon Line was based.
India had initially sought Beijing’s confirmation of the McMahon Line in return for assistance with 
Tibet, but the Chinese had avoided the issue because they they still felt weak in Tibet. However, 
early in 1952 Delhi changed its approach and adopted a policy of diplomatic silence and public 
certainty on the border. While still seeking an understanding over Tibet, Delhi pretended that the 
border was settled. In the meantime, Delhi would build up its presence in the border zones. Beijing 
at first continued to ignore Delhi’s desire to discuss Tibet, but eventually agreed to discuss some 
limited issues. But Nehru’s silence on the border allowed Beijing to also pursue consolidation of 
Tibet and research better its territorial claims. While Nehru thought he was earning China’s trust, 
the ambiguity helped China postpone a genuine border settlement. The fault was on both sides as 
the Chinese took advantage of the silences and assumptions on India’s part to build an expanded 
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sense of what they could claim. Beijing certainly knew what India’s view of the border was as, 
besides Nehru’s public statements, Delhi was deporting Tibetan officials who crossed the border to 
collect taxes in Indian territory.  Equally, India should not have ignored the implications of the 309
Chinese statement that relations would be ‘built up anew’. The mutual duplicity allowed for a few 
years of cautious cooperation but would eventually become a problem when their respective efforts 
to consolidate their border zones collided.
Ambiguous Cooperation
The duplicity and silences woven through interactions over Tibet, the Himalayan region in general 
and the border specifically were characteristic of the ambiguity that marked broader Sino-Indian 
diplomacy during the Korean War. A powerful element of this ambiguity was that Nehru’s 
encouragement of Beijing’s supposed latent, Asian moderation and his desire to socialise it to the 
international system, was partly driven by a desire to disrupt the Moscow-Beijing axis. Beijing 
meanwhile was deeply skeptical of Indian motivations on ideological grounds, but overcame this to 
exploit Delhi’s desire to be useful. Throughout this period reasons to be wary of Beijing and 
question the possibility of influencing it would emerge, but Nehru’s commitment to his overall 
strategy was never destabilised by such dissonance for long. 
In early 1951 Beijing decided to build on the stabilisation of relations that had followed the 
excitement over Tibet and seek a major improvement in ties with Delhi. Beijing benefitted from 
Washington’s insensitive policy towards Delhi. The US had appeared to exploit Indian distress at 
the major famine being suffered by explicitly tying potential relief to a more coooperative approach 
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towards the US’s international agenda.  Beijing determined to take a more ‘positive’ stance 310
towards India and this new attitude resulted in the dispatch of three grain shipments and five 
cultural delegations to India through the year.  Most dramatically, on 26 January, Mao made an 311
unprecedented appearance at a party Panikkar hosted at the Indian embassy. The Chairman’s 
speech echoed Indian hopes for Asian cooperation and dangled the prospect of an alliance with 
Russia and China before the Indians, ‘if India, China and the Soviet Union’s relations are good, 
then the world’s problems can be solved. India, China and the Soviet Union have no conflicts 
between them. The relations between them ought to be even better.’  Subsequently, Xinhua 312
News Agency celebrated the warmth of Sino-Indian friendship which could ‘defend the lasting 
peace of Asia and of the whole world’ and extolled the common history of ‘national liberation 
against the long-term aggression of the western capitalist countries’. The British observed that, 
‘China may not have succeeded in splitting the West, but she is certainly well on the way to 
detaching India’.   313
Mao’s gambit was riddled with ambiguities however, with regard to both India and the Soviet 
alliance. One account has characterised China’s diplomacy as fore-shadowing the later post-
Korean War moderate turn, in an effort in 1951 to manage the fall-out from the PLA’s occupation of 
Tibet.  Such a perspective is highly persuasive. The language of Asian fraternity belied a 314
profound ideological scepticism that was shared by Moscow and Beijing. Stalin’s meeting with CPI 
leaders in February 1951 indicated that the Socialist Bloc still hoped that India’s government would 
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be overthrown. Stalin regarded friendship with Nehru as tactical and necessary mainly in order to 
secure China’s position in Tibet.  Mao’s toasting of Panikkar disguised these calculations.315
The common public courting of India also obscured tensions within the Sino-Soviet relationship. On 
the one hand Chinese discussions of India displayed a flexibility alien to Stalin’s two-camp vision. 
In September, Zhou explained that the ‘two camps’ understanding of global politics was insufficient. 
One also needed to grasp that there were ‘three types’ of country - imperialist, fraternal, and 
‘vacillating’.  India, Burma and Indonesia belonged to this third group, controlled by imperialism, but 
not beneficiaries of war.  Others, like the UK and France, wanted to preserve the status quo. Such 
an analysis gave Beijing far more flexibility than Stalin’s rigid, polar understanding of global 
confrontation, and thus the opportunity to pursue an independent policy. It was also consistent with 
Beijing’s early opinion, as Zhou told staff at the Foreign Ministry in March 1950 that ‘from India to 
Japan, we need to do some work, to expand our camp’.  316
In addition, the Sino-Soviet joint pursuit of India obscured a subtle conflict for influence over the 
CPI. When Stalin met with the CPI in February 1951 he tried to discredit the CCP as a model for 
India. He denounced the former CPI leader Ranadive for his leftist attacks on Mao and pointed out 
that the Indians ought to follow the current ‘Chinese path’ of moderate and gradual change and 
eschew any hasty move to ‘socialist revolution’. Stalin’s point was that the CPI should follow the 
CCP’s example only in its submission to Soviet policy preferences. He explained the CPI should 
not pursue a Maoist strategy of rural insurrection but should work in the cities also. Stalin said 
Mao’s success was highly contingent, the latter would have worked in the cities if he could, and he 
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had enjoyed a secure rear in the USSR. The CPI had no similar strategic asset.  That the CPI 317
cancelled the Telengana insurgency in October was no doubt linked to Moscow and Beijing’s 
desire to placate Nehru, but also indicated that Stalin was reasserting control over the Indian 
comrades.318
India’s engagement of Beijing was crafted to influence the PRC into distancing itself from 
Moscow’s extremism, thereby cooling the temperature of global politics. At the peak of the Korea 
and Tibet crises Nehru diagnosed an ‘identity’ in Sino-Soviet foreign policy, with China cut off and 
dependent on Moscow. He foresaw a weakening of this bond if tensions eased and expected 
China to resist Soviet influence in the long run.  One Indian diplomat’s concern that the PRC was 319
proving resistant to Nehru’s policy indicated that the goal of subverting Sino-Soviet relations 
remained.  YD Gundevia, Counsellor to the Indian Embassy in Moscow, perceived a ‘dangerous 
echo’ of the Soviets in all that China said, and possibly did.  He ended a letter to Delhi thus, 
We have had great hopes in China. We still have them. There may be explanations for 
China’s intransigence, but that does not explain away the fact of the typical Communist 
intransigence that she has repeatedly exhibited in recent months… I am not for giving up 
hope, but I do feel that hard facts must gradually and even reluctantly compel us to curtail 
them – the hope of an Asiatic Tito rising in the east, which we all so deeply cherish.  320
This frank assessment contradicted the effusive language of Panikkar’s dinner in Beijing and 
showed the Indians were still trying to detach Beijing from Moscow. The problem was that Delhi 
rarely allowed ‘hard facts’ to challenge its underlying strategy.
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While Delhi pinned hopes for socialist bloc moderation on China, Pandit was trying to cultivate cool 
heads in Washington, despite the US media’s ‘hymn of hate’ against India.  Certain contacts 321
bolstered the belief in India’s moderating mission. Pandit reported that Robert Oppenheimer, the 
US nuclear physicist and former head of the Manhattan Project, was begging India to maintain its 
foreign policy and also withhold its thorium supplies from the US to thwart the ‘horrible and deadly’ 
work to develop new powerful weapons.  Nehru replied on 8 March assuring Pandit they would 322
‘take no step’ regarding thorium, and suggested she meet Oppenheimer again.  While there is no 323
evidence that communications with Oppenheimer went any further, this episode underlined the 
morality of Nehru’s foreign policy and cemented his sense of purpose in trying to win China’s trust.
Nehru’s justification for Delhi’s rejection of the Japan peace treaty illustrated the gulf between his 
and Chinese perceptions of Moscow. Despite the hidden agendas Chinese diplomats welcomed 
Delhi’s emphasis on Beijing’s responsibilities in the region and they agreed that the proposed 
treaty was a scheme to ‘divide Asians’.  The Indians explained that they rejected the treaty 324
because it was an affront both to Japanese and Chinese sovereignty and declared that by refusing 
to sign the treaty Delhi had burnished its independence.  Nehru had resisted significant pressure 325
from Pandit and Bajpai who feared further damage to relations with Washington.  But Nehru 326
insisted he would not ‘turn a political somersault’ and abandon Indian independence by signing the 
treaty, which would also mean ‘a break with China’.  He justified this move in terms of carving out 327
middle ground between the two extremes of the West, busy re-arming the old fascist states, and 
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the Soviets, who were pursuing ‘Communist expansionism’.  Nehru then imagined he was 328
securing Beijing’s loyalty to this moderate centre manned by Asian states, utterly failing to realise 
Beijing’s ongoing ‘identity’ with Moscow.  
The ambiguous cooperation on high politics was threatened by more straightforward problems 
regarding frontier consolidation and regime legitimacy. In September, a party of muslim Kazakh 
refugees from Xinjiang arrived in Indian-controlled Kashmir. Initially Beijing seemed content for 
India to disarm and manage the group appropriately.  However, in November, a Chinese cultural 329
delegation’s scheduled visit to Kashmir was suddenly cancelled. The reasons were unclear, but the 
Indians and British assumed it was related to the Kazakh refugees, and that Beijing wished to 
obscure the fact that its rule in China’s Muslim borderlands was disputed.  A panegyric in the 330
Chinese press marvelling at the liberated lifestyle now enjoyed by Kazakhs in the grasslands 
seemed to confirm this was a propaganda issue.  India’s own intelligence assessment surmised 331
Beijing was pettily protesting the sanctuary given to the Kazakhs.  The incident revealed a basic 332
hesitation on both sides to give unambiguous endorsement of the other’s regime.
Delhi’s suspicion of Chinese subversion within India adding a layer of ambiguity to relations with 
Beijing. Indian Intelligence closely tracked the Chinese Cultural Mission’s tour of India and all its 
interactions with local communists. It was assumed that instructions were being given to Indian 
communists. One report concluded by querying the legitimacy of the delegation and its relationship 
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to the CPI: ‘According to reliable information, the cultural department, Peking, sent a sum of Rs. 
273,000/- to the Chinese delegation through the Chinese Consulate Calcutta, and the Chinese 
Embassy New Delhi. The Chinese delegates were guests of the government of India and the 
purpose for which such a huge amount was sent to them remained obscure.’  The IB was 333
probably the Indian institution most hostile to both communists and Chinese in India, but such 
reporting nevertheless would have kept the threat of Chinese communist subversion at the front of 
ministerial minds. The Director of the IB (DIB) had a close relationship with Nehru, and so he would 
have been fully aware of these suspicions. Of course, one aspect of Nehru’s policy to develop 
relations with the PRC was to obviate its desire to fund the CPI, but he under-estimated Beijing’s 
commitment to the spread of global revolution.
In April 1952 Nehru sent a delegation headed by his internationally respected sister Vijayalakshmi 
Pandit to China to inculcate more sympathy between Delhi and Beijing. Part of her brief was to 
relay messages from the Americans and she was also carefully briefed on the Tibet question in 
case the Chinese broached the subject.  However, her main task was to paint a more appealing 334
picture of India and refute various themes of communist propaganda. Provided with sheets of 
statistics, one goal was to explain that contrary to Beijing’s scepticism Delhi was successfully 
reducing the influence of foreign capital in India. Furthermore, Pandit was to defend the reputation 
of Indian democracy. The CPI had recently intensified its attacks on India’s electoral system as a 
charade and Delhi believed Beijing and Moscow were supporting this. Pandit was to point out that 
‘several Ministers’ had lost their seats recently. Finally, she was to reject the slanderous rumour 
 Ibid333
 ‘Telegram from Foreign New Delhi to Indembassy Peking, No. 24917, 1 May 1952’, 1952, Papers relating 334
to Indian Cultural Delegation to China under the leadership by VL Pandit, judicial system in China and 
cultural relations with China in the past, Pandit 2, 23, NMML, 6;   ‘No.401-FS/52, Ministry of External 
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that India was supplying strategic materials to the US.  In essence Pandit was to counter 335
ideological assumptions that non-communist India’s economy was dominated by US capital, that it 
served US foreign policy, and that its political system was rigged. Her other job was to form her 
own impressions of Mao’s Republic.
Pandit’s observations on her tour highlighted profound tensions at the heart of Nehru’s China 
policy. First of all, there was a palpable clash between an ugly authoritarianism and the energetic 
embrace of progressive modernisation. This dissonance struck Pandit in the person of Chairman 
Mao himself when they met in intimate conclave at Zhongnanhai. While Pandit sensed that he 
modelled his regal mannerisms on Stalin he rustically and familiarly urged her to discard feudal 
etiquette and smoke a cigarette with him.  In Delhi, Pandit conveyed her awe and envy for the 336
‘contagious enthusiasm’ the CCP had unleashed for development work. She suggested that it was 
China’s land and marriage reform that had catalysed this energy. However, she also said that the 
CCP’s campaigns did not appeal to ‘democratic methods of thinking’ even if certain ‘evils’ had been 
eradicated and ’efficiency’ raised.  Although inspired by the training of young development 337
workers, she was suspicious of how ‘rigid the “remoulding” process’ was. Nevertheless, she 
thought something similar could be done in line with ‘our own ideology’ to train rural workers in 
India.  The most damning indictment of China’s system however came in a report by one of 338
Pandit’s companions on the tour, Shrimati G Durgabai. Her detailed survey of the PRC’s legal 
system revealed a total absence of legal restraint on the political power of the party.  So while 339
 ‘Ministry of External Affairs, XP Division S Sen,’ 24 April 52, [Contains a note on ‘Communist Propaganda 335
in India’], 1952 Notes/correspondence with K.M. Panikkar, K.P.S. Menon, Y.D. Gundevia regarding V.L. 
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admiring the enthusiasm the Chinese had harnessed for development India’s elite found the 
system which fostered this spirit distasteful if not repellent.
Secondly, this sense that Chinese progress was realised through dubious means buttressed a 
nascent conviction that India must compete with the PRC to define an Asian model of modern 
development. Having visited countless industrial sites, infrastructure projects, schools and training 
centres, Pandit was concerned that China’s success might ‘undermine the appeal of democracy in 
Asia’. She imagined that India faced a profound challenge: ‘[U]unless we can similarly respond to 
our own problems by our own methods of adaptation, assisted by others if need be, we shall not be 
able to withstand the appeal which China must make to the vast population of Asia.’  Although 340
Nehru himself regarded China as an important source of developmental inspiration for India, given 
their common problems and had often justified his policy in those terms, he now also spoke in 
terms of a great contest. If India could liberate its own masses from poverty that would be a great 
victory for democracy, he argued.  So, Delhi seemed to have imbibed a central tenet of the Cold 341
War, that there was an epic clash of social systems underway. Nehru was a partisan for 
democracy, indicated by his warm approval of recent reforms delivered by the UK Parliament.  342
But, for Nehru the contest with China was to provide a model specially conditioned by Indian soil 
that might take root across Asia. He certainly believed that India had its own unique sources of 
energy, exemplified for instance by the land reform campaign of the old Gandhian, Vinoba 
Bhave.343
Finally, Pandit’s delegation perceived an intimacy with Moscow that undermined India’s attachment 
to China as a symbol of Asia’s resurgence. This impression undercut a basic premise of Nehru’s 
 ‘China – The Great Challenge’, Background material on the history and polity of China, sent by the 340
ministry of external affairs to v.l. pandit, Pandit 2, 19, NMML
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policy, that China’s Asian character limited its deference to Moscow. When Pandit visited the Huai 
River Project she responded with prideful reveries: ‘when one saw what had been achieved by the 
Chinese people without any kind of outside assistance or financial help, how 2.5m workers had 
built it within six months, one could not but share in the pride of the Chinese people.’  The 344
Indians seemed desperate to cling to evidence of the indigenous, and Asian, nature of Chinese 
development. Pandit had been given for example an academic paper explaining the classical, 
ancient roots in Mencius and Wang Anshi of the CCP’s recent land reforms.   The Chinese 345
seemed prickly to Indian interest in Soviet assistance, with one Chinese site manager responding, 
‘Our Soviet advisers are in the Soviet Union. They come here when we send for them.’  The 346
group was taken to Manchuria to dispel rumours that it was run by the Soviets.  However, the 347
Chinese were not able to persuade the delegation that Moscow genuinely remained a distant 
partner. For example, while Frank Moraes was vey impressed by the gender equality he saw, he 
echoed Patel’s caution of 1950, warning that Beijing was closer to Moscow than realised, far less 
interested in Asian fraternity than thought and far from respectful of India’s own achievements.  348
Nehru’s confidence in Beijing’s independence from Moscow was prescient, but his assumption that 
this inclined Beijing towards moderation was misplaced. In fact the CCP and CPSU competed to 
influence the CPI’s ideological direction. In 1952 some of this tensions became more apparent to 
Indian observers. Moraes interpreted the Asian and Pacific Regional Peace Conference, held in 
Beijing in October, as a reflection of the CCP’s desire to establish Asian leadership. He reported on 
Moscow’s sceptical response to the conference and the care taken by Soviet theorists to reject the 
idea that China was an ‘obligatory model’ for Asian communist parties. Moraes noted that it was 
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said that in India, ‘we have seen the full error of mechanically applying the experience of the 
Chinese revolution’. The Soviet conclusion seemed to be that China’s experience must ‘not be 
made a fetish applicable to all situations in Asian countries.’  Moraes’s observations therefore 349
threw doubt on the assumption that Chinese nationalism created a fertile soil for Nehru’s Asian 
fraternity. He argued that Beijing wanted to lead in Asia, but it also wanted to compete ideologically 
with Moscow.
Despite Moraes’s views, Delhi remained certain that Moscow was more of a danger than Beijing. 
Nehru had said in August that the USSR was the source of ‘communist expansionism’.  In the 350
latter part of 1952 Indian Home Minister, H.V.R. Iyengar, grew hugely agitated by Moscow’s 
pressure on the CPI to adopt more aggressive tactics.  He was especially worried by the recent 
CPSU conference and Stalin’s conclusion that ‘Soviet Russia would henceforth give greater 
support to foreign Communists and democratic parties in their struggle for liberty and peace.’  351
Iyengar, was less alarmed by Beijing’s conference, which he saw as mainly propagandist, and less 
likely to have served as a conduit for instructions to the CPI.  352
In the final months of 1952 Nehru’s failure to mediate over the issue of Korean War PoWs 
highlighted his limited influence over Beijing and the contrasting intimacy of Sino-Soviet 
collaboration. There were various signs through the summer that Beijing would resist Indian 
persuasion. Pandit had failed to encourage a more flexible view and Zhou himself had rejected this 
while communist forces were under pressure.  In addition, Nehru observed the strengthening of 353
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Sino-Soviet ties as a raft of new agreements emerged.  By October, the Chinese had regained 354
the initiative on the Korean battlefield, reinforcing their recalcitrance at the talks.  However, Nehru 355
continued mediating sustained by a conviction that the UN must engage with issues of war and 
peace to avoid irrelevance.  In fact, there was even some sympathy in Delhi for China’s public 356
position regarding the PoWs.  So, Delhi tried to develop a mutually acceptable plan in November 357
and communicated closely with Beijing while formulating a proposal.  The Indians believed that 358
Beijing had encouraged them to expect a compromise.  However, on 24 November the Chinese 359
suddenly announced that they could not support Delhi’s plan.  Nehru’s spirits fell. It had been 360
clear to him all along that the US favoured the continuation of conflict.  But China’s rejection was 361
a shock. Only a few days previously he had thought Beijing would accept India’s resolution.362
Indian diplomacy was in disarray. But it was China’s retreat from the reassurances it had given that 
stung most. Sino-Soviet partnership seemed as strong as ever and Nehru’s China policy a case of 
dead-end. The Indians noted that the whole event had left the Soviets suspicious of them, while 
the US thought it had outmanoeuvred Delhi into lining up on its side.  But, while Moscow’s 363
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reaction ‘irritated’ Nehru, Iyengar told the British, ‘he [Nehru] was even more deeply offended by 
the attitude of Peking.’ The Indians worried that they had damaged their reputation for non-
alignment, noting that Moscow commented that in the event of war India would at best be an 
unfriendly neutral.  The basis of Nehru’s policy was challenged. He reflected in early December, 364
‘One gets the impression that China’s final attitude was partly at least governed by Soviet advice or 
pressure’, and it seemed Beijing was ‘more closely associated with the Soviet Union than might 
have been thought’.  Zhou formally rejected India’s resolution in mid-December, saying ‘this 365
illegal resolution, stripped of its disguise, is actually nothing but a revamped version of the 21-
nation proposal submitted by Dean Acheson to the Political Committee of the General Assembly on 
24 October.’  Internally the Chinese regarded India as ‘deceptive’ and ‘two-faced’.  Meanwhile, 366 367
Beijing was itself preparing for renewed conflict with the US in Korea following the inauguration of 
the incoming Eisenhower administration, and Mao consequently requested more aid from Stalin.368
A powerful ideological faith set the limits of China’s friendly attitude towards India. Despite the 
desire to draw India into an anti-US front, the revolutionary overthrow of Nehru’s government 
remained a long-term goal. However, Nehru’s own cooperation with Beijing also masked a 
fundamentally hostile scheme. Nehru was anti-communist but firmly believed that cooperating with 
Beijing would cool its revolutionary fever and integrate the PRC into the international system and 
so diminish the appeal of the alliance with Moscow. Nehru believed international stability was 
threatened most by the dangerous extremists in Washington and Moscow and he imagined that 
because Beijing’s revolutionary zeal was tempered by its nationalism it could also be a bulwark of 
moderation. The mutual suspicion underlying these conflicting goals manifested in petty clashes 
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like over the Kazakh refugees and Kashmir, and the Indian fears that the Chinese channelled funds 
and advice to the CPI. Delhi’s diplomacy, best symbolised by Pandit’s tour, aimed at continuing 
Panikkar’s mission to show Beijing that neutrality was possible. The Indians wanted to demonstrate 
that Beijing’s ideological dismissal of India was misplaced, their development path had prospects 
and they were not dependent on the US. But India was nonetheless increasingly aware of an 
unpleasant radical authoritarianism in China that implied it was closer to Moscow than Nehru 
hoped. As a result, the Indians grew to regard themselves as in a contest with China to provide a 
more democratic model of development for Asia. Subsequently the violent rejection of India’s plans 
to resolve the PoW problem rocked Nehru’s confidence that Beijing was both amenable to reason 
and willing to diverge from Moscow.
Conclusion
Sino-Soviet attacks on India continued at high intensity into January 1953 underlining how 
powerfully the Socialist Bloc alliance congealed around the Korean War regardless of Delhi’s 
efforts.  Nehru was downcast and he was briefly minded to refocus on domestic development,  369
‘[f]oreign entanglements’, he suggested, were a distraction. However, the Indian Prime Minister 
quickly recommitted to his approach because he regarded it as India’s ‘destiny’ as an ‘independent 
country’. The Congress Party then reconfirmed its support for Nehru’s foreign policy, in particular 
the importance of the PRC entering the UN’s various bodies.370
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Nehru clung to his central argument that the PRC’s admission to the UNSC would ease the bitter 
polarisation of international politics. This seemed eminently practical because, outside of this 
international forum, the PRC was likely to be more fearful and less predictable. Moreover, it was 
also a point of simple justice that the body exercising authority over the mainland of China ought to 
be acknowledged as its legitimate government. Nehru’s undeniable idealism was manifest in his 
private insistence that India defer its undoubted right to a seat in the UN Security Council until the 
more critical question of China’s representation had been resolved. But the idealism blended with a 
realist emphasis on India’s broadest interest in a stable international system which incorporated 
China as a great power. It was this imperative that dominated Nehru’s consistent response to the 
evolution of the Korean War and Tibet problem in 1950. Nehru believed that if the PRC was 
placated and brought into the international system then it would far less likely to lash out.
China’s leaders could not appreciate their centrality to Nehru’s strategy. Beijing just did not 
recognise the value that Delhi placed on the UN. While Nehru critiqued the very concept of alliance 
arguing this was a fundamental cause of instability, the Soviet alliance was Beijing’s anchor in a 
world of threats. Even if the PRC had been admitted to the UN its prioritisation of the socialist bloc 
would not have diminished. Therefore, India was peripheral to China’s central strategy. Beijing’s 
revolutionary aspirations for India sharply contradicted the policy of friendship begun in early 1951. 
At the same time the centrality of India to international communism’s plans for continued revolution 
was an issue in which Sino-Soviet tensions could be observed. Although unwitting, this partly 
justified Nehru’s faith that Beijing could be drawn away from Moscow. But his analysis of the Sino-
Soviet embrace was misguided, he thought Beijing could be wooed away as it was the less 
passionate partner, not realising that it was competition that would drive them apart.
Beijing’s scepticism of India had a more concrete source in the threat Delhi posed to Tibet. 
Beijing’s suspicions eased when it appeared that the Indians had conceded the former’s full 
sovereignty in Tibet. However, it was clear in private that Nehru continued to think that Tibet should 
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have a separate and special status within the PRC and this was made plain by his attempt to 
dissuade Beijing from taking military action. Although Beijing reacted with outrage, it was soon 
decided to restore relations in the interests of focusing China’s energy against the US, but also 
because cooperative relations with India served the stabilisation of Tibet. But Beijing always 
regarded the Indians as ‘two-faced’, and with good reason. Many Indian officials were far less 
enthusiastic than Nehru to retreat from Tibet, and even he thought it was reasonable for India to 
maintain some influence.
Broader Himalayan questions related to the fate of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, and the border itself, 
formed additional obstacles to trusting long-term cooperation. Nehru’s attitude to the sovereignty of 
the border states looked unfriendly to Beijing as well as hypocritical and was an implicit challenge 
to China’s absolute rights in Tibet. The failure of both sides to confront the ambiguous issue of the 
border created an underlying instability that would plague relations. In particular, Nehru’s strategy 
of reassuring the public that there was no problem would ultimately make him a hostage to 
nationalist sentiment. Beijing meanwhile was happy to exploit the nebulous state of the border 
discourse to research its own position and quietly consolidate its key claims.
 
Beside the clash of these hard interests, Delhi’s strategy of socialising the PRC was riven by acute 
tensions. Not only were there real doubts about the feasibility of appealing to China’s Asian 
flavoured nationalism in order to dilute its bonds to Mosccow, but increasingly Delhi came to 
observe that, like Moscow, there was a profoundly radical and authoritarian system being 
developed in the PRC. As a result, the conviction was taking root amongst many senior Indian 
figures, including Nehru, that India had an obligation to compete with China to project an 
alternative, democratic model of development for Asia. Of course, this was not simply a case of 
being an Asian democracy, Nehru’s sense of India’s unique mission went beyond this. He also 
wanted to develop an approach to economic development more in tune with Asia and that 
harmonised the extreme alternatives offered by the Cold War.
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Chinese leaders, gripped by their ideology had no sympathy for Indian innovations in economic 
development or politics. However, Beijing’s pragmatic engagement encouraged the Nehruvians to 
think that their policy of socialising the PRC had potential. But the vast gulf which remained was 
hard to breach. A powerful distrust of the Chinese as communists remained in India, demonstrated 
rather starkly by the wife of ambassador Panikkar, who in one incident panicked that her husband 
might not be returned if he responded to a midnight call to visit to Zhou.  The Chinese leaders 371
were a tight-knit group of guerrilla strategists and revolutionary theorists who had discovered 
through their own experience the political benefits of violent struggle. However, Nehru saw this not 
so much as a reason to shun China but rather a compelling reason to embrace it.  He believed his 
mission was to show them that the paranoid fear of the guerrilla fighter should now give way to the 
sober moderation of the statesman. Nehru perceived all of Beijing’s violence in language and deed 
as simply a response to ongoing isolation. So, the PLA’s march into Tibet, the confrontation with 
the US in Korea, and the several bitter denunciations of India, were all judged by the Indian Prime 
Minister to justify his policy to cultivate Beijing’s latent moderation. Nehru failed to realise that 
rather than being an aberration caused by the baleful impact on the international environment of 
the real extremists in Moscow and Washington, Beijing’s periodic outbursts of hostility towards 
India reflected sincere ideological conviction. 
 Panikkar, 1955, 109371
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Chapter Three - A Moderate Friendship? 1953-56
Introduction
Shortly after Stalin’s death in March 1953 Beijing and Moscow began to engage with Asia 
under the language of peaceful coexistence.  Together the communist allies projected a 372
moderate image in order to expand a diplomatic front in non-socialist Asia. Therefore, 
Beijing took a more friendly approach to India, dropping the castigation related to the 
Korean PoW issue and largely adopting its plan to resolve that deadlock.  Mao explicitly 373
revived talk of the ‘intermediate zone’ and the international united front, positing that 
Beijing’s strategic imperative was to rally those countries between the Cold War camps to 
collectively resist US imperialism. India’s size made it a critical component of this project 
and also made it the gateway to expanding relations throughout Asia.  India’s  centrality 374
to this strategy produced an Indian consciousness within Sino-Soviet interactions, 
symbolised by Anastas Mikoyan, the senior Soviet leader, greeting the Chinese comrades 
at Beijing airport in Spring 1956 with palms in a prayer pose, imitating an Indian 
namaste.375
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Nehru welcomed this new approach and credited his longstanding policy of engaging the 
PRC and Moscow.  Nehru did not think the change was simply due to the demise of 376
Stalin, as the old man had recently hinted at a softening view of India.  The Indian Prime 377
Minister ascribed the ongoing improvement in the international atmosphere to Moscow and 
Beijing’s initiative and talk of peaceful coexistence.  His enthusiasm for this trend was 378
compounded by his view of the US, which declined from dismay to outrage through 1953. 
In Nehru’s view US policy increasingly appeared to obstruct reconciliation, decolonisation 
and Asian independence.  The US’s China policy particularly frustrated and at times 379
outraged the Indians.  American scepticism of Indian impartiality was also increasingly 380
public.  Moreover, Nehru thought the US’s military supply agreement with Pakistan 381
showed Washington was now actually targeting India.  Nehru was also alarmed by 382
American influence in Nepal, a country with which India believed it had special relations.  383
These concrete threats to Indian interests contrasted with China’s efforts to encourage 
reconciliation on the sub-continent.384
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The Sino-Soviet policy to assure the world of their commitment to peaceful coexistence 
was simply a convenient posture. Khrushchev denied it, but the 1920 Leninist origin of the 
policy of peaceful coexistence had simply been tactical cover for the Red Army’s retreat 
from Poland.  In 1953, behind this updated facade of moderation, Beijing and Moscow 385
continued to prepare overseas communist parties for revolution.    Faith in the Marxist 386
creed meant a cast-iron confidence in the ultimate victory of the revolutionary cause, and 
so Beijing and Moscow could afford a pause after the Korean War to regather their 
strength. Furthermore, the apparent shelving of revolutionary ambition was belied by the 
simple fact that even the strategy of the intermediate zone and the international united 
front remained at their core policies derived from the radical ideology of class struggle.387
Besides the latent question of whether Moscow and Beijing could maintain agreement on 
their degree of moderation, the new approach had immediate implications for Sino-Soviet 
cohesion. For instance, Beijing's emphasis on the intermediate zone implicitly downgraded 
the centrality of the Soviet alliance and socialist bloc in Beijing’s strategic thinking.  In 388
addition, an emphasis on inter-state over inter-party relations also implied a threat to the 
cohesion of the Socialist Bloc.  The fact that Beijing had mulled a change in approach 389
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before Stalin’s death also suggested some desire to carve an independent path.  Finally, 390
Mao’s eulogy to Stalin hinted that he might seek more influence over international 
communism.  Clearly then, the new foreign policy posture carried dangers for the Sino-391
Soviet alliance.
Nehru’s policy towards the PRC and socialist bloc also contained certain ambiguities. He 
had always assumed that Beijing could be levered away from the radicals in Moscow. In 
April 1953, Nehru reconfirmed his goal of easing the PRC’s isolated dependency on 
Moscow, even suggesting that the Soviets wanted the PRC outside of the UN to preserve 
the Soviet dependency.  In December, Nehru explained that the ‘Asian’ conception of 392
international relations emphasised independence.  There was a contradiction here 393
because, although Nehru perceived Beijing through his own anti-colonial mindset, at the 
same time he observed that Mao’s stature might now change the balance of Sino-Soviet 
relations.  Furthermore, a growing sense of Moscow’s relative moderation would 394
increasingly contradict Nehru’s basic approach to China. In fact, Nehru failed to envision 
that Chinese nationalism might lead the PRC ultimately in a more radical direction. In 
addition, Nehru had a basic mistrust of ‘expansionist’ Moscow and Beijing.  Engagement 395
with distrusted counter-parts was however at the core of Nehru’s non-alignment, which he 
conceived of as an exercise in socialisation, trust building and dissipation of fears. This 
was the doctrine of ‘right means’ applied to international politics.
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Sino-Indian relations can be analysed in the period following the Korean War from the 
perspective of three subjects. Firstly, the specific concerns symbolised by and evolving 
from the 1954 agreement over Tibet . Secondly, the theory and practice of the package of 
principles that emerged from that agreement, known as the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, or Panchsheel. Finally, the new strategic importance of economic 
development in the Cold War. The tensions arising form the interplay of these different 
concerns became acute but were resolved in 1956 once they climaxed with widespread 
instability across Tibet and within the socialist bloc.
The formal agreement reached between Delhi and Beijing over Tibet in April 1954 provided 
a platform for developing relations but also symbolised the collaborative, competitive, and 
catalysing relationship between their imperial projects.  The preceding talks confirmed 396
Delhi’s concession of British India’s rights in Tibet, and the agreement articulated the ‘Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ (later often referred to by the Sanskrit term 
panchsheel) , which provided the logic for India’s withdrawal from Tibet, and were deemed 
to be the basis of future Sino-Indian relations.  However, this apparently straightforward 397
arrangement was riddled with problems. Neither side confronted the border issue. The 
agreement was something of an imperial concord, a compromise between the ‘internal 
colonialism’ underway on either side of the Himalayas. Nehru realised that for India to 
consolidate its own interests such as the border, and control of the Himalayan border 
states, he had to cooperate with PRC control of Tibet. But he wanted a system of limited 
 Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Trade and 396
Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India, Peking, 29 April 1954, UN Treaty Series, 
Volume 299, No. 4307, 1958.
 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were: mutual respect for each other’s territorial 397
integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal 
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.  
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sovereignty in the Himalayas. If India accepted Tibet’s autonomous position within the 
PRC, Beijing would have to recognise India’s pre-eminence in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim.
For its part, Beijing saw the agreement as a pillar of a policy of a moderate united front to 
effect rapid consolidation of Tibet. Moderation in the international and Tibetan sphere 
reinforced each other. The Indians and Tibetans were encouraged to think that the test of 
Tibetan autonomy, and Chinese moderation in general, would be Lhasa’s right to delineate 
the timing and extent of reform. Thus, Sino-Indian relations were hostage to the CCP’s 
desire to defer progress in Tibet. Ultimately, this would become an issue of sovereignty, 
when Mao decided that only revolutionary methods would properly integrate Tibet and that 
moderation and autonomy were allowing Tibetan reactionaries to resist Beijing.
The Five Principles were regarded as the foundation of a shared approach to international 
affairs. However, in theory and practice these principles implied major tensions and 
contradictions. Not least, Nehru’s imagined system of limited sovereignty in the Himalayas 
was directly contradicted by the explicit emphasis of absolute sovereignty dictated by the 
Five Principles.  In addition, this emphasis and the practical deployment of these principles 
as a tool for expanding Beijing’s diplomacy in Asia, logically contradicted the proletarian 
internationalist duty to support revolution and submit to the international socialist hierarchy. 
A policy that emphasised moderation and the rights of the nation-state undermined the 
rational basis of the Socialist Bloc. Furthermore, Moscow and Beijing would come to 
disagree about the applicability of peaceful coexistence. Delhi firmly regarded these 
principles as universal and the Soviets agreed that the US should be a target for this 
policy. Beijing disagreed and, furthermore, came to suggest that the principles could also 
be applied within the socialist bloc.
Page  116
The third crucial aspect of Sino-Indian relations in the mid-1950s was the question of 
economic development. Beijing’s new emphasis on re-construction provided much 
diplomatic common ground with Delhi. But at the same time also brought new ambiguities. 
India’s ability to exploit the new superpower desire to sponsor Third World development 
led to a dramatic growth in economic ties to the USSR but seemed to muddy the purity of 
relations within the socialist bloc. Even while Beijing had reservations about the ideological 
implications of Soviet aid for India, Mao was nevertheless starting to re-evaluate Soviet 
influence over Chinese development. So, ironically, as Indian and Soviet economic ties 
grew, Mao started to strain against the limits of Soviet guidance, reflecting the triangular 
tensions between Delhi, Moscow and Beijing over Panchsheel. At the same time, Nehru 
had also decided that India was competing to both outperform Beijing’s economic 
performance and to promote its own unique model of development within Asia. While this 
demonstrated that in some ways Nehru accepted the Cold War premise that there was a 
contest underway to define modernity, his intense anxiety to keep up with China damaged 
India’s own planning. The reality was that Nehru and Mao’s view of development was 
starkly different and pointed towards a fundamental clash of world-views.
In 1956 the contradictions of Beijing’s moderate policies would converge in Tibet and 
Eastern Europe. This crucible of ambiguities would clarify one startling point however, that 
was only dimly apparent from Delhi and Beijing’s different views of development. Leaders 
in China and India were operating on utterly opposed views of the driving force of history. 
While the CCP saw class as the key dynamic powering politics, the Indians disagreed 
seeing history rather as the rise and fall of nations. Beijing had suppressed this frame of 
analysis in order to cultivate ties with India but it improved impossible to continue to do so. 
Autonomy for Tibet, a key pillar of Sino-Indian relations, was allowing reactionaries to 
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challenge the CCP with support from overseas class allies. Mao began to think that class 
struggle might better resolve matters in his favour. Furthermore, his ideological impatience 
with the Soviets was growing, they seemed to be adapting themselves to a permanent 
policy of peaceful coexistence, betraying its Leninist origin as a tactical tool. The crises in 
Eastern Europe of 1956 confirmed to Mao that the threat of domestic and international 
class enemies collaborating to undermine socialist governments was more profound than 
he had realised. However, the disruption also showed the danger caused by disunity in the 
socialist camp. Mao chose to repress his misgivings and prioritise bloc unity, reconfirming 
Beijing’s commitment to the socialist hierarchy. 
Tibet, the Himalayas and the contradictions of sovereignty
Delhi sought a settlement over Tibet for a couple of years because it was crucial for 
Nehru’s grand strategy for China to neutralise this contentious issue.  But he also hoped to 
have Beijing acknowledge India’s own interests in the Himalayas. In August 1953, Nehru 
returned to the Tibet issue even before the new relationship between Pakistan and the US 
emerged.  In September, India again requested talks with Beijing.  The earlier initiative 398 399
had produced a consulate exchange in 1952,  but Nehru wanted to settle other issues, 400
including the facilities in Tibet inherited from the British. He called these ‘old-time 
 ‘Residual Problems Regarding Tibet’, 30 August 1953, JNSW, Vol.23, 484398
 ‘Message to Chou En-lai’, 1 September 1953, JNSW, Vol. 23, 485399
 See Chapter 2400
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privileges’, meaningless in the ‘present day’ once they had conceded China’s sovereignty 
in Tibet.401
Nehru was happy to concede old interests to an autonomous Tibet but wanted Beijing to 
accommodate India’s own concerns in the Himalayas. In fact, the implication of Nehru’s 
approach to the Tibet talks was that China and India would acknowledge a system of 
graded sovereignty across the Himalayan region within which Delhi and Beijing would 
dominate respectively Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim and Tibet. When first contemplating the 
talks, Nehru had said that in the future he wanted India’s ‘special position in the border 
states’ recognised.  Nepal, the most significant of these border states was ‘[n]ot quite a 402
foreign country’, but a critical strategic interest for India and the exclusion of China and 
others from there was a key goal.403
The content of the final treaty appeared to confirm that Beijing had acquiesced to a system 
of fluid sovereignty. The agreement seemed to dilute the usual authority of the state to 
control border movement and made concessions to those engaged in cross-border travel 
deemed traditional and in line with ‘custom’. The particular beneficiaries were Lamaist, 
Buddhist and Hindu pilgrims travelling in either direction or else ‘[I]nhabitants of the border 
districts’ habituated to cross-border travel, and traders ‘customarily’ involved in cross-
border trade. Such individuals and their families would be subject to very limited 
documentary requirements.  The consideration for religious activity especially was a 404
useful manifestation of the CCP’s new image, and confirmed in Indian minds that China 
 ‘Note 46’, 1 December 1953, JNLCM, Vol. 3, 453401
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 ‘To BK Gokhale’, 15 September 1953, JNSW, Vol. 23, 468-471; Also see, Nepal - and Indo-403
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respected Indo-Tibetan cultural relations and would allow the continuation of traditionally 
fluid sovereignty across the Himalayas.
The sense of compromise led Nehru to relax his insistence on describing Beijing’s 
relationship with Lhasa in terms of ‘suzerainty’. He suggested the distinction with 
‘sovereignty’ was irrelevant because in practice Tibet had always exercised significant 
autonomy and would continue to do so.  However, Nehru’s conception of a system of 405
limited sovereignty was contradictory in a number of ways. Despite the Tibet agreement’s 
implicit acknowledgment of PRC sovereignty, Delhi believed that the 1951 agreement 
between Beijing and Lhasa guaranteed Tibet’s autonomy, and that retained its traditionally 
flexible relationship with China.  The Indians appeared to hope that Beijing’s relations 406
with Lhasa would mirror Delhi’s relations with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. But this 
demonstrated a striking failure to grasp the CCP’s commitment to modern, absolute 
sovereignty. India may have been happy to continue Raj-style domination of the border 
states, but the PRC leaders wanted full integration of Tibet, even if fundamental change 
could be deferred. The impression that the PRC had moderated its revolutionary 
aspirations added to Indian expectations that this compromise was possible.
Ill-conceived as it was, Nehru’s effort to forge an imperial settlement was also undermined 
by Delhi’s indirect approach. Rather than seek a candid discussion of Indian interests, 
Nehru continued the policy of silence begun in 1952. Delhi pretended to assume that 
China’s lack of response to pronouncements about the McMahon Line indicated 
acceptance.  It was decided that if China insisted on discussing these topics, India’s 407
 ‘The Indo-Tibetan Frontier Issue’, 24 December 1953, JNSW, Vol.24, 579;  see also, ‘India and 405
the International Situation’, 15 May 1954, JNSW, Vol. 25, 397
 Maitra, 1963, 29, 39-40406
 ‘Friendly Policy Towards China’, 25 October 1953, JNSW, Vol. 24, 596407
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delegation would walk out.  Despite growing concern in Delhi about its grip over Nepal, 408
Bhutan and Sikkim,  Nehru also instructed the delegation to avoid discussing these in 409
Beijing.  Delhi tried to trap Beijing into acknowledging the border, and its relations with 410
the border states, by saying the talks included all outstanding issues, therefore these 
queestions, by implication because of their non-inclusion in talks, were considered settled. 
There was some justification for this pretence, as the Chinese had said in 1952 that there 
were no territorial disputes between them, but it was dangerously dishonest 
nonetheless.411
Silence regarding the border was particularly ill-judged. Nehru was quite aware that 
Beijing’s revolutionary nationalism rejected old ‘unequal’ treaties.  However, this 412
engendered no caution regarding the legitimacy of the McMahon Line, confirmed by the 
Simla Treaty of 1914. The contradiction is startling. Aware that the CCP was, at best, 
deeply suspicious of the collection of international legal agreements which had restrained 
previous Chinese governments, Nehru was still content to risk the assumption that Beijing 
would not challenge the legality of a border based on just such an agreement.
 ‘The Beijing Conference’, 3 December 1953, JNSW, Vol. 24, 598408
 ‘Neighbours, Foreign Settlements and Tribals’, 18 June 1953, JNSW, Vol. 22, 522; see also, 409
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The policy of silence was followed in order to consolidate India’s position in the border 
zones. Nehru keenly felt India’s weakness in this encounter, but identified an opportunity 
due to China’s ideology. Unlike some officials, Nehru saw no direct Chinese threat to 
India’s North East. But, he thought, Delhi must develop ‘settled conditions within India’s 
border, in areas where the administrative position was weak and the political position was 
only growing’.  India must exploit the ‘contradictions of China’s policy in Tibet’ and so firmly 
integrate its own border zones. Nehru felt that the development of communications 
infrastructure in the border regions but especially ‘winning people there to the conception 
of India’ would guarantee stable relations with China.  He implicitly acknowledged that 413
there was a contest with Beijing for the loyalty of these border peoples.
While Nehru thought the CCP’s radical reputation gave India an advantage in the contest 
for the border peoples, Delhi’s weakness was exactly the lack of an ideology of unity or 
indeed some justification for its arbitrary boundaries.  The increasingly violent response 414
to the Naga problem would evince, for example, Delhi’s shortage of legitimacy in the North 
East.  Such weakness was another reason why Nehru adopted the policy of silence and 415
hoped to establish a system of graded sovereignty because it gave India time to cultivate 
these peripheral zones and acknowledged that India needed external recognition of its 
imperial claims. Nehru failed to realise that the CCP promise of class liberation was a very 
competitive legitimating ideology.
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Beijing regarded the Tibet talks an important step in the international strategy to form a 
united front against the US.  But in the first instance, the talks would be a crucial 
confirmation of Beijing’s sovereignty in Tibet and begin the process of winding down British 
India’s extra-territorial rights. This was a key goal for the CCP and Zhou had written to 
Nehru in October 1953 that foreclosing these rights would demonstrate their mutual 
respect for each other’s sovereignty.  Beijing was keen to dull the Indian threat. Strategic 416
planning for Tibet often considered the India factor. For instance, in January 1953, Mao 
had selected a longer route for  the Chamdo-Lhasa highway, closer to the Indian border it 
better served national defence.417
Secondly, the talks with India complemented Beijing’s approach to ruling Tibet. The CCP 
had shelved its ideological preferences and was trying to govern via a united front with the 
Dalai Lama and Tibetan elite in charge of ‘political, economic, cultural and religious 
development’.  The termination of India’s extra-territorial rights boosted Beijing’s 418
legitimacy amongst elite Tibetans. Furthermore, a friendly relationship with India reassured 
the Tibetans of Beijing’s sincerity and made India more willing to assist Beijing. After all, in 
the first friendly meeting since the Korean PoW row, Zhou had asked ambassador 
Raghavan for help transhipping Chinese grain to Tibet. So, it was clear that engagement 
with India was linked to a very specific domestic interest, the stabilisation of CCP rule in 
Tibet. 
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Because sound Sino-Indian relations appeared to be premised on Tibetan autonomy, the 
extent of Beijing’s commitment to this autonomy was a critical question. Some major 
recent scholarship takes a sympathetic view of Beijing’s attempt to govern Tibet with a light 
touch.  However, there was a fundamental clash between the CCP’s central ideals and 419
the notion of Tibetan autonomy. Every united front the CCP constructed was conceived of 
as a temporary servant of the ultimate ideological goal to transform China. Claims that 
Tibet could decide for itself what changes to make were contradicted by Mao’s assertion in 
1949 that Tibet would become a ‘People’s Democratic Tibet’. Furthermore, the vaunted 
1951 agreement on Tibetan autonomy had been signed by the Tibetans with Deng 
Xiaoping’s army massed at their border and a crushed Tibetan army in its wake. How 
autonomy would function was demonstrated when the Tibetan Cabinet requested in July 
1954 that the military be reduced. The CCP Work Committee for Tibet rejected the 
proposal as unwise.  Rather than the overall direction of policy autonomy was limited 420
only to its timing.
Beijing’s prioritisation of international factors and Indian cooperation with the stabilisation 
of the united front in Tibet meant that contentious issues were tactically shelved. Zhou 
briefed his negotiating team that although India’s attitude had changed to one of equals, it 
‘still wants to retain some special rights in Tibet. [However], the stronger China grows and 
the more consolidated is the unity of our ethnic groups, then India’s attitude will change.’  
Beijing’s prime purpose was to settle outstanding problems that were ripe for settlement. 
‘Unripe’ questions like the border and McMahon Line could wait for an opportune moment 
and when there was more material available to research China’s claims.  Therefore, 421
 See Melvyn Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, Volumes 1, 2 & 3; also, Khan, 2015.419
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although Beijing knew there were potentially large claims to be made south of the 
McMahon Line and deep into Ladakh,  and some officials wanted to raise these issues 422
with India, Beijing rejected this for fear of destabilising relations with India.  Like India, 423
the Chinese made no explicit reference to the deferral of such important issues. Zhou told 
Delhi they should set up ‘new’ relations in Tibet and settle specific problems such as that 
recently raised by an Indian trade agent.   That building ‘new’ relations implied 424
cancellation of the Simla Treaty was left unsaid
 
Unsurprisingly, after the agreement was reached both sides moved to strengthen their 
positions on the border. Nehru proceeded as if the status quo had been fixed,  ignoring 425
Zhou’s explicit reservations about the McMahon Line made in Delhi in June 1954.  On 1 426
July, Nehru ordered all maps redrawn with the McMahon Line transformed into a settled 
border. He said the frontier was ‘finalised not only by implication in this Agreement but the 
specific passes mentioned are direct recognitions of our frontier there.’ Checkpoints were 
also to be set up in areas of possible dispute. He reiterated the policy of silence on the 
frontier, although acknowledging that India might have to raise the issue of problematic 
Chinese maps in the future.  So Nehru acted as if the border was confirmed but privately 427
he knew this was not the case. Fatefully, by maintaining the projection of public confidence 
in a border settlement, Nehru restricted his leeway for later compromise.
 Ibid, 214422
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Beijing was clear that the Tibet agreement with India was not permanent, implied nothing 
about the border, and was simply a step towards the firm integration of Tibet.  Beijing 428
believed it had won irrevocable recognition of its sovereignty in Tibet from India and so 
responded by removing the responsibility for foreign affairs from Lhasa. However, the 
border remained an outstanding question and the Chinese began researching Tibetan 
territorial claims against India.  That Beijing viewed the border with India and Burma as a 429
delicate problem was clear from the way that Zhang Hanfu’s recommended Zhou visit 
India, despite the risk that the Indians and Burmese might try to raise the border 
problem.  430
Another weakness in Nehru’s notion of an Himalayan compromise was the ongoing 
confusion of Delhi’s Tibet policy. Nehru explained that China was not to be trusted and was 
‘expansive’, but insisted that compromise over Tibet would develop trust. India must, he 
said, consider China’s history of expansionism and ‘fashion our policy to prevent it coming 
in the way of our interests’.  Unfortunately, India’s ability to concede even an 431
autonomous Tibet to China was undermined by the obvious regret of certain officials and 
their sense of contest with Beijing for influence.  And indeed, the Chinese noted the 432
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reluctance of some Indian officials to implement the Tibet agreement.  From Beijing’s 433
perspective, India looked to be seeking to maintain its influence in Tibet.
While Nehru maladroitly sought to concede Tibet to Beijing, he provocatively attempted to 
tie Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim to a state of semi-subjection as the other side of a 
Himalayan compromise.  Shortly after concluding the Tibet agreement, Nehru told 434
Kathmandu he wanted its foreign policy subordination to Delhi confirmed.  Subsequently, 435
throughout 1954 and 1955 Delhi tried to limit Nepal’s diplomatic activities.  Delhi wanted 436
to maintain a traditional system of subordinate states to its north and hoped that China 
acknowledged this and viewed Tibet similarly. Hence there was great disquiet when Beijing 
interfered in Nepalese affairs, traditionally the concern of Lhasa.  Delhi thought an 437
autonomous Lhasa should maintain its own customary relations with its neighbours.
This attempt to maintain something akin to a traditional system of limited sovereignty not 
only clashed with Beijing’s modern conception of binary sovereignty but also contradicted 
Nehru’s anti-colonial reputation and provoked Beijing. To the Chinese, Indian machinations 
in Nepal negated his assertion of friendship and Beijing responded by gradually 
challenging Delhi’s position.  In October 1954, Yuan Zhongxian, China’s ambassador to 438
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India, noted with frustration that the Nepalese were waiting to consult with Nehru before 
replying to China’s official request for diplomatic relations.  In Beijing, Zhou resisted 439
Nehru’s efforts to secure his recognition of India’s rights in Nepal, and only agreed on an 
ad hoc basis to follow the US example and designate China’s ambassador in Delhi 
simultaneously to Kathmandu.   Asked in India about China’s view of Indian interests in 440
Nepal, Nehru said there was no need for formal recognition of this as it was well known.  441
This attitude matched his approach to the border. He thought that his unilateral 
pronouncements were accepted if repeated often enough and were not publicly refuted.442
The Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet was the basis for diplomatic cooperation in the 1950s 
but it was also an imperial concord for the Himalayas. However, the settlement was flawed 
and contest continued alongside collaboration. Nehru sincerely believed it was only 
realistic to concede the old privileges in Tibet. He also imagined that they were adhering to 
a system of fluid, traditional sovereignty across the Himalayas, in which an autonomous 
Tibet reflected the semi-sovereign border states. But Nehru over-estimated Beijing’s 
commitment to Tibetan autonomy and failed to realise that his attitude to the border states 
made him seem like a hostile imperialist. Furthermore, silence over the border undermined 
the longterm viability of this concord and Nehru’s projection of public certainty regarding an 
agreement meant the Indian public were unprepared for any future compromise. While 
Beijing believed the agreement was a plank of it new foreign policy, it was also crucial to 
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get Delhi’s acceptance of Beijing’s sovereignty. Friendship with India boosted the credibility 
of the united front in Tibet and secured Indian assistance with the consolidation of the 
region.  Of course, autonomy was a facade, but in the interests of international factors, and 
Indian cooperation, the Chinese disguised their true ambitions for Tibet and also remained 
quiet about the border. But Nehru’s effort to win Beijing’s trust was undermined in two 
ways. First of all, he failed to implement a Tibet policy that fully reassured Beijing of Delhi’s 
disinterest. And secondly, Indian attempts to dominate Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim looked 
imperialist and specifically hostile towards China.  But there was a genuine degree of 
collaboration nonetheless, and Beijing and Delhi would seek to cooperate further by 
supporting other state-building efforts in the region.
Panchsheel in theory and practice
 
There has been a remarkable longevity to the mistaken idea that India converted the PRC 
to moderation with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.  In fact, Zhou introduced 443
these to Sino-Indian discourse at the first session of the Tibet talks in Beijing, although 
they were only included in the final text at India’s request.  Zhou had thought their 444
inclusion was unnecessary given their presence in the PRC’s temporary constitution.   445
Niu Jun argues that these principles were Beijing’s attempt to find a basis for relations with 
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the non-socialist world.  It was likely, however, that Moscow was the ultimate source, 446
given its influence over the PRC’s first constitution, and because peaceful coexistence 
was, after all, a Soviets doctrine which they re-introduced to international affairs in 1953. 
However, the Indians felt these principles echoed their own thinking so closely that it was 
as if they had converted Beijing.  Nehru appropriated the Five Principles so firmly that he 447
sanctified them with the Sanskrit term, Panchsheel, and by 1955 was proclaiming their 
ancient Indian origin in the rule of the Buddhist Emperor, Ashoka.  The confusion 448
indicates Nehru’s exaggeration of his responsibility for any moderation in Beijing or 
Moscow. 
Whatever the origins of Panchsheel, Delhi and Beijing both prioritised the broad 
international value of the Tibet agreement, which provided the basis for them to rally the 
region against US intervention. Zhou had explained prior to the talks that China’s policy 
was to draw India into opposition to US expansionism.  By April 1954, Delhi and Beijing 449
agreed that Asian unity was the solution to US imperialism’s unprecedented threat to 
Asia.  While the Tibet talks had dragged on,  Nehru, alarmed at the US’s attempt to 450 451
create an anti-communist alliance for South East Asia, urged his Ambassador in Beijing 
that a quick agreement was desirable and would have a ‘salutary effect’ on the forthcoming 
Geneva Conference.  Zhou subsequently told Burmese Prime Minister, U Nu, that he 452
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thought the Five Principles would catalyse greater trust in the region.  At Geneva, the 453
Chinese observed that India had a similar plan to their own and also opposed the US’s 
development of an alliance system in Asia.  So a shared concern with the US intrusion 454
into South East Asia fostered agreement between Delhi and Beijing.
However, Nehru was not only concerned at US belligerence but also Chinese. Therefore 
the restraining effect of these principles on Beijing seemed a major contribution to world 
peace.  For Nehru, the problem with US intervention in South East Asia was that it would 
provoke a PRC to respond and produce another Korean-type war.  Nehru’s more exalted 455
perception of the Five Principles’s value than Beijing had was underlined by his ecstatic 
response to their articulation. He said, ‘We have done nothing better in the field of foreign 
affairs during the last six years than signing this Agreement over Tibet…This agreement is 
good not only for our country but for the whole of Asia and the rest of the world.’  Nehru 456
felt his China policy was vindicated and he coined a new term, ‘collective peace’, an Asian 
contribution to international relations, based on an Asian identity formed by Asian history. 
For Nehru, Sino-Indian relations had become a universal model for best practice in 
bilateral diplomacy.  In Delhi, it was thought they had discovered an antidote to the Cold 457
War.
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1954, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 203-00007-03, 46-57. 
Translated by Jeffrey Wang. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/120364
 Niu, ’Chongjian “zhongjiandidai”’, 250454
 ‘Note 58’, 3 June 1954, JNLCM, Vol. 3, 552455
 Dutt, 1977, 90456
 ‘India and International Situation’, 15 May 1954, JNSW, Vol.25, 397-410; See also, ‘Note 62’, 22 457
June 1954, JNLCM, Vol. 3, 572
Page  131
Nehru believed that regional adherence to the Five Principles would boost trust, create an 
environment conducive to non-alignment, and loosen Chinese ties to Moscow. Beijing’s 
restraint would diminish the risk of US intervention. Therefore, China’s explicit commitment 
to non-interference in India should now be extended to inoculate the region against Cold 
War paranoia. Burma was a case in point. Nehru instructed ambassador Raghavan in 
Beijing that he was to gently explain Burmese fears about Chinese support for rebels in 
Burma, its involvement in the fighting at Dien Bien Phu, and Rangoon’s resentment at the 
recent trade agreement. Raghavan was to advise that fear of China might curtail Burma’s 
non-alignment.  Concurrently, Nehru advised the Burmese to persevere, take confidence 458
from India’s understanding with China, and seek its own Panchsheel agreement with 
Beijing.  In June, one day after a Sino-Indian statement on the Five Principles, Burma 459
and China followed suit.  Thus continued the project of socialising the PRC in order to 460
ease regional paranoia, forestall nations from taking sides in the Cold War, and gently 
undercut Beijing’s isolated dependence on Moscow. 
The Five Principles was a statement of the absolute sanctity of national sovereignty. 
Nehru’s celebration of these principles therefore appears to contradict his well-known 
campaign for an international human rights regime, a form of over-arching world 
government he often referred to as ‘One World’.  At one time, Nehru had actively sought 461
to break down the concept of absolute national sovereignty by forcing the UN to intervene 
 ‘To N Raghavan’, 9 May 1954, JNSW, Vol. 25, 476458
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in South Africa’s development of racist legislation.  So it might appear that his desire to 462
socialise China had led him to a dramatic shift to prioritise national rights. No doubt Nehru 
had become disillusioned with UN impartiality given the impasse over Kashmir and its role 
in the Korean War. But Subimal Dutt explained that Nehru had for some years baseed his 
foreign policy on the spirit of these principles.  Nehru’s joy at reaching the agreement 463
with China suggests it had been a long-standing goal to have Beijing commit itself to 
respect for sovereign limits. The bilateral nature of the Five Principles meant they need not 
impact Nehru’s ultimate goal of a system of international human rights.  A diffuse 464
acceptance of these principles as the basis of bilateral relations would provide a useful 
prerequisite to strengthening the UN.
Beijing’s embrace of the Five Principles and India was neither so novel or indicative of 
genuine moderation as might be assumed. The Five Principles and the new India policy 
are often said to be the critical component of the PRC’s moderate foreign policy after the 
Korean War.  But some have indicated that there were signs of this shift in 1952, with 465
Zhou’s language showing a new emphasis on inter-state over inter-party relations.  466
Furthermore, the policy was underpinned by Mao’s old concept of the intermediate zone. 
In fact, the basis of this new approach to India had been lain in 1951 when Mao attended 
Panikkar’s party in Beijing and encouraged the idea of Sino-Indian solidarity.  Zhou had 467
even emphasised as early as 1950 that the importance of diplomatic work in India was that 
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it would lay the basis for the unity of hundreds of millions of people.  Nevertheless, the 468
policy was clearly a joint project with Moscow.
Logically, Panchsheel displaced the Marxist doctrine of proletarian internationalism 
suggesting that Beijing had accepted the sanctity of the nation-state and renounced the 
export of revolution. However, the apparent moderation was belied by the fact that the 
radical ideology of class struggle remained at the core of this united front policy. While the 
international united front served the international class struggle with US imperialism, 
temporary allies still remained class enemies.  Behind the moderate facade, Beijing and 469
Moscow continued to prepare Asian communist parties for revolution and Mao only ever 
saw moderation as tactical.  So, the idea that Mao had permanently accepted the nation-470
state as the major unit of international affairs was dubious.471
Despite the shared underlying ideology and the fact that Panchsheel emerged within a 
common Sino-Soviet policy, different understandings of how this framework might be used 
created some profound tensions. The emphasis on individual state sovereignty logically 
challenged the notion that socialist states submitted to a hierarchy centred around 
Moscow.  So the embrace of inter-state diplomacy implied a potential threat to this 472
system, and indeed the Chinese came to think that Panchsheel should be applied within 
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the socialist bloc.  Simultaneously, Beijing rejected Moscow’s idea that these principles 473
could be applied to relations with the US because the PRC had a uniquely intimate and 
physical sense of a threat from the US, due to Korea and Taiwan.  This friction between 474
both interests and ideas was a point of potential tension even at this period of highly 
successful Sino-Soviet cooperation, and presaged future disagreements.  
Beijing regarded its new policy as a success. The neutralisation of Indochina at Geneva 
proved that the policy of an international united front, regional promotion of Panchsheel 
and cooperation with India, was effective in isolating the US and relaxing international 
tension.  As a result, Beijing continued to promote this approach with new regional 475
counterparts, urging Thailand that it could follow India’s example and avoid sides in the 
Cold War. Beijing even cooperated with Moscow to order the Malay communists to end 
their insurrection.476
Whatever the latent problems, Sino-Soviet diplomatic cooperation was the chief force 
behind Beijing’s success at Geneva and its warming relations with India.  This new 477
approach delivered the neutralisation of Indochina, relaxed international tensions and 
isolated the US.  Beijing urged other regional actors, like Thailand to copy India’s 478
example and avoid sides in the Cold War. Beijing even cooperated with Moscow to order 
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the Malay communists to end their insurrection.  Soviet enthusiasm for Nehru and 479
Panchsheel only grew, particularly after the US moved to create the South East Asia 
Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Moscow told the Indians they regarded the Five Principles 
and Sino-Indian relations as bulwarks of Asia’s resistance to the US and proposed they 
also make a Panchsheel agreement with Delhi.  In October 1954, Moscow and Beijing 480
made a joint commitment to basing relations with Asian states on Panchsheel.  Hand in 481
hand, the comrades courted non-socialist Asia and assured the region that revolution was 
not for export,  but secret support for overseas insurrections continued.482 483
Nehru under-estimated the degree of unity in the Sino-Soviet relationship and exaggerated 
his ability to effect moderation in Beijing and Moscow. He did not realise the extent to 
which the Five Principles, and Beijing’s partnership with India were serving joint Sino-
Soviet goals. Nehru over-estimated the significance of India’s role as a channel between 
the US and PRC on the question of US prisoners and its assistance to Egypt in 
establishing relations with Beijing.  Nehru failed to grasp the ongoing influence of 484
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Moscow over Beijing’s foreign policy. For instance, he seemed to credit India rather than 
Moscow for the resumption of ties between Yugoslavia and China.485
However, Beijing’s more visceral sense of a US threat soon undermined its ability to 
reassure both Delhi and Moscow of its moderation. Underlining the PRC’s inability to 
coexist with the US, Beijing had told the Soviets, in late July 1954, that they were planning 
the liberation of Taiwan.   Obviously, this was a long-standing preoccupation, but a 486
proximate cause was the US’s alliance building in Asia after Geneva. In September, the 
PLA began a sustained bombardment of the GMD’s offshore islands, fomenting the first 
Taiwan Straits Crisis.  The ideology of class struggle meant that Beijing could not long 487
ignore the US threat and Mao reminded Zhou in January 1955 that a united front strategy 
should still include an element of confrontation.  Bombing the islands was also a 488
carefully calibrated demonstration to Moscow of the limits of coexistence with the US.  489
Khrushchev wanted CCP support in his own internal struggles, so backed Beijing in face of 
the US’s nuclear guarantee of Taiwan.490
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Nehru did not share Khrushchev’s tolerance but he tried to find a way for Beijing to 
reconcile the Taiwan problem with peaceful coexistence. During his visit to China in 
October 1954, Nehru debated the nature of the US threat and the consequent limitations 
of peaceful coexistence. Mao complained that Beijing could not coexist with the US while it 
was literally invading China in Taiwan. He told Nehru that Panchsheel could only be used 
to reduce fears within Asia.  Zhou explained that coexistence with the US would 491
legitimise the separation of Taiwan and argued with Nehru that the US sought to expand, 
not just maintain, its position.  In February, 1955 Nehru proposed a solution suggesting 492
Beijing use subversion to destabilise Jiang Jieshi, this was a middle way between 
diplomacy and outright war.  Although Nehru tried to find a way for Beijing to achieve its 493
goals in less confrontational ways, there can be no doubt that his sense of China as 
inherently more prone to moderation shifted after the Taiwan Crisis and his close 
encounters in Beijing with Mao’s extreme language about nuclear weapons and the 
progressive nature of war.494
While Beijing’s bellicosity did not prevent Sino-Soviet cooperation it certainly fortified 
Nehru’s resistance to their joint courting. Moscow and Beijing made repeated attempts to 
draw Delhi into a more formal diplomatic relationship, proposing in May, August and 
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November 1954 that they ought to agree a ‘non-aggression’ pact.  Nehru naturally 495
rejected the invitation to align and instead rediscovered an interest in using the 
forthcoming Asian African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, for crafting international 
resistance to US imperialism.  Nehru regarded nonaligned Asia to be the most positive 496
force for peace because they practised ‘right means’, not the Communist powers, which 
had shown themselves to be persistent protagonists in the Cold War at Dien Bien Phu and 
across the Taiwan Straits.497
In some ways the Bandung Conference was a high point of Sino-Indian cooperation. Both 
sides use it to further spread Panchsheel to exclude the US from SE Asia.  Despite the 498
Taiwan crisis, Nehru thought inclusion of the PRC would demonstrate that Asia operated 
outside Cold War paranoia.  In Beijing, Zhou agreed that the Conference would strike a 499
blow against US imperialism and he asked Nehru to support the PRC’s participation.  500
Therefore, Nehru fully backed the PRC’s participation and blocked Pakistan and Ceylon’s 
attempt to invite the GMD. He argued that the conference would promote Panchsheel and 
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reduce fears of China.  Thus Nehru continued trying to socialise the PRC and propagate 501
peaceful coexistence to build trust as an antidote to the Cold War.
A component of Panchsheel based trust-building between China and regional states at 
Bandung was the demarcation of sovereign limits in cases where ambiguity prevailed.  
Similar to the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet, this was to some extent an exercise in 
imperial collaboration.  Nehru believed it was critical for new Asian states to cooperate in 502
pacifying their peripheral zones. Hence, while suppressing the ambitions of the Nagas, he 
had also supported counter-insurgency in Burma and Malaya.  At Bandung, Zhou 503
assured Burma that Beijing was content to divide the Dai ethnic group between it and 
China’s Yunnan province. He insisted that the creation of a Dai Minority Autonomous 
Region was no threat to Burma and that Beijing saw no danger from a similar political unit 
across the border.  Beijing submitted to another limitation of the modern nation state and 504
followed Delhi’s lead to begin relinquishing claims on the loyalty of overseas Chinese so 
cooperating with the nation-building efforts of states like Cambodia, Thailand and 
 ‘Thoughts on Afro-Asian Conference’, 20 December 1954, JNSW, Vol. 27, 107-110; ‘Objective 501
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Indonesia.  The settlement of interests such as these in line with the practice of modern 505
nation states demonstrated Beijing’s moderation and supported its overall strategy.
Beijing’s aim at Bandung was to bolster its moderate image and project its new Asian 
identity that was critical to building the united front.  Moderation was evinced by 506
proclaiming that revolution could not be exported and that communism could not be 
imposed on Tibet. But in particular, the conference was a forum for demonstrating China’s 
Asian identity. The response to the blowing up of the Chinese chartered Indian airliner, the 
Kashmir Princess, which was originally scheduled to carry Zhou to Bandung, showed how 
this identity was used, the importance of Sino-Indian relations to the development and 
credibility of this identity, and how the Taiwan problem was reframed in the process. The 
Chinese said the attack on their chartered plane targeted the Asian African Conference 
and Sino-Indian relations.  The assumed culprits, Beijing’s most intimate enemies, the 507
GMD backed by the US, were characterised as the enemies of India and the whole Asian 
African movement.  Zhou’s eulogy underlined the point: ‘The glorious names of the 
martyrs, will forever be written in the history of the struggle for peace by the peoples of 
Asia and Africa and the world’s advanced members of mankind.’  Taiwan was again 508
confirmed as a colonial problem.  Hence, at Bandung, Beijing offered direct talks about 509
 Abraham, ‘Bandung and State Formation’, 54. See also, Bhagavan, 2013, 87505
 Niu, ‘Chongjian “zhongjiandidai”’, 253-4506
 Ji Pengfei fubuzhang yu yindu zhuhua dashi Laijiawen de tanhua jilu, 12 April 1955, 507
CMFA207-00009-01; then Ji said it was an attack on both China and India by KMT and US agents, 
Ji Pengfei fubuzhang yu yindu zhuhua dashi Laijiawen de tanhua jilu, 13 April 1955, CMFA 
207-00009-02
 20 April 1955, ZELNP508
 Zhou Enlai zongli jiejian yindu zhuhua dashi laijiawen tanhua jilu, 6 February 1955, 509
105-000057-01, CMFA; ‘Mao Zedong  zhuxi tong yindu zhuhua dashi la ku nihelu ji dashi furen 
tanhua jiyao’, 8 December 1955, 105-00055-04, 3, CMFA
Page  141
Taiwan to the US, cutting out the non-state GMD, and burnishing a moderate, conciliatory 
image to the world.  One firm strategic gain from this Asian approach came in the form of 510
a new channel to the US ally Pakistan, a nascent relationship of great significance.511
Nehru thought he could use Bandung to continue to encourage Sino-Soviet moderation to 
dissolve the radical glue binding Moscow and Beijing in an atmosphere of international 
tension.  However, Nehru’s relative perception of Chinese and Soviets interest in 512
confrontation had shifted. Chinese belligerence over Taiwan and Mao’s language 
regarding nuclear weapons and the progressive consequences of war, had induced a 
more cautious view of Beijing. By contrast, Moscow’s recent conciliatory approach to 
international affairs seemed down to Indian influence and their shared understanding of 
peaceful coexistence.  Indo-Soviet relations were increasingly showing more common 513
ground than Sino-Indian relations, despite Nehru’s early expectation that Asian nationalism 
would bring Beijing and Delhi together. Unlike Beijing, Moscow publicly sided with India on 
Goa and Kashmir,. It also privately suggested that Delhi might join the UNSC and 
continued to increase economic aid.  The Indians even speculated that Moscow’s 514
embrace of India was an attempt to balance the PRC.  Nehru therefore explicitly used 515
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Bandung to further encourage Moscow’s commitment to peaceful methods and to desist 
from supporting the CPI and other overseas communist parties.516
Indian leaders were satisfied in the wake of Bandung that it had served their major interest 
in encouraging Moscow and Beijing’s commitment to peaceful coexistence. Dutt concluded 
that India’s primary goal of encouraging Beijing’s moderation was met.  Nehru felt a  517
sense of victory in excising condemnation of Soviet ‘imperialism’ from the conference’s 
Final Communique. He had not wanted any criticism of Moscow to damage its recent 
trajectory, nor put Beijing on the defensive at Bandung, to the detriment of overall unity.  518
Delhi’s confidence in Moscow was quickly confirmed when Soviet Premier Bulganin held a 
reception at his dacha to celebrate the end of the Cold War.  But Nehru did not realise 519
how profoundly Mao thought that peaceful coexistence threatened Beijing’s interests.
Despite Beijing’s announcement that it would discuss the Taiwan problem with the US, the 
sincerity of the turn from belligerence was dubious. After all, Beijing’s creation of the crisis 
had wrested from the Soviets the infinitely valuable commitment to provide nuclear aid.  520
Tension brought results.  So, although Bandung’s Final Communique stated that 
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participants supported disarmament and prohibition of nuclear weapons,  Beijing was 521
actively pursuing its own nuclear weapons programme.  While Beijing’s greed for Soviet 522
nuclear aid thwarted any hopes of drawing it away from dependence on Moscow, the 
Chinese defection from the anti-nuclear campaign was compounded by the horrific nature 
of Beijing’s nuclear doctrine.  Furthermore, Beijing remained deeply sceptical of the 523
leaders of non-socialist Asia, believing they were natural allies of the West.  524
If Beijing’s commitment to confrontation was disguised at Bandung, it overtly differed with 
Delhi on the issue of non-alignment. Beijing did not back Nehru’s vision of Asian non-
alignment or support the specific language of Panchsheel. Preparing for the Conference, 
Beijing decided it would ‘strive to have the Five Principles accepted by even more 
countries in the Asian-African region’ to thwart US expansionism.  However, at Bandung 525
Zhou revealed that he did not regard Panchsheel as sacrosanct: ‘We think, the Five 
Principles form can be modified, items can be added or subtracted, because what we are 
seeking is confirmation of our shared aspirations, in order to benefit the guarantee of 
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collective security.’  As a result, the Final Communique’s principles looked rather different 526
to the Five Principles, and had nothing to do with non-alignment.The fifth of the ten 
Bandung principles read: ‘Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or 
collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.’ Point six was a sop that 
could not disguise that the Asian African movement had collectively agreed that taking 
sides in the cold war was acceptable: ‘Abstention from the use of arrangements of 
collective defence to serve the particular interests of the big powers.’  The Bandung 527
Conference had rejected non-alignment.  528
Delhi regularly over-estimated its responsibility for Beijing’s embrace of Panchsheel and 
more moderate posture after 1953, overlooking Moscow’s role. Although Beijing and Delhi 
shared the view that the Five Principles were a tool to exclude the US from South East 
Asia, the Indian understanding of these principles’ value went further. Nehru believed that 
Panchsheel could help socialise China and make South East Asia safe for non-alignment, 
so stabilising peace in the region, but it was also a universal antidote for wider Cold War 
tensions. Nehru’s belief that his foreign policy was partly responsible for Sino-Soviet 
moderation missed the fact that Beijing’s new approach was not a complete innovation 
and belonged to a joint Sino-Soviet strategy. Furthermore, the very idea of peaceful 
coexistence was only tactical, and Beijing’s underlying ideology remained decisive. 
Although Beijing’s new approach did logically contradict the cohesion of the Sino-Soviet 
alliance and Moscow and Beijing would disagree about the applicability of the Five 
Principles, nevertheless, this was a period of great success for their joint diplomacy. While 
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the Taiwan Crisis and Mao’s belligerent language began to cause Nehru to revise his 
expectation that the Chinese would tend towards moderation, Khrushchev only deepened 
his cooperation with Beijing. Nehru’s response was to revive his interest in the potential for 
Bandung to form an obstacle to US imperialism and encourage the Soviets and Chinese to 
stick with their recent moderation. In many ways, Bandung was a highpoint for Sino-Indian 
cooperation as the PRC’s peaceful integration with the region continued. But in fact Nehru 
was mistaken to think he was successfully prodding Beijing along a more conciliatory path. 
He failed to realise the depth of Beijing’s suspicions of Indian leaders and of Delhi’s closer 
ties with Moscow and encouragement of its less confrontational foreign policy. The Taiwan 
Straits crisis had shown Mao that Cold War tension brought great benefits to Beijing. Thus 
although Delhi was satisfied that Bandung had successfully boosted Moscow and Beijing’s 
commitment to moderation, Beijing was gratified that the Asian African Conference had 
rejected Nehru’s principle of non-alignment, explicitly accepting the confrontational logic of 
the Cold War. As a result of this failure, Nehru’s skepticism of creating a permanent 
machinery for the Asian Africa movement was confirmed.529
Development
The question of economic development became complicated common ground for Delhi 
and Beijing in the mid-1950s. Firstly, a Sino-Indian contest to promote one’s own model of 
development in Asia emerged. This was not simply a result of Nehruvian nationalism, but 
was linked to Nehru’s strategy of defusing the Cold War. By synthesising the best of East 
and West, Nehru’s development model refuted the binary logic of the Cold War, and 
offered an alternative for impoverished Asia. Naturally, this clashed with the CCP’s own 
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ideology. Secondly, economic development related to the shifts in the balance of relations 
between Delhi, Beijing and Moscow. While Nehru increasingly regarded Moscow as more 
reasonable than the Chinese, he also sought to draw on Soviet experience and aid, while 
Mao began straining against the limitations of the model Moscow had provided to the 
PRC. 
Economic development in Asia became a central aspect of international politics in the 
mid-1950s. Even before the Korean War’s end there were US officials who advocated 
support for Indian development efforts to thwart communist influence. After 1953 US 
setbacks in Asia led to an explicit strategic value being placed on India’s economic 
success. Although, it was only in 1955 that President Eisenhower received Congressional 
approval for finance to compete with Soviet overseas aid, it was undoubtedly India’s 
growing economic and political relationship with Moscow that spurred the US in this 
direction.  By the late 1950s, the superpowers would be extraordinarily focused on which 530
form of development third world states chose, but even in 1955-56 India’s apparent 
preference for Soviet planning, industry over agriculture, and even its record against 
China’s performance, caused anxiety amongst US development thinkers.531
While Washington and Moscow began to see development as a strategic and ideological 
contest, shifting attitudes in Beijing and Delhi seemed to make economic policy a sphere 
of common ground. A key motive behind Beijing’s moderate turn after 1953 was the desire 
to revive China’s economy.  Focusing on development in turn buttressed Beijing’s new 532
moderate image. A key aspect of the Asian identity that Beijing began to assert included an 
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emphasis on the common under-development and agricultural character of the region’s 
economies.  In India, Nehru had always conceived of development as both a unifying 533
national project and part of a modern Indian identity.  In 1953, with the First Five Year 534
Plan (FYP) (1951-56) apparently failing, he had reclaimed control of the planning process 
and guided India towards a more industrial, public sector and Soviet direction. Non-
alignment was a crucial complement to this because Nehru remained sceptical of Moscow, 
and still wanted to draw on US support.  Nehru also remained very interested in China’s 535
progress.
Indian diplomats had seen a great opportunity for seeking Soviet assistance in the 
aftermath of Stalin’s death, and the expectation that India could benefit from superpower 
competition only grew in the following years. In particular, Soviet support would help 
balance dependence on US grain aid, thus serving Delhi’s independence.  For Nehru, 536
development aid did not conflict with nonalignment as political independence would be 
maintained through vigilance. But Soviet aid now made it easier to resist US pressure and 
Indian enthusiasm produced the popular slogan, ‘Hindi Rusi Bhai Bhai’.  So, India’s non-537
alignment performed the exemplary function of refuting the Cold War’s binary logic, but it 
also served the instrumental purpose of securing superpower aid. However, the growing 
warmth of Indo-Soviet relations implied a change to Nehru’s focus on Chinese moderation 
and another threat to the logical cohesion of the socialist bloc in which Moscow prioritised 
the economic development of the fraternal states.
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Nehru’s belief that Indian development served as a paradigm for Asia was a challenge to 
Beijing’s sense of its role in the world. The Indian Prime Minister sought to construct a 
unique Indian model, a ‘third way’, eschewing the extremes of American capitalism and 
Soviet central planning.  Just as his foreign policy insisted on the possibility and 538
necessity of compromise between systems, so did Nehru’s concept of development 
propose a middle way incorporating democracy and planning. This satisfied a practical 
imperative and the Nehruvian idea that India the ‘palimpsest’ was a beacon of tolerance 
and synthesis.  Nehru’s catholic interest in other development experiences grew through 539
1953 and by 1954 he was talking about ‘democratic planning’, a synthesis and solution 
most appropriate to India.  540
Nehru’s sense that Delhi was evolving a unique, syncretic model of Asian development 
confirmed his sense of a developmental contest with China. One motive for Nehru’s China 
policy had always been to benefit from exchanges on their economic experiments. Nehru 
wanted to learn from China’s rural policies to invigorate India’s own efforts.  To some 541
extent the idea of using social reform to boost rural productivity was inspired by the 
Chinese.  Nehru also envied how central government decisions were seamlessly 542
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activated across the country.  However, his trip to China in October 1954 particularly 543
convinced Nehru that there was a real competition afoot.  Nehru shared the general awe, 544
felt also by Pandit’s earlier delegation, in Beijing’s apparent ability to mobilise vast 
quantities of labour. He concluded the key to this energy was serious land reform and 
bemoaned India’s slow progress on that question.  The great question for Nehru was 545
how to replicate this spirit in India and match China’s progress, but without violence.546
Nehru believed that the parameters of India’s solution to Asia’s development challenge 
were starting to emerge. There were two key aspects to India’s approach. First of all was 
the peaceful social transformation in India’s villages realised through local development 
projects. The second element, as seen above, was the merger of Western style 
democracy with Soviet central planning. In 1953 Nehru had welcomed the prospects of 
‘revolutionary change’ in rural India brought by the ‘Community Projects’.  Nehru’s 547
confidence in these grew through the mid-1950s and by 1956 he spoke of them as a 
unique model of more value in Asia than Western methods.  India had shifted towards 548
Soviet planning in 1953, but it was only in 1955 that the hybrid approach was more 
formally declared with the Congress Party’s Avadi declaration. India committed to a 
‘socialistic’ pattern of society, but the declaration’s wording avoided ‘socialism’ and the 
implication that India was aligning with the Soviets. The declaration clearly articulated the 
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limit of India’s embrace of Soviet methods. While land reform was promoted the land 
would remain with the tiller rather than be collectivised; planning was to be ‘democratic’ 
and class conflict was not mentioned.549
Girded by his confidence in India’s progress, real and potential, Nehru presented India’s 
model to the world believing it had universal value. The Indian Prime Minister had 
enthusiastically embraced the new turn in the Cold War, the shift towards a global 
development contest that Indian diplomats were reporting about in the mid-50s.  It 550
seemed to Nehru in 1955 that the world was following Indian development efforts closely, 
with great expectation and great approval.   Hence, Indian officials had been so 551
determined to use Bandung to showcase their country’s unique methods to the 
‘underdeveloped and agricultural countries.’  552
After Bandung, when Nehru travelled to the USSR, his sense of the historic importance of 
India’s project to forge a competitive alternative to Soviet and Chinese development only 
grew. En route to the USSR, he wondered if Soviet methods could be reproduced shorn of 
their coercive aspects, a crucial question given capitalism’s utter failure to avoid war and 
subjugation.  Nehru felt India had a global mission to resolve these contradictions. He 553
returned from Russia apparently convinced. Although conceding the possibility of Soviet 
slave labour camps, Nehru decided:
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“So far as the economic structure is concerned, it might be said to be a completely 
new experiment in human organisation. The only way to consider it objectively is to 
forget or set aside the coercive technique of communism and try to understand it 
purely as an economic system.”  554
His misapprehension of the function of violence in that system meant Nehru would turn the 
same cracked lens upon the development efforts of both the People’s Republic and also 
India.555
Soviet aid and this trip confirmed Delhi’s impression that Moscow had become the more 
moderate member of the Sino-Soviet bloc, challenging the basic assumption of Nehru’s 
China policy. Nehru had long sought to encourage Beijing to distance itself from Moscow’s 
radicalism, but now it was Moscow apparently leading an effort to defuse tensions. In the 
mid-1950s Nehru increasingly thought revolution and fear were fading in a more flexible 
USSR, while Beijing’s irascible leaders were willing to risk millions of lives for Taiwan.   556
Nehru had always assumed that Chinese nationalism would restrain the revolutionary 
impulses of the CCP. He failed to predict that while Moscow’s fervour cooled Chinese 
nationalism would drive it in more extreme directions. 
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The Chinese did not really think there was any common ground or anything significant to 
learn from Indian economic policy. However, Beijing did think that Indian interest in its 
development projects was a diplomatic asset, the fruit borne by the language of Asian 
identity and under-development. In early 1956, some Chinese analysts were optimistic that  
this interest would sustain a continued improvement in Sino-Indian relations, and that even 
though Delhi remained greedy for US aid it was regularly opposing American positions on 
international questions. However, the Chinese had very little expectation that India’s own 
economic policy could deliver genuine progress.  The narrowness of Beijing’s interest in 557
India was clear from the dismissal of its developmental prospects. 
Beijing’s scepticism meant that Nehru’s conviction that India had a template to inspire the 
region was viewed as extremely presumptuous.  Furthermore, Mao believed that it was the 
PRC that was pioneering Asian modernity. Beijing’s transition from a policy of revolutionary 
export to one calibrated to support domestic development suggested that less emphasis 
might be placed on the universal value of the CCP’s experience. However, just because 
the model was not being packaged for export, did not mean it was no longer on display. At 
the Eighth Party Congress, Mao announced that they were entering a new epoch, as
‘An Eastern country of 600 million people undertaking a socialist revolution to change 
the historical direction and national appearance of this country, to achieve basic 
industrialisation within the space of three five year plans, and moreover to complete 
socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist commercial industry, 
to catch up and overtake the most powerful capitalist countries in a few 
decades…’.558
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Mao was clear therefore that he was leading his vast Asian country to a modernity in 
advance of the capitalist west. The implication being that the rest of Asia should follow him. 
Thus steeled, Beijing had continued to guide revolutionary movements in Asia despite the 
policy of the international united front.  So while the Indians thought there was a 559
competition underway, Beijing simply thought it was no contest.
Even more profoundly, while Indian development rebalanced towards the Soviets, Mao 
began bucking against the limitations imposed by Moscow. So, while economic 
development provided a base for warming Indo-Soviet ties, it became a source of tension 
for the Sino-Soviet alliance. The CCP had long shelved its public celebration of its vision of 
Asian modernity, defined by Mao Zedong Thought to be the creative blend of Marxism-
Leninism with China’s historical conditions, in order to ‘lean to one side’ and enjoy the 
security and economic support of the Soviet Union.  The PRC had therefore committed, 560
more or less, to Soviet modernity.  Following the Korean War, Soviet economic support 561
grew tremendously. However, despite ‘leaning to one side’, the state’s legitimacy was 
founded upon the fact it represented the ‘standing up’ of the Chinese people. Dependence 
on outside forces could only be temporary.  Hence, despite the huge material benefits, 562
Mao grew to perceive a threat to Chinese independence from Soviet economic influence. 
But he also quite simply thought that Beijing could develop faster. So, despite the First 
Five Year Plan (1953-57) closely following Soviet industrial priorities, from 1955 Mao would 
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increasingly push in favour of a more rural emphasis, collectivisation and an acceleration 
of effort beyond Soviet recommendations.563
Mao’s scepticism of Soviet caution lay in his sense that class struggle and popular 
enthusiasm could force an economic leap beyond more conservative forecasts. From the 
end of 1955, Mao began pushing agricultural production targets up, thinking China could 
outperform Soviet recommendations.  One aspect of this was Mao’s rivalry with his 564
colleagues for pre-eminence within the CCP, and through the first half of 1956 he wrestled 
with the more cautious Zhou and Liu Shaoqi over production targets.  However, Mao’s 565
influence clearly had the PRC juddering towards far more radical notions of development 
and science than prevailed in India and elsewhere.  The Chairman’s dramatic elevation 566
of targets would have an impact on those striving to learn from and match Chinese efforts.
Nehru shared Chairman Mao’s acute unease with the pace of economic development.   567
The Indian Prime Minister regularly voiced concern that the enthusiasm of the freedom 
struggle had been lost.  And, like Mao, Nehru sought to use international tension to 568
rouse energy for efforts in development. For example, the National Development Loan 
scheme of 1954 was consciously viewed as a tool to exploit public anger at Pakistan’s 
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military relationship with the US and incite popular developmental passion.  Nehru had 569
even expressed a Maoist-like frustration with his own economic experts.  Although Zhou 570
had admitted to an Indian delegation that there were ‘coercive orders’ behind the setting 
up of the communes,  nevertheless, Nehru did not realise the centrality of violence for 571
Mao, who regarded the killing of counter-revolutionaries as a catalyst for popular 
energy.  Nehru desperately wanted to understand the growth of agricultural and 572
industrial cooperatives in China , as he believed, or hoped, there must surely be causes 
other than an authoritarian regime.  573
Nehru’s anxiety and close attention to the progress claimed by Beijing led him to an 
exaggerated sense of what planning could deliver. The proliferation of Indian study 
delegations to China since 1955 returned with tales of astonishing developmental targets. 
Nehru’s impatience only grew as a result, driving him to demand much higher food 
production targets from his own planners in summer 1956.  The irony was that Chinese 574
planning was in turmoil, Beijing’s leadership divided, and Zhou had to spend all of July and 
August 1956 revising and moderating China’s Second Five Year Plan.  Mao’s own 575
enthusiasm for irrational advance in economic growth had led India to also squeeze more 
from its plan. Nehru did not know it but rather than the tedium of conservative centralised 
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planning Mao had a romantic preference for the spontaneous energy of mass 
movements.  Therefore, taking Chinese development targets as a benchmark of rational 576
planning in 1956 was an error because these figures were in fact more goals for Maoist 
mobilization than sober forecasts.
The reality is that economic development was understood very differently in Beijing and 
Delhi in the mid-1950s. To be sure, leaders in both capitals saw economic progress as the 
sine qua non for the consolidation and unity of their new states and integration of areas 
like India’s north-east and China’s Tibet. But unity through development was understood 
very differently. Nehru believed economic development was the key to national unity, a 
counter to the ‘fissiparous’ pressures that tortured India, and the solution to the tribal 
problem. But Nehru’s sense in 1955 that China practised ‘gentle’ colonialism in Tibet, 
underscored his misunderstanding of Beijing’s attitude.  Ultimately, just as Mao’s 577
moderate foreign policy was underpinned by a fundamental class perspective, so was his 
view of development primarily related to class. For Mao, economic development brought 
class unity. Revolutionary methods in Tibet would finally integrate that region with the 
PRC, hence Beijing aimed to create a Tibetan working class that would be loyal to the 
CCP.  Concerned with class rather than national unity, Mao believed class struggle 578
catalysed genuine development.  While Nehru was therefore misguided to think either 579
that Chinese development was a reliable model for India or a sound basis for deepening 
Sino-Indian cooperation, Mao’s reversal to his underlying preferences would also cause 
tension for relations with Moscow.
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Although the issue of economic development provided Delhi and Beijing with common 
diplomatic ground it also led to the complication of their relations. Changing views of 
development led to a profound shift in the balance of relations between Delhi, Beijing and 
Moscow. India exploited the new environment to counter-balance US aid and seek more 
Soviet support. At the same time, Nehru drew more on Soviet approaches as his hybrid 
model took more concrete shape. The resulting growth in Indo-Soviet economic ties 
complemented Delhi’s appreciation of Moscow’s conciliatory international posture, which 
contrasted with Beijing’s ongoing inflexibility. Meanwhile, Mao was growing to regard 
Moscow as a limitation on China’s prospects. A second major shift was the emergence of a 
Sino-Indian contest in the developmental field. While to some extent this underpinned 
Delhi’s interest in Beijing, as it sought to learn from China’s developmental experiments, it 
also exacerbated Nehru’s impatience and led him to unduly pressure his planning 
bureaucracy. In Beijing, there was little respect for Delhi’s development policy, which was 
regarded as doomed to fail, but the desire to highlight Beijing’s superiority added to Mao’s 
desire to accelerate China’s progress. But the thinking underlying development in Delhi 
and Beijing indicated a clash of world-views, in which economic policy served either class 
or national unity. The collision of these perspectives would become explicit in 1956. But 
simultaneously, Mao would decide that despite the limitations imposed by his ties to 
Moscow, the vital unity of the socialist bloc demanded he reaffirm his commitment to the 
Soviet alliance.
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Crucible of contradictions: The 1956 Rebellions in Hungary and Tibet
The dangers of ideological relaxation required by Beijing’s engagement with India became 
acute in 1956. The growing instability in Tibetan regions already demonstrated that 
moderation risked the proliferation of class enemies. Meanwhile, Moscow seemed 
oblivious to the danger and moved to enshrine peaceful coexistence as permanent 
doctrine at the CPSU Congress. However, while the instability in Eastern Europe in 1956 
confirmed to Mao that class confrontation remained a fundamental problem it also brought 
home the danger posed by any disunity within the socialist bloc. The Chairman therefore 
prioritised the principle of socialist unity, regarding this as the foundation on which all other 
problems could be solved. As a result, regardless of the instability in Tibet, suspicion of 
Indian interference, and heightened sensitivity to the threat of reactionary subversion in 
general, Beijing continued to seek Delhi's cooperation because this adhered to Soviet 
preferences. Although the Soviet invasion of Hungary seemed a reversal in Sino-Soviet 
moderation and renewal of their alliance, Nehru was content to maintain his non-aligned 
engagement of the socialist bloc.
In late 1955, India decided to exploit the perception that Beijing endorsed Indo-Tibetan 
cultural relations. Delhi turned to Buddhism and the Dalai Lama to consolidate its 
legitimacy in its border zones. Nehru had acknowledged privately that the McMahon Line’s  
dubious origin impelled Delhi to win the loyalty of the border peoples.  The Government 580
now decided to sponsor Indian Buddhist organisations’ celebration of the anniversary of 
Buddha’s death, the Buddha Jayanti, and their invitation to the Dalai Lama to attend these 
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events in late 1956. It was thought the celebrations would raise New Delhi’s prestige in the 
eyes of the Buddhist populations in the border areas,  and it was hoped the Dalai Lama’s 581
participation would boost the stature of the events.  The manner of the Dalai Lama’s 582
invitation with a traditionally styled letter was an ostentatious flourishing of India’s cultural 
links to Tibet, which implied a special relationship was still expected.
This invitation was not particularly threatening to China’s immediate interests in Tibet. 
Beijing’s basic policy in the region was moderation, a united front with the Dalai Lama and 
elites, and friendship with India. The key goal of policy was to isolate Tibetan radicals,  583
and rally the majority under the Dalai Lama.  As a result, throughout 1955 the Chinese 584
emphasised to the Tibetans that Sino-Indian relations were ‘friendly’.  To reassure Nehru, 585
Zhou Enlai had laughingly told him at Bandung that ‘communism’ could not be imposed on 
Tibet.  This approach was maintained despite the outbursts of resistance across Tibetan 586
regions in 1955. Mao wrote to the Dalai Lama in November admitting errors which he 
ascribed to the excessive zeal of some officials in the campaign against counter-
revolutionaries. He soothingly stressed that progress in Tibet need not be rushed.587
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But the invitations for the Dalai Lama to join the Buddha Jayanti came at a moment of 
crisis for Beijing’s Tibet policy. The disconnected discontent across of 1955 exploded in 
acute form with the Khampa Tibetans’ rebellion in early 1956. This uprising in Kham, 
Western Sichuan, against local CCP control seemed to suggest Beijing could not deliver 
sufficient moderation or autonomy to placate Tibetans. The Khampa rebelllion is usually 
said to have been the direct result of the ‘democratic reforms’ begun by local  CCP 
officials.  No doubt this was the major proximate cause of the resort to arms. But the 588
Khampas also believed Han migration and demands that they relinquish their weapons to 
contradicted the assurances of autonomy in 1950. Their response in 1956 was to start 
massacring Han.  It was also clear that although only the Khampas rose in armed 589
rebellion, opposition to the CCP was pan-Tibetan.  Throughout 1955, Apa Pant had 
reported on resistance within Tibet based on a national antagonism towards the Chinese, 
even despite the Dalai Lama’s efforts to cooperate.  In 1956, Pant continued to underline 590
pan-Tibetan factors, such as that Khampa partisans were trying to mobilise people in 
Lhasa, and that fighting was in some instances only 150 miles from there.  Moreover, 591
although Beijing’s very violent repression focused on the Khampas,  its anxiety to 592
reassure Lhasa about continued moderation showed an awareness of the broader risks.  593
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However, even while the Dalai Lama assisted with Beijing’s pacification efforts, Mao was 
reconsidering his united front policy in Tibet,  and thus cooperation with the Tibetan leader 
and India. In July, Mao discussed redefining the conflict as a class struggle. The rebels, 
Mao complained, used slogans like ‘Defend Religion’ and ‘Protect Tibetans’, in order to 
‘trick’ the people. Mao suggested that the CCP might persuade the Tibetan masses that it 
could liberate them from oppression and raise living standards.  In other words, Mao 594
contemplated ending the united front and unleashing revolution against Tibet’s elite. Mao’s 
refusal to allow the Dalai Lama to go to India for the Buddha Jayanti contradicted the 
pretence of cultural autonomy and was a symptom of the dilemma Beijing faced over how 
to respond to the crisis in Tibet. Mao did not want the Dalai Lama to go to India and 
endorse it as the home of Buddhism and risk his recruitment by the rebel Tibetans whom, 
he thought, operated from there.  By October, Beijing was still blocking the visit and Tibet 595
was rife with speculation on the question. As the date for the Buddha Jayanti approached, 
Khampa rebels looked likely to remain in control of large territories through the winter.  596
But Mao’s analysis of events in Kham and Tibet and their relationship to India went far 
beyond the purely regional level.
Events far from China had a crucial impact on Mao’s calculations. The opportunities and 
risks inherent to the Sino-Soviet embrace of Panchsheel and India came into sharp relief 
with the turmoil in Egypt and Eastern Europe in 1956. Sino-Indian relations, the rhetoric of 
Panchsheel and the ‘Bandung Spirit’ all contributed to Nasser’s confident nationalisation of 
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the Suez Canal, and thus the ensuing international crisis.  The common response to the 597
crisis itself then seemed to demonstrate the potential for the Sino-Soviet bloc to link arms 
with the Afro-Asian movement in opposition to colonialism, bringing Indian and Sino-Soviet 
concerns together just as the San Fransisco Treaty and SEATO had earlier. It was agreed 
all round that Suez was a test of Asian unity.598
Simultaneously, the inherent risk that the logic of Panchsheel and Sino-Soviet moderation 
held for the cohesion of the socialist bloc took concrete and dramatic shape in Eastern 
Europe. Khruschev’s beginning of de-Stalinisation was a crucial precondition for this. And 
Yugoslavia’s statement of equality with the Soviets in June 1956, giving recognition to 
Tito’s third way approach, was a major inspiration to reformers in Poland and Hungary.  599
But the Sino-Indian rhetoric of Panchsheel also resonated with these restless observers in 
the Soviet satraps, imagining Beijing’s growing moderation and independence. Following 
the CPSU’s 20th Congress, Hungarian and Polish reformers had called for the study of 
China, and later, protestors celebrated Chinese-Hungarian unity, deploying Hundred 
Flowers slogans.  The CCP declared at its Eighth Congress that Panchsheel should be 600
applied to relations between socialist states, making explicit the tacit threat of the Five 
Principles’ logic for intra-socialist relations.  The doomed Imre Nagy in Hungary 601
announced that the Bandung principles should apply to relations between socialist states 
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just as the Chinese had declared during the Polish crisis.  Until the final moment in 602
Hungary the protestors expected China’s sympathy, with the press welcoming the People’s 
Daily’s criticism of Soviet chauvinism and calls for peaceful coexistence amongst all 
nations.  Indian inspiration was also clear from the Indian flags amongst the crowds in 603
Budapest.604
Soviet extermination of Hungarian independence undermined the unified opposition to 
imperialism at Suez, the carefully wrought image of Soviet moderation and Nehru’s 
Bandung rejection of the concept of Soviet ‘imperialism’. The invasion’s coincidence with 
the climax of the Suez crisis epitomised Nehru’s critique of the Cold War, that it obstructed 
de-colonisation. While the Chinese called for the Bandung powers to rally against Suez,  605
Nehru bemoaned the Soviet action for distracting attention from events in Egypt.  At 606
Bandung, Nehru had crushed discussion of Soviet ‘imperialism’ in his urgency to enlist 
Beijing and Moscow to the anti-colonial struggle and opposition to the US’s threat to Asia. 
But Nehru’s conceit that the Soviets did not practice ‘imperialism’ in Eastern Europe was 
eviscerated in Hungary.
The Hungary crisis led to shifts in Beijing that would have a profound meaning for Sino-
Indian relations. First of all, Beijing fully supported Moscow, dropped Panchsheel as a 
guide to intra-bloc relations and recommitted to the principle of socialist hierarchy. China’s 
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influence on the Soviet decision to invade was minimal but Beijing quickly backed Moscow, 
dropping criticism of Soviet chauvinism and ending its moderate image in Europe.  Mao 607
did so despite his alarm at Khrushchev’s recent ideological innovations at the CPSU 
Congress, and particularly the shift to viewing peaceful coexistence as a permanent 
strategy. Mao also backed Moscow despite the Soviet support of his domestic opponents 
in economic policy debates.  In December, Mao’s More on the Historical Experience of 608
the People’s Democratic Dictatorship re-emphasised the universal value of Soviet 
experience, dropping the warnings against dogmatism that had followed Khrushchev’s 
‘Secret Speech’.  China’s leaders certainly felt that the Hungary episode proved Soviet 609
leaders were inexperienced, rash and even incompetent.  But Mao decided Beijing 610
should pursue dominance within a unified bloc and de-emphasise Panchsheel for intra-
Bloc relations. Thus Hungary was also a setback for Nehru’s strategy of undermining the 
Sino-Soviet relationship.
Secondly, Mao’s particular analysis, that Hungary’s troubles were due to a lack of class 
struggle seemed to confirm his view that Tibet also would be best pacified by a dose of 
revolution. While Liu and Zhou argued for moderation in economic policy to avoid similar 
disruption to Hungary and Poland, Mao’s radical nature asserted itself. He urged his 
comrades to take the opposite lesson: Eastern Europe’s difficulties had been the result of 
a wilting resolve to scour their societies for counter-revolutionary threats. Therefore, class 
struggle must be deployed to boost production and inoculate the country against similar 
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trouble.  Mao’s perception that trouble in Eastern Europe was related to class 611
confrontation reinforced his sensitivity to the same problem within China, not least 
because the US alliance with reactionaries in Hungary seemed to mirror a similar 
constellation of threats in Tibet.
However, although Mao was convinced that the stability, development and integration of 
Tibet would be best delivered by full-blooded class struggle, he held back. He decided that 
the united front in Tibet should be maintained in order to adhere to the ongoing Soviet 
interest in sound relations with Delhi.  Therefore, in late November, the Indians were told 
that the Dalai Lama could travel to the Buddha Jayanti.  Mao resisted the temptation to 612
launch revolution in Tibet in late 1956 because of ‘international factors.  A Central 613
Committee document of September stated: ‘We can say that this is our compromise with 
the elite Tibetans. We think that this compromise is necessary and correct.’  He 614
continued to prioritise Sino-Indian relations to serve the wider Sino-Soviet agenda. Indeed, 
at that moment, Mao was extolling the united front’s applicability at home and abroad.  615
The impact of Hungary was nonetheless clear. The Dalai Lama, the Tibetan elite and India 
had one final chance to cooperate, but Mao’s contingency planning for a revolutionary 
solution in Tibet was straightforward. He told his colleagues he did not care if the Dalai 
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Lama leader remained in India and publicly opposed Beijing.  Zhou followed the Dalai 616
Lama to India and warned him that opposition in Tibet would bring violent revolution. Delhi 
was expected to help by urging the Dalai Lama to cooperate. The message to the Tibetans 
was that ‘reforms’ would be delayed and India would not help the rebels because of Sino-
Indian friendship.  In mid-December Mao explained to CCP officials in Lhasa that if 617
‘foreign directed reactionaries’ launched rebellion the ‘labouring classes’ would overthrow 
feudalism.618
To secure Indian pressure on the Dalai Lama, the Chinese made an artfully hedged 
concession to Delhi’s interests in the Himalayas. Zhou first demolished Nehru’s pretence 
that the border was settled: ‘In the last agreement which we signed about Tibet, the 
Tibetans wanted us to reject this Line; but we told them that the question should be 
temporarily set aside.’ He explained that he had never known about the McMahon Line 
until the CCP had studied the border, but because it seemed to be an ‘accomplished fact, 
we should accept it.’  However, giving himself leeway to withdraw this offer, while also 
casting Beijing as the reasonable party, Zhou added that ‘we should try to persuade and 
convince the Tibetans to accept it.’ Finally, Zhou also reassured Nehru that the ‘relations of 
Sikkim and Bhutan with China differ from those between Tibet and China, because Sikkim 
and Bhutan were never under China’.   But this assurance did not amount to recognition 619
of India’s ‘special interests’ in the border states. Nevertheless, Beijing was clearly trying to 
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lure Delhi into assisting with the crisis in Tibet by appearing to maintain the trans-
Himalayan cooperation with India.
While Zhou’s offer was slippery he was perfectly frank that Beijing’s Tibet problem was 
subversion a la Hungary. Zhou explained that while Tibetan autonomy was a good thing, it 
was no general panacea and could be exploited by foreign interference. Therefore, he 
made clear, Indian cooperation was imperative if autonomy was to survive in Tibet.  A 620
week later, Zhou told the Indonesian Ambassador that the imperialist powers, having 
realised that they cannot overturn the socialist countries on the battlefield, now focus on 
subversion instead.  So the lessons from Hungary were firmly applied to Tibet. For 621
Beijing, sound relations with India were founded on Delhi’s willingness to assist with the 
elimination of external reactionary interference in Tibet.
Nehru’s problem was that Beijing had reverted to a world-view profoundly at odds with his 
own. Nehru explained the Hungary crisis in terms of a national uprising against Soviet 
domination and forecast failure for the external imposition of communism.  But, in early 622
December, Zhou dismissed this insisting to Nehru on the ideological legitimacy of force 
and fully supporting Soviet action.  On 31 December, Zhou explicitly disagreed with 623
Nehru’s characterisation of the crisis and argued it was a counter-revolutionary uprising 
and that force had saved the socialist system. He implied that neutrality was impossible for 
a socialist state, and socialism was impossible for a neutral state.  So despite the desire 624
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to continue cooperation with India, Beijing was no longer willing to compromise on 
ideological principle. Zhou made plain his scepticism of neutrality and abandoned the 
reassuring language of Bandung.
Nehru was now in a very awkward position. He had defended his China policy as practical 
in light of historical Chinese expansionism, and had said that, like the Soviets, China was 
expansionist for ‘evils other than communism’.  But, not only was Beijing supportive of 625
the Soviet invasion on ideological grounds and was re-committing to the Soviet bloc, they 
were doing so publicly and in as stark terms as possible, almost daring Nehru to find fault 
with their uncompromising ideology. That China was rewarded for its support with a new 
stature in the Socialist Bloc by Moscow only compounded Nehru’s ongoing difficulty in 
separating the comrades.626
As a result, Nehru was assailed, home and abroad, for his handling of both Suez and 
Hungary. The ongoing association with the UK through the Commonwealth was attacked 
in light of the UK’s imperial action at Suez against India’s non-aligned partner, Egypt.  627
Nehru was even more vociferously assaulted for his failure to promptly criticise Soviet 
action in Budapest and for India’s abstention on the UN vote against the Soviet action.  628
His China policy, seen as linked to his response to these events, was harshly criticised into 
the new year.629
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Nehru had no intention of bowing to these attacks and adjusting his non-aligned policy. 
There had been practical and principled reasons for his delay in criticising Moscow, and he 
had made his outrage public on 5 November once armed with the facts.   To charge that 630
non-alignment ‘failed’ in November 1956 is to misunderstand Nehru’s foreign policy. Nehru 
rammed his commitment to Commonwealth membership back at those criticising him over 
Suez.  And, despite Soviet action in Budapest and China’s unambiguous support, 631
Nehru’s public friendship for the Sino-Soviet bloc did not waver. This was Nehruvian non-
alignment in action. The discomfort was clear, but, as Nehru admitted often, non-alignment 
implied the dissatisfaction of all sides.
In fact, India’s relations with the UK make an instructive comparison with Sino-Indian 
relations. Nehru insisted on close ties to the UK and the Commonwealth, despite many 
historical and current differences. Nehru regarded the Commonwealth connection as an 
‘exemplar’ without the obligations of a ‘treaty of alliance’.  He repeatedly expressed the 632
hope that Sino-Indian relations would also perform an exemplary function in international 
relations. Furthermore, he had explained to India’s diplomatic elite in June 1955 that the 
intimate relations India had with the UK and the PRCwere the foundation of India’s 
international stature. The significance of relations with the UK was despite the fact that 
India was in acute conflict with the UK regarding East Africa.  Therefore, the idea that 633
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non-alignment ‘failed’ over Hungary is as absurd as the idea that Indian membership of the 
Commonwealth was an ‘anomaly’  of Nehru’s foreign policy.  Despite their distasteful 634
behaviour,  in fact almost because of it, relations with these countries were critical 
components of Nehruvian non-alignment and the exercise of ‘right means’ in international 
affairs as an antidote to the Cold War.
While Nehru’s broadest international goals led him to continue assisting Beijing over Tibet, 
this cooperation was profoundly undermined at the same time. Nehru urged the Dalai 
Lama to return to Tibet, curbed trouble in Kalimpong and dismissed talk of Indian 
intervention in Tibet.  But Nehru was unable to capitalise on Zhou’s comments about a 635
border settlement, because to admit first that the border was not already fixed would wreck 
his longstanding public position.  Furthermore, while Zhou made it clear that Sino-Indian 636
relations and Tibetan autonomy now rested on India’s ability to curb subversion in Tibet, 
Nehru was unable to even restrain those Indian officials who continued trying to encourage 
the Dalai Lama to resist the CCP.  Even Nehru himself persisted with the expectation 637
that Beijing tolerated the cultivation of special cultural ties between Delhi and Lhasa.638
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The crisis in Tibet indicated to Mao the risk of accommodating the bourgeois preferences 
of Delhi by deferring the class problem. At the same time, the Soviet leadership’s apparent 
shift to make peaceful coexistence a permanent strategic posture rather than a tactical 
expedience added to Mao’s conviction that the Soviet leadership were incompetent. To 
Mao the intrinsic and implacable hostility of the exploiting class meant coexistence could 
never be permanent. While the Hungary crisis confirmed this perception, it nevertheless 
also made Mao realise that he needed to prioritise the cohesion of the socialist bloc. As a 
result he dropped the idea that Panchsheel had any meaning for intra-bloc relations and 
opted to preserve cooperation with India over Tibet.  This did not mean he accepted 
Khrushchev’s ideological innovations. Mao believed that once the socialist camp had been 
stabilised then he could in time lead it back to what he considered ideological orthodoxy. 
Nehru, on the other hand, while confronted by the devastating reversal of recent positive 
trends in the moderation of Moscow and Beijing, and the firm restoration of Sino-Soviet 
unity, had no option but to persevere. He engaged the communist powers in order to 
moderate them, not because they had moderated. Non-alignment was an active posture, 
and moreover was a moral demonstration to the world that nothing could obstruct Indian 
friendship. While this might appear naive it was at least a consistent strategy.  But Nehru’s 
Tibet policy was crippled by his inability to make it genuinely friendly. Partly this was due to 
the independent machinations of some Indian officials, but the clash of world-views, of 
class versus nation meant that India’s interaction with Tibet would ultimately come to be 
seen in Beijing as the interference of a hostile class.
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Conclusion
Panchsheel, the disavowal of revolutionary ambition and warm Sino-Indian relations all 
served important goals for Beijing after the Korean War.  These leant credibility to the 
united front strategy in Tibet and secured Indian cooperation with that approach. 
Simultaneously, this gave Beijing the breathing space to clarify and secure its border 
interests. Moderation and partnership with India also presented a pacific image of the PRC 
throughout the region, reducing China’s neighbours’ incentives for cozying up to the US. 
Thus the risks of another conflagration like that in Korea seemed to retreat. The fact that 
this all took place within a joint Sino-Soviet strategy to ease international tensions after the 
Korean War confirmed Moscow’s new confidence in Beijing and economic aid grew 
dramatically. Therefore, Beijing was able to focus on economic reconstruction. 
Delhi also extracted great benefits from Sino-Indian relations, Panchsheel and Sino-Soviet 
moderation after the Korean War. Nehru believed India had reached an understanding with 
Beijing to respect each other’s interests in the Himalayas. While the border was not 
unambiguously settled he felt he had enough flexibility to secure India’s position. Delhi was 
also optimistic that the principles agreed with Beijing served the reduction of tensions 
within South East Asia, and provided a universal template for normalising international 
relations. This cooperative era brought economic benefits also, as Delhi studied Chinese 
developmental efforts more closely, but also balanced its dependence on US aid with 
Soviet support and guidance.
However, an array of problems implied a certain vulnerability to the Sino-Indian 
partnership. Across the Himalayas, in Tibet and along the borders a fragile understanding 
had been achieved to provide a platform for Delhi and Beijing to develop broader 
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cooperation. Both parties avoided a frank discussion of their border interests in order to 
unilaterally consolidate their position. This reticence remained a latent threat to the stability 
of Sino-Indian relations. Another challenge was Nehru’s idea that India would exchange 
Tibet’s autonomous integration into the PRC in return for Beijing’s acceptance of the semi-
sovereign subjection of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim to Delhi. Chinese leaders saw no 
comparison between its absolute rights over Tibet and Indian relations with these 
Himalayan border states, and simply regarded Nehru’s ambitions as imperialist. Moreover, 
Beijing’s tolerance of Tibet’s autonomy depended on stability. Friendship with India served 
Beijing’s effort to ally with Tibetan elites, but once those elites began to reject cooperation 
then Sino-Indian relations lost an element of its appeal.
Panchsheel based cooperation was challenged by different calculations in Beijing and 
Delhi. Beijing had a far narrower conception of Panchsheel as simply a tool to block US 
interference and secure regional stability. Delhi’s grandiose vision went far beyond this and 
conceived of Panchsheel as an Asian innovation in international affairs that could help to 
defuse the Cold War. For Nehru, Panchsheel was not only a tool to obstruct the US but 
also constrain the PRC and by encouraging Sino-Soviet moderation ease Beijing’s 
dependency on its comrade. Concrete differences emerged between Moscow, Beijing and 
Delhi as it became clear that the CCP’s could not accept peaceful coexistence with 
Washington. Beijing’s underlying interest in maintaining a degree of Cold War 
confrontation, revealed by the first Taiwan Straits Crisis, clashed with Moscow and Delhi’s 
overall strategies. But Khrushchev decided he could tolerate this and offered Beijing 
nuclear aid, confirming for Mao the value of international tension. However, Nehru’s basic 
expectation that China would prove to be more moderate than the USSR was now 
upturned, and he began to regard India’s interests as more closely aligned to Moscow than 
the PRC. Nehru tried to use Bandung to maintain the pressure on Beijing and Moscow to 
Page  174
continue to pursue moderation and persuade the non-Western world to embrace non-
alignment. But while Beijing sought to restore its positive image at Bandung it was 
embracing a nuclear weapons programme and contradicted Nehru by agreeing with those 
who confirmed the right of states to enter military alliances. 
To some extent economic development afforded a new sphere for Sino-Indian interaction 
after the Korean War. The Chinese leadership wanted to focus on economic reconstruction 
and emphasised this as a common Asian concern. The Indians had always wanted to 
development exchanges with Beijing, but this became more pertinent as Nehru steered his 
country’s planning institutions in a Soviet direction. But at a more profound level the 
question of economic development introduced new tensions. India’s burgeoning economic 
ties to Moscow in terms of aid, guidance and proximity of methods complemented Nehru’s 
basic shift towards viewing the Soviets in a more favourable light than Beijing. At the same 
time, while Delhi increasingly valued Moscow, Mao was pushing back against its 
dominance of the PRC’s development policy. There was also a growing sense of a contest 
between Delhi and Beijing over their development models, with Nehru convinced India was 
evolving a revolutionary, hybrid approach to inspire the rest of Asia. Soviet support for 
Delhi therefore seemed all the more worrying in Beijing. This sense of contest contributed 
to the underlying desire to accelerate progress in India and China, which anxiety in turn 
disrupted the planning process in both countries. 
The problem with Sino-Indian cooperation in this period was that in many ways it clashed 
with Mao’s fundamental worldview. Partnership with India implied Beijing’s acceptance of 
the viability of non-alignment, Tibetan autonomy, Nehru’s development approach and 
peaceful coexistence. But all these were ways of avoiding class conflict. The delusion of 
this became clear to Mao in 1956. The explosive threat from Tibetan reactionaries as the 
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Khampa rebellion reverberated across the region made autonomy and cooperation with 
India look extremely dangerous. This and the myriad other ways in which class enemies 
continued to threaten and obstruct revolution made the Soviet desire to cement peaceful 
coexistence as a permanent strategy look like the most naive nonsense to Mao. 
Furthermore, sustained peaceful coexistence would also permit the continued support of 
defunct development models like India’s. However, the instability in Eastern Europe of 
1956 presented a dilemma to Mao. While it completely confirmed the acute risk of 
deferring class struggle, it also made plain the danger posed by an over-emphasis on 
moderation and Panchsheel for the unity of the socialist bloc. Mao chose to cement bloc 
unity and confirmed his commitment to Moscow. As a result, Mao also resisted the 
temptation of unleashing revolution in Tibet in order to preserve relations with India, a 
central pillar of Moscow’s foreign policy.
Nehru for his part was confronted by the problem that Beijing, and Moscow, had jointly 
shifted back to the uncompromising language of class confrontation. Soviet action in 
Hungary was defended as the legitimate suppression of counter-revolution. So Nehru’s 
conceit that he was both leading the communist giants to moderation and at the same time 
levering them apart was exposed. The brazen defence of the blood spilt in Budapest 
seemed a gigantic infringement of the spirit of Panchsheel. Indeed, Mao had redefined 
Panchsheel , saying in January 1957 that support for overseas communist parties was no 
contradiction of this because it furthered world revolution.  But Nehru was not going to 639
give up his efforts. While starting to look for new partners in non-alignment, his 
engagement with China and Moscow would continue to aim to smooth the brittle edges of 
their revolutionary fever. But Nehru failed to realise that operating on the assumption of 
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inevitable class conflict, Beijing simply viewed his basic political positions as at best naive 
and at worst dams to be swept away by the final revolutionary flood.
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Chapter Four - Drawing lines between class and nation, 1957-1959
Introduction
1956 ended with the Indian Prime Minister and Chinese Premier disputing the central meaning of 
the Hungary crisis. Nehru believed it to have been a manifestation of nationalism, while in Beijing it 
was regarded as the product of class struggle. The significance of these different world-views only 
grew from 1957. If history was indeed driven by dialectical materialism, then non-alignment and 
Nehru’s syncretic politics, explicitly formulated to ease class confrontation, obstructed historical 
progress. Furthermore, Beijing’s leaders, especially Chairman Mao, believed China had a duty to 
demonstrate this to the world. It was a question of whether to continue with the conventional inter-
state diplomacy pursued since the Korean War’s end, or realign more explicitly with history, 
revolution and transnational class struggle.
After 1956 Mao’s renewed commitment to class struggle meant continued cooperation with India 
was premised on the degree to which Nehru’s Government was perceived as popular. Hence, 
Beijing’s analysis of political and economic trends in India became crucial. 1957 began with 
cautious optimism, but Mao’s dismissal of the Soviet doctrine of ‘peaceful transition’ revealed his 
skepticism of Asian leaders like Nehru. The Communist Party of India’s (CPI) degree of 
cooperation with Nehru’s Government subsequently became an important bone of contention 
between Moscow and Beijing. Mao’s growing radical mood exacerbated his desire to see the CPI’s 
experiment with ‘peaceful transition’ fail. Hence, in 1958 Beijing’s interest in the intensifying political 
confrontation of ‘reactionaries’ and ‘progressives’ in India grew. Meanwhile, Nehru sought to defuse 
the real polarisation of the Indian politics of economic development and prevent it becoming a Cold 
War issue. He had begun to fear that the rival international camps were provoking the clash within 
India and preventing stabilisation of the Kerala crisis in particular. Nehru tried to reinvigorate his 
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middle way approach to economic policy, but the effort to do so only added to the confrontations 
within India.
The confrontation within India confirmed Mao’s doubts about ‘peaceful transition’ and allowed him 
to gain new influence over the CPI. At the same time, Beijing’s diplomacy generally shifted away 
from the cooperative inter-state approach symbolised by the Panchsheel rhetoric. Meanwhile, to 
Mao, India’s international posture appeared also to underline the growing power of the reactionary 
classes. By 1958, Mao’s interest in inter-class rather than inter-state politics was leading him to 
increasingly engage the global masses and encourage them to confront their oppressors. This 
meant Mao was now actively opposing central ideas in both Delhi and Moscow. By disputing the 
possibility that Nehruvian politics could harmonise class interests Mao highlighted Soviet blindness 
to the revolutionary potential in India and globally. But Mao’s growing preference for class politics 
clashed with Nehru’s understanding of nationalism in Asia.
Nehru had always imagined that Asian nationalisms could be collaborative, and the compromise 
with China, begun with the 1954 agreement on Tibet, had promised much. However, Delhi and 
Beijing’s interests in the Himalayas particularly highlighted the tension within the national 
compromise, as these were at once collaborative, competitive and antagonistic. For instance, while 
China’s presence catalysed India’s push north, Delhi offered cooperation on Tibet. But Nehru over-
estimated the extent of Beijing’s commitment to an imperial concord in the Himalayas. Mao’s 
perception that class confrontation underpinned both the growing instability across Tibetan regions, 
and Indian interference, led Beijing to curtail its cooperation with Delhi. Just as Nehru and Zhou 
disagreed over whether class or national conflict caused the Hungary crisis, so now would Delhi 
and Beijing disagree about the cause of the trouble in Tibet.
The instability in Tibet challenged the viability of India’s border policy: the repeated public assertion 
that the boundary was settled, with only minor matters outstanding. Beijing had happily exploited 
the latent ambiguity this created to continue state-building projects in Tibet.  In 1958, Chinese road-
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building and reticence drove Delhi to seek reassurances, but this just made plain that major 
differences existed and that Beijing was no longer friendly. The possibility of a settlement remained 
in early 1959 however because Zhou hinted the McMahon Line could still be accepted while Nehru 
appeared internally to regard Aksai Chin as negotiable.  Beijing had not entirely rejected the 
potential of a national compromise. The problem was Nehru’s long-standing public assertion of 
certainty combined with Indian national sentiment to make him inflexible. Instead, Nehru made 
legal arguments which only provoked China and, by confirming his bourgeois reputation, pushed 
Mao further in the direction of pure class based politics.
However, it was Mao’s ideologically framed response to the Lhasa uprising of March 1959 that 
would permanently damage relations. The Chairman used the crisis to draw clear lines of class 
confrontation home and abroad. The Tibetan elites, Dalai Lama, Nehru and even the Soviets would 
all be measured by events in Tibet.  Nehru failed to solve the contradiction between national 
sympathy for Tibet and his friendly China stance and his political opponents exploited the turmoil to 
unleash attacks on his domestic and foreign policy. In contrast with Moscow, Mao preferred to see 
this confrontation within India escalate and so openly attacked Nehru’s ideology. Mao had good 
reason to think India was a real ideological threat to his revolutionary plans for Tibet. No material 
aid came via Delhi to the Tibetans, but the thrust of Indian interaction with Tibet for several years 
had been to support a degree of separation from central China. But the idea in Beijing was that this 
attack on Nehru would help resolve his vacillations; caught between the battle of progress and 
reaction, he needed to choose sides. Hence, Mao believed his attack would drive the confrontation 
in Indian politics to a new level, but would ultimately deliver a new progressive synthesis. 
This was critical to Mao’s overall international strategy at this time in the middle of 1959 when he 
was trying to encourage the global masses to welcome at least rhetorical confrontation. Because 
Mao ascribed the ‘anti-China wave’ in India to class antagonism rather than nationalism, he was 
compelled to respond with confrontation, so exacerbating the tensions. In fact, from a class point of 
view he welcomed the conflict. Mao desired to foment tension both within India and with India. This 
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desire fundamentally clashed with Soviet priorities which were for both India’s domestic and 
international stability. But Mao now wanted to inspire the global masses to confront their 
oppressors. Thus, while China, a nation of oppressed peoples, would confront the Indian 
bourgeoisie, so too would he support the Indian people in their confrontation with their oppressors
Class concerns return
Although the Hungary and Poland crises had led Mao to re-evaluate the importance of class 
struggle, with socialist bloc unity restored Beijing nevertheless continued to emphasise the 
strategic value of cooperation with Nehru and the forces of Asian nationalism. In January 1957, 
Zhou told Nehru socialism must join hands with nationalism. He used Nehru’s term ‘collective 
peace’ and said disarmament and abolition of military blocs would improve inter-bloc relations.  640
Mao emphasised Beijing followed a broad strategy of unity within the Socialist Bloc and with Afro 
Asia, and even some imperialists.   Clearly Beijing still wanted to maximise Third World unity as 641
the most powerful weapon against global imperialism, and as a result continued to suggest to the 
Indians that a second Bandung Conference would be useful.  In January 1958, Chairman Mao 642
himself chased down Indian Ambassador RK Nehru in Guangzhou and sought to persuade him to 
support another Asian African Conference to discuss nuclear disarmament. He explained this could 
be a precursor to a Great Power summit, which India should propose and join as a mediator.  643
 ‘Talks with Chou En-lai - V’, 24 January 1957, JNSW, 36:623640
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Publishing House, 1994), 284
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Asian unity also continued to have a local and regional importance for Beijing in 1958. In July, the 
Chinese wrote to Delhi requesting it repress US and GMD plotting amongst Tibetan emigres and 
appealed to Panchsheel warning that imperialists were attempting to ‘create tensions in Asia and 
Africa’.  The Chinese continued to discuss the US threat to South East Asia with Indian 644
diplomats, and assured those neighbours of Beijing’s essential benevolence.  Clearly, class 645
analysis of  international affairs was not yet the dominating paradigm in Beijing.
However, Mao’s internal recommitment to class struggle in 1957 meant that cooperation with Asian 
nationalist governments and Nehru was premised on the assumption that these were reasonably 
progressive. Mao’s global strategy was based on his conviction that he had the world’s ‘people’ on 
his side against imperialism. In April 1957, Mao had referred specifically to Nehru’s leadership of 
the Indian freedom struggle as an example of the invincibility of the ‘people’ in progressive 
struggle.  The implication of this was that good relations with the Indian state were only desirable 646
if that state genuinely represented the Indian people. Otherwise, the hundreds of millions of Indians 
would have to be engaged via another channel. Thus, Mao’s India policy, and indeed his policy for 
Asia broadly, was very influenced by the class analysis of these respective governments. 
While some official analyses of India’s development policies indicated a benign view of Delhi’s 
class loyalties, China’s leadership’s attitudes to the new Soviet doctrine of ‘peaceful transition’ 
 ‘Note from Chinese Alleging Kuomintang and US plotting from Kalimpong with Tibetan 644
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revealed its true assessment of India and other non-socialist states.  At the 20th Congress of the 647
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the traditional Marxist-Leninist concept of revolution 
was revised. Neither war nor a revolutionary seizure of power were now considered necessary pre-
conditions. Moscow’s new ‘Theory of World Revolution in the Atomic Age’ stated that war was now 
so potentially destructive as to be illogical.  The foundations of Soviet foreign policy had thus 648
become ‘peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition and peaceful competition’.649
Mao’s fundamental disagreement with this theory reflected a basic scepticism of the possibility of 
deferral of class confrontation in India and other such states. This in turn implied a fundamental 
distrust of Nehru’s government. The Chairman’s renewed sensitivity to the inevitability of class 
confrontation meant that despite the re-commitment to socialist bloc unity, he disagreed with the 
Soviets’ neat elimination of the practicality of war and doctrinal insistence on peaceful methods. 
Therefore, Mao’s major published response to events in Hungary, otherwise supportive of Moscow, 
deleted reference to ‘peaceful transition’.  The Chairman shared his reading of the Soviet’s 650
Concise Philosophical Dictionary with senior party cadres in January 1957. The entry for the term 
‘identity’ troubled him:
The dictionary states: “Phenomena like war and peace, capitalist and proletariat, life and 
death etc can share identity because they are in basic opposition and mutually exclusive.” 
That is to say, these fundamentally antagonistic phenomena have no Marxist unity, they are 
only mutually exclusive, they cannot connect with each other, and they cannot under certain 
conditions transform into the other. This understanding is a fundamental error…
 Qi nian lai Zhongguo Yindu wenhua youhao huodong gaikuang 1957nian dui Yindu wenhua 647
youhao gongzuo guihua,18 March, 1957, CMFA 105-00535-02
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Mao gave then gave his view:
Lenin quoted Clausewitz: “War is the extension of politics by other means.” Struggle in a time 
of peace is politics, war is also politics, but simply with special means. War and Peace on the 
one hand exclude each other, and on the other are linked to each other, and under certain 
conditions, they can transform into one another. If preparation for war does not occur under 
peace, then why does war suddenly occur? During war if there is no preparation for peace, 
then why does peace suddenly happen?651
Mao was therefore highly sceptical of ‘peaceful transition’ as a strategy for non-governing 
communist parties. Moreover, by contrast with Moscow, and Delhi, Mao believed it was illogical 
and irresponsible to rule out the possibility of war and violent conflict.
So despite Beijing’s sincere desire to maintain cooperation with Nehru a profound scepticism of his 
ultimate class loyalties persisted. India became a testing ground for this Sino-Soviet doctrinal 
dispute and the Communist Party of India (CPI) the lab rat. Electoral success in April 1957, winning 
the state of Kerala, had convinced the CPI to embrace the Soviet position on ‘peaceful 
transition’.   The CPSU and CCP compromised on the question at the Moscow Conference of 652
December 1957, suggesting the case of Kerala might indeed prove Moscow right while alternatives 
may also exist.   But Mao still privately tried to persuade the Indians ‘peaceful transition’ could 653
 Zhanzheng yu heping ji huxiang paichi you huxiang lianjie, 27 January 1957,JGYLMZDJSWG, 651
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only be tactical.  In 1958 however the CPI would uphold the Soviet doctrine, despite Moscow’s 654
compromise with Beijing and growing political instability in India. The Indian comrades felt the party 
was performing well in Kerala and so should not change approach. Moscow made no attempt to 
hold the CPI to the compromise with Beijing.
Beijing’s antipathy for Moscow’s theory of ‘peaceful transition’ was accentuated by Mao’s personal 
radicalisation of Chinese domestic politics and development policy in 1957. The Chairman would 
come to see Moscow’s doctrinal preferences as a restraint on his own ambitions for China. The 
CCP’s Eighth Congress in 1956 had appeared a retreat from rule by revolution to a more 
technocratic style of government. The party had declared that the conflict between capitalism and 
socialism in China had been resolved and the chief contradiction was now that between backward 
and advanced socialist production. But after Hungary Mao’s internal reassessment of the 
persistent threat of class contradictions had led him to rethink. His anxiety at the threat posed by 
internal and external class enemies led Mao to believe that the CCP needed to pay closer attention 
to maintaining intimate relations with the masses. It was this concern that prompted the invitation 
for external criticism that is referred to as the Hundred Flowers campaign. But the overwhelming 
scale of attacks on the party and top leadership seemed to Mao evidence that class enemies were 
more entrenched than he had feared, and in July 1957 he counter-attacked with the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign.  Mao felt that Khrushchev was wrong to react to the growing sense of strength in the 
socialist bloc, what he labelled the ‘East Wind’, with a policy of co-existence with the West. 
Concerned at this strategic error Mao felt that China needed to accelerate its economic growth 
past the USSR in order to assume leadership of their bloc. The consolidation of the party’s, and 
Mao’s, ideological monopoly meant that the Chairman’s subsequent calls for more rapid 
development met little opposition.  In March 1958, the Chengdu Conference laid out the policies 655
 ‘Geming defazhan zongshi jingguo yuhui daolu zhubu shangsheng’, 16 November 1957, 654
JGYLMZDJSWG, zhong, 355
 Shen, 2013, 1-9; Also see, Liu, ‘Friend or Foe’, 130655
Page  185
for a sharp break with Soviet policies, and what would become known as the Great Leap 
Forward.656
This new radical mood intensified the CCP’s desire to repudiate ‘peaceful transition’ and gave 
Beijing a critical interest in identifying any evidence that aggressive reactionary power in India was 
growing.  In short, the CCP had an interest in escalating class confrontation in India because this 
would highlight the naiveté of ‘peaceful transition’. An extensive array of official analyses by 
officials in Beijing charted a growing perception through 1957, and particularly in 1958, that ‘feudal 
forces’ were obstructing once moderately progressive economic policies in Delhi, increasing Indian 
dependency on US economic aid, and triggering an intensifying confrontation of reactionary and 
progressive forces in India, with Nehru under immense pressure to choose sides.  Particularly 657
ominous were the examples of warming ties between Indian and US military figures in May and 
September 1958.  Indeed, in addition to aid, the US was regarded as actively supporting the 658
Indian reactionaries.  Chinese analysts suggested that the growing alliance of the US with 659
reactionary forces in India would threaten Sino-Indian cooperation.
These analysts did not dwell on the paradox that a basic international loss for the PRC, namely the 
significant improvement in India’s relations with the US, took place within the favourable context of 
 Chen Jian & Yang Kuisong. ‘Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance’, In 656
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Mao’s prevailing ‘East Wind’.  But this contradiction can be understood if one grasps that ‘East 660
Wind’ did not simply include the socialist states, but progressive classes everywhere. Class 
confrontation in India was growing with the right wing and progressive forces both advancing on 
each other, with the middle being squeezed between. Similarly, in international politics the class 
confrontation was intensifying. India’s right wing elites were drawing closer to the US, but this was 
no loss to Beijing. On the contrary it was a great advance. In the context of dialectical materialism 
heightened class confrontation was a very good thing, as this would trigger inevitable revolution 
and a new progressive synthesis. The waverers, domestically and internationally, would have to 
choose sides. So US aid to India only contributed to this process and the growing confrontation 
demonstrated to Moscow the facile naiveté of ‘peaceful transition’.
Chinese official perceptions of a growing polarisation of India politics were not totally misguided. 
Nehru was indeed contending with an intensifying confrontation of left and right and trying to 
prevent international influence from exacerbating this contest. On the one hand Nehru ridiculed 
CPI criticisms that India’s economic problems were due to ‘monopoly capitalists’.  And, on the 661
other, he dismissed fears on the right that India would collapse without Western aid and revolution 
would sweep Moscow and Beijing’s influence to the heart of India.  Nehru was trying to 662
depoliticise the question of economic policy.  The corollary to this was the defence of India’s 663
international posture of non-alignment, which Nehru realised was threatened by Western aid.   664
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But, throughout 1957, he continued to deny that India was closer to the US than it appeared, that 
nonalignment was under threat, or that the Congress Government was retreating from socialism.665
Nehru attempted to reinvigorate his ‘middle way’, syncretic approach to development in order to 
counter India’s economic woes and growing domestic polarisation and thereby re-assert his 
country’s non-alignment in the Cold War.  He chose the issue of land reform for the practical 666
reason that agricultural production was a major problem and for its symbolic value in relation to the 
feudal past. Nehru genuinely drew inspiration from either side of the Cold War. He was inspired, for 
example, by the apparent relationship between social reform in China and increased rural 
production.  On the other hand, he wanted India to study the US ability to use productivity growth 667
to offset social inequality.  As a result, beginning in 1957 and leading to the resolution at the 668
Nagpur Congress in January 1959, Nehru developed the idea of a unique Indian form of rural 
cooperatives that he labelled ‘joint-farming’. In effect, Nehru imagined India could reproduce the 
apparent dynamism of Soviet and Chinese cooperatives without the coercion involved in those 
states. Thus, India would demonstrate a peaceful, democratic route to a classless society, 
dissolving the need for class confrontation. A ‘new spirit’ in the Indian peasantry would stimulate a 
revival in agricultural production.  However, Nehru’s insistence that peasants were not to be 669
coerced and that the ‘service cooperatives’ were entirely voluntary could not disguise the obvious 
contradictions.  On the one hand he claimed there was no real change of land ownership, but on 670
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the other Nehru roamed philosophically across the face of a future scientific society of ‘abundance’ 
and common ownership.   It was all too easy for his critics on the right wing of Congress and 671
elsewhere to hurl dire warnings of violence and collectivisation at his plans.  As a result, the 672
divisions in India only grew.
For all his attempt to hold the middle ground, Nehru’s perception of renewed Sino-Soviet rigidity 
aggravated his concern at the growing political confrontation in India, especially in Kerala. He had 
observed in May 1958 that Moscow and Beijing had turned on Yugoslavia once more, attacking its 
moderate policies and reducing the emphasis on different roads to socialism. Nehru remarked that 
the hundred flowers had ‘become weeds to be pulled out’ and the CPI had been caught out by the 
reversal of policy.  Nehru thought the ‘cold-blooded’ execution of Nagy was another gloomy 673
portent and China’s response and language appeared even worse than the Soviets.  As a result 674
Nehru sought reassurances that Kerala’s CPI Government upheld the constitution and gave no 
special role to Moscow.  Meanwhile, clashes between supporters and opponents of the CPI 675
government continued to grow in July.676
India’s intensifying class confrontation in late 1958 brought gains for Beijing as it allowed the CCP 
to shift the debate with Moscow and the CPI over ‘peaceful transition’ in its own favour.  Firstly, this 
facilitated Beijing’s restoration of more influence over the CPI. During a visit to Beijing, the CCP 
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persuaded the CPI leader Ghosh to revive a focus on a broad rural strategy, rather than allow the 
party to be distracted by an exclusive concentration on peaceful parliamentary efforts.  Secondly, 677
Moscow joined in Beijing’s criticism of Nehru’s development methods in December 1958.  The 
Soviet Ambassador in Beijing penned a critique of an article by Nehru titled, The Basic Approach, 
in which the Soviets supported Beijing’s lambasting of the Indian claim to a unique model of 
socialism and ridiculing the notion that land reform need not be violent.  The Soviets now publicly 678
acknowledged that there may well be violence in India.679
Accumulating evidence of India’s increasingly reactionary foreign policy only cemented Chinese 
gains in the contest to define the feasibility of ‘peaceful transition’. Even early in 1957 it was known 
that Nehru had told the Americans that his basic goal was to weaken the Sino-Soviet alliance.  680
Furthermore, Nehru in general seemed to be taking a softer line on colonial issues also.  By 1958 681
the predictions of China’s foreign policy bureaucracy that Indian ties with the West would continue 
to improve seemed confirmed. Nehru was dead against a second Bandung.  He was also 682
obstructing Beijing and Hanoi’s basic goal of national elections in Vietnam and appeared to be 
recognising the Southern regime. To Ho Chi Minh’s request that India provide aid to Laos, the 
Indians had suggested the socialist countries curtail their activity there to avoid provoking the US. 
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Furthermore, India had equated the Warsaw Pact countries with the ‘invasive military groups’ 
under US imperialism.683
Beijing intensified its support for national liberation movements in 1958, partly to displace India as 
the leading anti-colonial Asian state, but also in order to burnish moral leadership over international 
communism.  While Beijing suspected Moscow’s attempts to dominate the PRC militarily and 684
economically,  it was equally resistant to attempts at ideological domination. Just as confrontation 685
within India bolstered Beijing’s claim that ‘peaceful transition’ was an insufficient doctrine, so too 
did growing global confrontation support Beijing’s argument that class confrontation was inevitable. 
Moscow had already made some concessions to Beijing on this question, such as joint criticism of 
Yugoslavia. Mao now wanted to seize leadership of global revolution to exploit the ‘East Wind’ that 
prevailed while the Soviets were paralysed by ‘peaceful transition’ and peaceful coexistence. In 
July 1958, Mao admonished an African Youth Delegation that nationalism was an insufficient force, 
they must confront their domestic oppressors.  In December 1958, representatives from the 686
recently formed Provisional Government of Algeria (GPRA), unrecognised by Moscow, visited 
Beijing, Hanoi and Pyongyang. In Beijing, the Algerians said ‘sarcastically’ that India will only 
recognise their government once we are independent.  In February 1959 Mao hinted to visitors 687
from the Moroccan Communist Party that ‘peaceful transition’ may be an insufficient strategy, as it 
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could lead to tragic complacency and give an opportunity to the party’s capitalist enemies.  Mao 688
told another African delegation: “We [China] can restrain imperialism, dissipate its strength, so it 
cannot concentrate its strength and suppress Africa.”  The Chairman was placing China at the 689
head of radical anti-colonial movements.
Chairman Mao was now bypassing bourgeois Asian governments such as Nehru’s and seeking to 
engage, support and inspire the people of the world directly. The Taiwan Straits crisis of August 
1958 helped build enthusiasm for the Great Leap and demonstrated to the Soviets the impossibility 
of peaceful coexistence with the US, but Mao also made clear that by aggravating the US and 
dispersing its forces he was supporting revolution in the Middle East.  In addition, and 690
underpinning his return to a foreign policy predicated on transnational class alliances, Mao saw the 
Taiwan Crisis as of explicit value in educating the global masses, including the Chinese and 
American peoples, that US imperialist aggression, and nuclear weapons, were not to be feared.   691
Mao thought that US imperialism simply stimulated the revolutionary passions of the people 
everywhere, including India and even in America, hence he welcomed confrontation. Although 
some scholars regard this, and Mao’s apparent encouragement of a return to confrontation in 
Indochina in 1958 as evidence of full retreat from the ‘Bandung Spirit’,  others point out that for 692
reasons of national security Mao still counselled restraint in Indochina in late 1959.  But Beijing’s 693
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rhetoric had shifted back to one based on vast and global class struggle to inspire opposition to the 
US, challenge Soviet diffidence and highlight Nehru’s betrayal of national liberation.694
If the Taiwan Crisis was about encouraging the masses not to fear confrontation then Mao had set 
himself up in direct opposition to Delhi and Moscow. Moscow’s public cooperation during the 
Taiwan Crisis of 1958 masked private shock at Beijing’s belligerent challenge of peaceful 
coexistence, and it was from this point that the precipitous decline in Soviet nuclear aid to the PRC 
began.  But the gloomy prognosis for Sino-Soviet relations was compounded by Soviet 695
endorsement of Indian syncretism. Nehruvian socialism, democratic planning and non-alignment 
were all synonyms for class harmony. If these approaches were successful they would add lustre 
to Moscow’s campaign for peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition. In Beijing, the Soviets 
appeared oblivious to the revolutionary possibilities emerging in the crucible of Indian class 
confrontation. Despite Yudin’s criticism of Delhi’s economic policies, Nehru and Khrushchev 
corresponded warmly in February 1959 about a high-powered Soviet planning delegation due in 
India,  and Nehru thanked the Soviets for the offer of long-term credit.  Such Soviet support for 696
Indian development efforts would have been viewed with immense suspicion by Beijing, wary of 
propping up a bankrupt system in which the reactionary class was rampant and viciously circling 
the progressive outpost in Kerala. Moscow and Beijing’s unified criticism of Nehru’s socialist 
delusions had been short-lived.
Mao’s renewed sensitivity  to class had a profound impact on relations with India and Moscow and 
on the PRC itself. Beijing’s persistent appreciation for the strategic value of cooperation came 
under great strain in 1957 and 1958. Mao’s firm belief in the inevitability of class struggle meant he 
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was profoundly sceptical of Moscow’s theory of ‘peaceful transition’ which in turn underlined a 
fundamental distrust in governments such as Nehru. India in fact became a test case for the 
viability of ‘peaceful transition’ in this period. Mao’s skepticism intensified as he interpreted the 
response to the ‘Hundred Flowers’ campaign as shocking evidence of the ongoing class 
contradictions in China and decided that ‘peaceful transition’ constrained his desire to speed up 
Chinese development. The perception that class confrontation in India was actually growing had a 
big impact on China’s own domestic trajectory and relations with the Soviets. In addition, Chinese 
analysts predicted that the growing collaboration of Indian reactionaries with US imperialism would 
also damage Sino-Indian relations. But, in an environment in which transnational class dynamics 
are key then an alliance with the Indian State itself would anyway became less important. Nehru 
responded to the crisis by trying to reboot his development model, with an eye on both the 
domestic and international sphere. Nehru’s effort failed and the perception of growing polarisation 
in India only boosted Mao’s faith and brought very concrete gains to Beijing in terms of influence 
over the CPI and concessions by Moscow. India’s apparently more reactionary foreign policy 
further confirmed Mao’s contention that class dangers continued and must be confronted. The 
Chairman began to offer more rhetorical support to national liberation movements to underscore 
his more revolutionary approach to Moscow, turning away from the inter-state approach of the 
Bandung era and partnership with India. Moscow was privately shocked at Beijing’s challenge to 
peaceful coexistence, but Soviet endorsement of Nehru’s syncretic development approach seemed 
equally shocking to Beijing for its betrayal of revolution.
The strains of collaborative nationalism
The Sino-Indian national compromise forged with the 1954 agreement on Tibet, and symbolically 
continued with the Bandung Conference, had been based on China’s apparent acceptance of 
Nehru’s idea that Asian nationalisms were not conflictual but cooperative and mutually supportive. 
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Mao’s growing preference, through 1957-58, for proceeding in international, and domestic, affairs 
on the basis of class analysis exerted increasingly heavy pressure on this effort however. 
Nevertheless, this compromise had always contained fractures related to regional influence, the 
border and limits of sovereignty. The simple clash of national interest would increasingly test the 
sustainability of these ambiguities. Regionally, and bilaterally, the complex brew of national 
cooperation, collaboration and antagonism between Delhi and Beijing would ferment until Beijing 
decided that clarity was required, and a new basis for relating to each other should be found. 
National sentiment in India and Tibet became an increasingly disruptive factor particularly as 
Beijing’s sensitivity to this declined and its perception of the interrelationship of class hostility in 
Tibet and India grew. The silences over the border were a particular focus for this tension as 
Delhi’s public projection of certainty slowly unravelled.  Despite growing suspicions, and the 
increasing influence of class calculations in Beijing, nation based inter-state cooperation did not 
entirely collapse, and there was still the possibility of a settlement of national interests on the 
border. But Nehru was unable to seize this opportunity, trapped by his public claims about the 
border and aroused national feelings across India.
Delhi and Beijing’s respective imperial projects in the Himalayas continued to be simultaneously 
collaborative, competitive and antagonistic. From the mid-1950s, Delhi extended British legal 
structures into previously un-administered zones such as Tuensang, in the Naga region.  On the 697
one hand, Nehru explained the importance of the British ‘inner line’ concept, which restricted 
regular travellers and foreigners from entry to the border zones, as preventing trouble for 
neighbouring ‘friendly regions’.  His explanation revealed Nehru’s sense that the new Asian 698
states should collaborate with each other’s imperial designs.  But on the other hand, the extension 
of Indian administration north to the McMahon Line, a major inheritance of British imperialism, was 
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both a response to the emergence of a new and powerful China and a direct challenge to Beijing 
and Lhasa’s irredentism. In November 1957, Nehru said that the emergence of China and Burma, 
‘strong and independent’, beyond Assam and the North East, increased these areas’ importance 
and the need for administration there.  Thus, China’s shadow stimulated Indian state-building 699
efforts in its northern border areas. In March 1958, Nehru proposed that one special committee 
supervise development of the hill regions and noted China had built 4,000km of basic roads in 
Tibet.  Nehru’s 1958 trip to Bhutan was also partly conceived as a response to the publication in 700
Beijing of maps showing Bhutan and Sikkim as Chinese territory.  701
So a new and powerful China justified Indian imperialism. But Nehru also used China to scare the 
objects of his imperial ambition. He was generally happy to threaten Himalayan states to get his 
way, warning the Maharaja of Sikkim in January 1958 that any retreat from reform might result in 
Indian annexation.  But he particularly brandished the China bogey to intimidate the independent 702
minded. Following his tour of Bhutan in September 1958, Nehru was quite clear that the Indian 
Government must use the growing tension in Tibet to pressure Bhutan into accepting submission 
to Indian supervision, and in fact he said the trouble in Tibet helped India’s cause. Bhutan must 
choose between China or India.  703
While Nehru pursued India’s own interests in the Himalayas he also sought to maintain a form of 
collaboration with Beijing over Tibet. Nehru seemed to expect that the cooperative nature of Asian 
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nationalism meant that Beijing recognised India’s national feelings for Tibet and would respect the 
region’s autonomy. Nehru certainly had reservations and acknowledged that Tibet was under 
‘forcible occupation’. But nor did he admire Tibet’s social system and thought geography would 
muffle Beijing’s impact. So he cooperated, taking steps to prevent arms being smuggled into the 
region from Nepal.  He also told exiled Tibetans to forget the idea of resistance, India would not 704
supply arms, they must instead cooperate with Beijing.  In fact, in mid-1957, Nehru thought 705
Beijing’s moderate policy in Tibet was a generally positive sign for the CCP in general.  He 706
interpreted Beijing’s respect of Tibetan autonomy to mean endorsement of Indo-Tibetan cultural 
relations, and he sought to cultivate this in partnership with the Dalai Lama. They corresponded 
about work on new Tibetan monasteries in India, and Nehru indicated he would accept the Dalai 
Lama’s ecclesiastic authority to appoint the Abbot at Tharpa Choling monastery in Kalimpong.  707
He did this despite the credence such authority might give to Tibetan territorial claims. But this 
demonstrated Nehru’s sense of fluid sovereignty across the Himalayas. Nehru’s expectation that 
Delhi and Lhasa could maintain direct relations was further indicated by his correspondence with 
the Dalai Lama about a possible visit to Tibet.  708
Beijing buttressed Nehru’s confidence by continuing its tactical adherence to an implicit imperial 
settlement with India in the Himalayas. Despite Mao’s suspicion that ultimately only class struggle 
could secure the CCP’s position in  Tibet, and despite resistance from local CCP officials, Beijing 
insisted on a moderation of policy in the province, confirmed in May 1957 as the ‘great 
contraction’.  The policy accommodated Indian sensitivities about Tibetan autonomy and 709
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assurances to the the Dalai Lama about the timing of reforms.  Mao held his revolutionary 710
rhetoric of liberation in abeyance, wary of provoking Tibetan ‘local nationalism’, and choosing to 
slowly build popular support instead.  Beijing therefore reassured the Tibetan elite in August 1957 711
and stressed that Tibet policy was an aspect of the PRC’s policy towards India.   Beijing even 712
sought to acquiesce in India’s domination of Nepal in this period, despite Kathmandu’s 
complaints.713
In January 1958, the mood of imperial collaboration induced Beijing to expand on the Dalai Lama’s 
invitation for Nehru to visit Tibet and propose a joint tour of the region with Zhou.  Nehru seized 714
on the idea with alacrity.   Despite some suspicions of Nehru’s intentions, the Chinese proposed 715
in March that Zhou and Nehru could fly together from Delhi to Lhasa in the autumn.   U Nu had 716
perhaps given the idea to Zhou in 1954 when he had explained how he and Nehru had once 
toured the tribal areas either side of the Indo-Burmese border and suggested he and the Chinese 
Premier might make a similar tour  of Yunnan.  Nehru and Zhou imagined that this tour would 717
assist in the stabilisation of the region, reflecting the imperial aspect of the Bandung Spirit, in which 
the new Asian states cooperated with each other’s internal colonialism.
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Beijing’s reasons for accommodating Indian concerns in Tibet were declining however.  
Cooperation with India over Tibet assumed that the intrinsic moderation of this approach would 
placate Tibetan ‘local nationalism’ and so deliver stability in the province. But stability was 
undermined by various factors. The Dalai Lama returned to Tibet in early 1957 to help curb the 
Khampa revolt, but simultaneously he endorsed the continuing relations of the Tibetan resistance 
with the US.  By September 1957 the first group of CIA trained Tibetans was parachuted into the 718
province.  Limited in material terms, nonetheless, this encouraged the Tibetan rebels. 719
Furthermore, Beijing’s own insensitivity to Tibetan national sentiment aggravated the instability. 
While moderation was pursued in the province of Tibet, ‘reform’ in outer Tibet, where the Khampa 
rebellion was centred, was regarded as a tool of pacification.  Thus Beijing’s policy ignored the 720
relationship between ‘political’ and ‘ethnographic’ Tibet.   The mood of rebellion therefore spread 721
from ethnic kin in outer to inner Tibet. In early 1957, there had already been thousands of refugees 
camped outside Lhasa, and the ongoing violence in Kham and Amdo only increased their 
numbers.722
Furthermore, the value of Indian material cooperation in Tibet was diminishing. By 1957, the 
success of Chinese state-building projects in Tibet made Indian support less vital than it had been 
and allowed Beijing to be more assertive about its sovereignty. Two new highways into Tibet 
promised to overturn India’s domination of Tibetan trade and economy, accepted previously from 
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necessity.  As a result, Chinese officials began squeezing Indo-Tibetan border trade.  Nehru 723 724
thought Beijing was sensitive only because of the ongoing Khampa trouble.  But the local CCP 725
wanted to contain India’s commercial influence now.  In fact, by late 1957, Chinese officials were 726
clear that Delhi was using trade to support Tibetan reactionaries.  Now China could supply Tibet 727
itself the political threat of Indian trade could be eliminated. Power in the province had irrevocably 
shifted to Beijing.
It was not just India’s trade with Tibet that was viewed as threatening, but increasingly Beijing 
perceived India to be supportive generally of the spreading Khampa rebellion. Indian interference 
seemed related to the growing aggression of the reactionary class in India and the anti-China 
mood they were stirring up. Therefore, Beijing cancelled the mooted joint tour in July 1958 and 
signalled an end to cooperation in the Himalayas. The Hungary crisis had long since aggravated 
China’s sensitivity to US subversion, and the Kalimpong Tibetans’ links to the US now seemed 
clear.  Beijing was convinced that Indian agents also cooperated with the various agents of 728
subversion in Kalimpong.  Nehru had always appeared reluctant to clamp down on the dubious 729
activities in Kalimpong.   Now, in the middle of 1958, the general aggression of India’s 730
reactionaries provided Beijing with an explanation for Nehru’s reluctance. The Indian media’s 
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coverage of Nehru’s forthcoming trip to Tibet had also projected an anti-China and anti-communist 
tone.  The Chinese also feared that rebels exploited the liberal movement of pilgrims across the 731
border.  Thus, the Khampa rebellion undermined Beijing’s capacity to tolerate Nehru’s notion of 732
flexible sovereignty across the Himalayas. 
As ethnic sympathy between Tibetan regions undermined Beijing’s policy, so too did national 
sentiment in India complicate Nehru’s management of the growing crisis in Tibet. On the one hand, 
it is clear that India was not materially supporting the Tibet rebels.  Furthermore, aware of 733
Chinese suspicions, Nehru continued to try and accommodate Beijing’s interests in Tibet. He was 
keen, for example, that Chinese suspicions regarding Kalimpong be allayed.   Nehru defended 734
China’s claims of sovereignty in Tibet, refuting various British newspapers’ rejection of this.  He 735
accommodated China despite his personal observation, as he passed through Yatung on route to 
Bhutan, that Tibet was occupied territory and subject to ‘the brutal methods of Chinese 
communism’.  However, Nehru’s desire to placate Beijing was not widely shared. He was 736
accused in Parliament in March 1958 of betraying Tibet and that Panchsheel was ‘born in sin’.  737
Nehru was acutely aware of the pan-Tibetan potential of the Khampa rebellion.  But he was even 738
more aware of the intense sympathy for Tibet within India. He therefore sought to restrict any 
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public discussion of the trouble in Tibet which would inflame Indian sympathies, encourage Tibetan 
rebels and provoke Beijing.  739
National sentiment also constrained Nehru’s response to the new context of his border policy 
effected by the increasing movement of Tibetan rebels and refugees. India had been operating a 
diplomacy of certitude, assuming that the border was largely settled, and proclaiming this in public, 
when in fact it was entirely ambiguous. The public projection of clarity meant that Nehru had 
mortgaged his own reputation domestically to China’s willingness to maintain the pretence. It was a 
highly risky strategy given that modern nation states prioritise clear, unambiguous territorial limits. 
Tibetan instability meant China now had an interest in clarifying the border. However, once national 
feeling was aroused against China by the instability in Tibet, Nehru’s inflexibility on the border 
grew. Delhi’s projection of certainty served China by making clear what India’s claims were, while 
Beijing could hold its counsel. Beijing’s silence gave it more flexibility eventually as it was not 
committed to upholding any particular claim.
Delhi’s policy of projecting public certainty about the border was increasingly unsound. Nehru 
thought he had secured Zhou’s informal acceptance of the McMahon Line in early 1957, with some 
small matters, like the Bara Hoti plains, agreed to be negotiated.  Chinese delay on the Hoti talks 740
for a year and a half was itself one reason for anxiety.  But, far worse, a series of encounters with 741
Chinese patrols in Ladakh at points well south of the mountain passes, which had been opened 
under the 1954 agreement, suggested that the Chinese did not agree that those passes formed the 
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general boundary line.  In fact, the 1954 agreement did not state that the opening of these 742
passes equated to recognition of a border.  Furthermore, in the 1954 negotiations, the Chinese 743
had actually first proposed the formula that ‘China opened’ the various passes. India objected and 
the agreement stated instead that “both sides agree”.  All of this should have made Delhi very 744
wary of claiming too much certainty with regard to the border, in the West, or indeed the East.
India’s policy of border certitude was doubly dangerous because China operated deliberately on a 
basis of ambiguity to conceal its own understandable uncertainty about the border. Beijing created 
a special boundary commission in 1958 to investigate all of the PRC’s borders and possible 
disputes thereon. The commission has been called a ‘confession of ignorance’.  It is  true that 745
Beijing did not know exactly where the border with India should run, but they had plenty of material 
already on huge Tibetan claims to the south.  Beijing was not ignorant of its potential claims but 746
was researching what was ultimately viable.  Meanwhile, India’s own certainty made it clear to 
Beijing what Delhi’s claims were, while the Chinese could hold their counsel and proceed with 
road-building in key areas before any border dispute emerged.
When concerns about the border became more concrete 1958, Nehru’s long-standing projection of 
certainty complicated Delhi’s response. Despite reports of a Chinese highway having been built in 
Ladakh, through the Indian claimed territory of Aksai Chin, Nehru decided, in February 1958, that 
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they could not protest without clarifying the road’s alignment. Instead they might simply mention 
Aksai Chin in other correspondence, to record India’s interest.  In June, Delhi sent out two patrols 
to investigate the road’s route.  The long-delayed talks on Bara Hoti, held in April-May 1958, had 747
indicated a newly obstructive attitude because the Chinese officials had refused to share material 
or discuss their claims at all. Indian anxiety then became acute in July when China Pictorial 
published a small map showing large areas of Ladakh, NEFA and Uttar Pradesh within China.  748
Nehru decided they could no longer allow Chinese maps to go unanswered.   Delhi protested to 749
Beijing about cartographic incursions on India, Bhutan and Sikkim and reminded the Chinese that 
Zhou had previously said their maps were old and needed revising.  Beijing made no reply. Thus 750
Delhi elucidated its own territorial claims, and maintained its public certainty, but remained ignorant 
of China’s conception of the border. In early September, the political vulnerability created by the 
consistent claim that the border was settled was shown by the pressure MPs exerted on the 
government, worried that Chinese maps indicated a major territorial dispute existed.751
When India took a more direct approach the belief that there were only minor points of dispute on 
the boundary crumbled. One of the two Indian patrols to Aksai Chin returned in October and 
confirmed that the road ran through Indian territory. On 18 October, Delhi expressed its ‘regret’ to 
Beijing but added it was keen to ‘settle these petty frontier disputes’. Beijing was also asked if it 
had any idea of the whereabouts of the second, missing patrol.  The Chinese reply on the 1 752
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November showed that the border disputes were more than petty and that relations were no longer 
friendly. The Indian patrol, Beijing’s note explained, was arrested on Chinese territory conducting 
‘unlawful surveying activities’ and had been returned to India via the Karakoram pass on 22 
October.  The treatment of the patrol and lack of notice on their arrest struck Delhi as extremely 753
unfriendly.  754
It was now clear that the earlier obstinacy at the Bara Hoti talks and cancellation of the joint tour of 
Tibet had heralded a shift in China’s India policy.  Clearly, the growing instability in Tibet caused by 
the Khampa rebellion meant that Delhi’s apparently new claim on Aksai Chin had to be quickly 
crushed, given the critical military importance of the new road there. The new communications 
infrastructure in Tibet made Beijing less tolerant of Delhi’s ambiguous attitude to Tibet. 
Furthermore, the claim on Aksai Chin just seemed another instance of aggression emanating from 
the Indian reactionaries, which Chinese analysts were so sensitive to in 1958. These 
developments all took place after the March leadership conference in Chengdu at which a new 
radical direction had been set for domestic and foreign policy, and at which Zhou had offered a 
self-criticism for his neglect of struggle with the nationalist countries such as India.755
With the Ladakh dispute now acknowledged on both sides and the Indians outraged at the offhand 
treatment of their patrol, Beijing also decided to reply to India’s complaint about China’s maps on 3 
November. The note reiterated the consistent reassurance that the maps were old and needed 
revising. But the final statement added that following surveys and consultations with neighbouring 
states, a ‘new way of drawing the boundary of China will be decided.’  The explicit statement that 756
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the border itself needed redrawing seemed an alarming development to Delhi, especially as the 
actual extent of Chinese claims remained unclear. 
A few days later, on 11 November, Nehru told the Foreign Secretary that with regard to this dispute 
in Ladakh they must bear in mind an additional point. He had been told that the area they claimed 
was marked in their maps and was also within the McMahon Line, to make a concession in the 
West on the McMahon Line would undermined its credibility in other places. Also, Nehru said they 
should remind Zhou Enlai that he had indicated a willingness to accept the McMahon Line, though 
not its name, when he was last in Delhi.  In December, despite the growing sense of crisis Nehru 757
continued to keep the dispute from the public and avoided press questions about China’s attitude 
to the border.  758
The pretence of certainty unravelled entirely at the beginning of 1959 but the possibility of 
compromise nevertheless remained. In December, Nehru sought reassurances direct from Zhou 
that the overall border alignment remained certain. He explained the various reasons why he 
thought China accepted this, such as the 1954 agreement, and Zhou’s previous comments about 
the McMahon Line, and explained why therefore the recent map was so puzzling with its inclusion 
of large areas of India within China.  His goal was to confirm China was not making the large 759
claims on NEFA implied by that map. Aksai China was not mentioned however indicating Nehru did 
acknowledge some dispute.  Nehru’s attitude to Aksai Chin was not absolute, privately his 760
concern at the treatment of the arrested patrol was that this was in territory acknowledged to be in 
dispute.  India’s note of 8 November, specifically complained at the treatment of this patrol, but 761
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said a second note would address the actual territorial dispute.  India’s communications, by 762
admitting dispute existed, and also labelling them petty, implied negotiations were possible 
regarding the Western Sector of the boundary.  Zhou replied in January 1959 saying the 1954 763
agreement had nothing to do with the border and ignored Nehru’s reference to his earlier 
comments about the McMahon Line, and only repeated that it was illegal. He also insisted Aksai 
Chin had always been under Chinese administration. However, Zhou hinted that the McMahon 
Line was still acceptable.  Although unstated, both sides still thought that there was some basis 764
for a national compromise on border interests.
However, Nehru clung to his border policy of certainty ignoring Zhou’s hints. For domestic political 
reasons he could not reveal the vulnerability of his border policy. Furthermore, Delhi feared that 
Beijing might exploit the confusion to pursue rebels across the border and seize disputed territory, 
hence Nehru wanted to minimise the entry of Tibetan refugees into India, Bhutan and Sikkim.  765
Delhi’s concern was that China’s position implied that the whole border, except Askai Chin which 
Beijing insisted was unambiguous, should now be subject to negotiation.  But rather than 766
consider the veiled political bargain, on 22 March 1959, Nehru presented the Chinese with a 
detailed historico-legal case for India’s conception of the border.  While it might have been true 767
that Delhi regarded the case in the East as irrefutable and the West as open to negotiation, the 
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Chinese cannot have known that.  This approach had several drawbacks for India. Nehru might 768
have hoped that clearly presenting India’s claims to China would generate a like response, but 
once again China did not deign to offer such clarity. Furthermore, the legal argument made India 
appear uncompromising. But worst of all, by basing territorial claims on treaties from the age of 
European imperial domination of Asia, Delhi confirmed the conclusions of Beijing’s analysts 
through 1958, presenting itself as a bourgeois collaborator with imperialism, and therefore an 
opponent of revolutionary China.769
So the competing forces of class and nation were bound together in ever tighter knots. A dilemma 
faced Beijing: embrace the class confrontation that was offered by the wave of reactionary hostility 
sweeping India, or cling to the single possibility of national compromise that remained on the 
border.  The possibility of a settlement of national interests in order to pursue broader international 
goals was severely compromised by the beginning of 1959. Traditional national interests 
increasingly clashed. Imperial projects that once seemed potentially collaborative were strained. 
The problem of national feeling across the Himalayas caused instability and ill feeling. And yet, in 
January 1959 the chance of a compromise remained. Beijing might still put aside the accumulating 
evidence of class antagonism with Delhi to make a traditional settlement of national interests. But 
Nehru needed Beijing to accept the McMahon Line and overall alignment of the border before he 
could compromise in Ladakh, he could not submit to overall renegotiation of the border for 
domestic reasons. The possibility of cooperation would be lost completely however when Mao 
decided that the CCP’s class enemies in Tibet and abroad must be confronted.
Drawing Lines
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Mao saw the climaxing of the Tibet rebellion as an opportunity to test class loyalties not just in 
Tibet, but in India, the USSR and indeed globally.  It was a familiar Maoist tactic to allow opponents 
to isolate themselves before counter-attacking, as he had explained with the relaunch of the 
Hundred Flowers campaign in January 1957.  In effect, Mao had decided the time had come to 770
draw definite lines of class confrontation and establish clearly where his enemies lay.  In turn, the 
Dalai Lama and Nehru each failed Mao’s test and so placed themselves in the opposing formation. 
However, rather than stimulating the class antagonism of the Indian people against their domestic 
enemies, Beijing’s counter-attack against the Dalai Lama, Nehru and associated reactionaries only 
exacerbated national sentiment in India. Thus, the shift to a class dominated management of 
relations with India caused a collapse in trust between Beijing and Delhi. The incompatibility of 
Mao and Nehru’s visions of history’s motive force as either class or nation asserted itself, dooming 
the prospects for continued cooperation. Despite Beijing’s vitriol, Nehru sought to maintain Chinese 
sympathy for India’s syncretic approach to domestic and international politics. Moscow was 
therefore required to choose between Indian non-alignment and loyalty to the comrades in Beijing. 
However, following a brief detente between the socialist allies, Moscow resumed its tacit support 
for Nehru’s political experiments, further cementing Mao’s conviction that the CPSU was rotten and 
that Nehru’s hypocrisy must be exposed.
Mao increasingly felt that a crisis in Tibet would facilitate more thorough integration of that region 
by allowing him to draw clear lines of class confrontation and then counter-attack the isolated 
reactionaries. The growing organisational strength of the CCP made this more realistic.   The 771
new roads also would help this process. In addition, this was also a question of asserting Beijing’s 
absolute sovereignty in Tibet and satisfying the CCP’s claim to be the liberators of all the Chinese 
people. With India appearing more and more hostile there was less and less reason to continue to 
accept these political limitations simply to accommodate Delhi’s sensitivities.
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The unrest in Lhasa that built up in March 1959 was therefore an opportunity to establish loyalties 
and so Beijing’s initial strategy after 10 March was ‘not firing the first shot’ to allow the reactionaries 
and rebels to fully reveal themselves.  The confrontation escalated after the Dalai Lama’s 772
departure on the 17 March and on the 20th the PLA were ordered to return fire on the rebels. The 
instruction to begin suppression of the disorder emphasised class struggle also. For Mao, class 
struggle was the pre-eminent political tool for catalysing economic development.  Now, counter-773
insurgency would also be optimised by combining it with social revolution. But class struggle is 
most effectively prosecuted once one’s class enemies are clearly categorised and isolated. Hence, 
some caution was maintained and an order given to make no charge of treason yet against the 
Dalai Lama, he also had to reveal where he stood.774
Chinese leaders also used the crisis to delineate China’s enemies in India. Despite certainty that 
India and Nehru were involved in the rebellion, there was no public attack.  On the 25 March, 775
Deng Xiaoping explained that to attack India now would mean a public debate, so he asserted, ‘we 
are now letting the Indian authorities do more unjust things, and, when the time comes, we 
certainly will settle accounts with them.’ Mao agreed that they must closely watch India’s response 
to events in Tibet.  India’s response to events north of the Himalayas would reveal the class 776
allegiances within its government and society.  Mao believed that a key CCP strength had been its 
historical success in identifying comprador capitalists, those elite collaborators with foreign 
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imperialism.  Delhi’s actions now would reveal how much power Indian compradors had over 777
Nehru’s Government. At the end of 1958 Chinese analysts had observed that Nehru was under 
huge pressure to crush the CPI.  Crisis in Tibet would only intensify Nehru’s dilemma, forcing 778
him, like the Dalai Lama and everyone else, to take sides.
The Tibet crisis would also test the Soviet position regarding ‘peaceful transition’. First of all, the 
intensified political struggle within India caused by Tibet continued to challenge the notion that the 
CPI should pursue ‘peaceful transition’. Secondly, the actual situation in Tibet also served Mao’s 
refutation of Soviet doctrine. The incorrigible hostility of Tibetan elites confirmed the need for 
violent struggle. On the 19 April, Mao explained to a delegation from Italy that the CCP no longer 
needed to delay the reform programme in Tibet. He invited his guests to consider a theoretical 
issue: ‘The problem now is to take the arms from the shoulders of the serf-owners and give them to 
the labourers. This problem leads to a theoretical problem, namely class struggle in the end always 
needs a war, to transition peacefully is very difficult.’  779
The Tibet crisis was of such critical domestic, international and ideological importance that Mao 
personally calibrated Beijing’s public presentation of events in order to carefully test the various 
constituents. The Chairman corrected the first media response to events in Lhasa, published by 
Xinhua on the 28 March. There was no accusation against the Dalai Lama or Nehru, or even India 
directly. The statement announced that the Preparatory Committee of the Autonomous Region of 
Tibet had replaced the local government and the PLA had begun pacification. Mao satirised the 
rebels’ confidence in their strength and support of India and the US, but said that only Jiang Jieshi 
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was actually aiding the rebels. Mao welcomed Nehru’s ‘friendly’ statement of the 23rd that India 
would not interfere in China’s domestic affairs, hypocritically remarking that China had never 
intervened in India’s domestic politics.  More provocatively however, the article charged that 780
Kalimpong was the ‘commanding centre’ of the rebellion.  781
While this accusation provoked outrage in India, Nehru’s dilemma over Tibet was best 
encapsulated in the holy figure of the Dalai Lama. Delhi had always struggled to craft a Tibet policy 
that sufficiently reassured Beijing of India disinterest. How now was the Indian Prime Minister to 
reconcile the extraordinary level of popular Indian veneration for this god-king with the harsh 
political reality that Beijing believed that this man had thrown in his lot with the reactionary rebels in 
Tibet? On 15 March, once early intimations of the growing crisis in Lhasa had reached Nehru, he 
had told his officers in Lhasa and Gangtok that Delhi would offer the Dalai Lama asylum if it was 
sought.  Armed with this reassurance, the Dalai Lama had slipped out of Lhasa on the 20 March 782
travelling south, incognito, light and fast in a small party. Approaching the Indian border, an 
advanced group was sent ahead to confirm that sanctuary was available.  The main party then 783
crossed into India on the 31 March and Nehru sent a note of welcome on the 3 April. The Indian 
Prime Minister knew he had no choice other than to welcome the Dalai Lama. However, to avoid 
provoking Beijing and limit the public excitement, he ordered the Indian officials meeting the party 
that the Lama was to be kept away from the media and not allowed to make any statements.  784
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As Mao had expected, the crisis in Tibet dramatically raised the temperature of Indian politics and 
Nehru, acutely aware of how shackled he was, strained every sinew to cool passions.  The 785
pressure on Nehru was was well illustrated by Pandit’s telegram to him regretting that there had 
been no statement on the ‘tragic happenings in Lhasa.’  Consular officials in Lhasa had twice 786
turned away Tibetans seeking sympathy in mid-March and foreign press were warned against 
sensationalist reporting.  As the crisis exploded, Nehru refused on 23 March pressure for a 787
parliamentary debate saying it was a ‘novel’ idea to discuss another country’s affairs in such 
fashion.  He was forced to return to the house on the 2 April again rejecting calls for a debate but 788
also dismissing Chinese charges about Kalimpong and rubbishing the more outlandish Indian 
scaremongering. He pled with MPs to bear in mind the different understanding of public comment 
between China and India.  Nehru was caught fast between his public and Beijing’s suspicion.789
Nehru’s efforts to reconcile his China policy with Indian national sentiment for Tibet was partly 
impeded by his personal feelings. He regularly admitted private sympathy for the Tibetans.  But 790
Nehru could not exclude this sympathy from his public pronouncements. So, on 2 April, while 
appealing for calm, and recognising Beijing’s rights, he talked of the ‘cultural kinship’ between Tibet 
and India based on ‘vast numbers of pilgrims’, and veneration of the Dalai Lama by ‘large numbers 
of people’, which meant ‘our reaction to anything that happens in Tibet is bound to be very deep’. 
Nehru said such reactions have to be borne ‘in mind’.  That he actually shared this sentiment 791
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was suggested at a press conference dominated by news of the Dalai Lama’s arrival: ‘Tibet, 
culturally speaking, is an off-shoot of India, that is to say Buddhism - not of India politically - and we 
may be Hindus, we may be anything in India but Buddha is the greatest Indian that ever lived, and 
we still in India are under the umbrella of this feeling for the Buddha. Tibet, of course, is far more 
so and there is this tremendous bond.”792
The insistence on India’s right to express cultural solidarity with Tibet underpinned the confused 
and provocative tone on Tibetan autonomy. Nehru told a crowd in Allahabad on 6 April that,  ‘Tibet 
should regain their [sic] freedom and at the same time, our friendship with China should remain 
unbroken.’  All Nehru’s public talk of Tibetan ‘national feelings’ indicated a muddled policy, an 793
inability to face up to the choice he had to make between Tibet and China.  Nehru told crowds in 794
mid-April that Beijing had given Tibet autonomy because they were a separate people, and formed 
a state within a state.  Thus, Nehru defended himself to the Indian public by saying his policy had 795
been based on the understanding that Tibet was autonomous.  On the other hand, to some he 
privately acknowledged this autonomy had never really existed.  To others, Nehru complained 796
that Zhou had several times reassured him about Tibetan autonomy.   However, if Zhou had 797
conceded Tibetan autonomy previously, it was annulled on the 28 March, and Indian talk of a 
‘broad revolt’ there or ‘national uprising’ only angered Beijing.  798
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Nehru’s problem was that the right wing used Tibet to launch a comprehensive attack on his 
political position. He had himself welcomed the domestic political lines drawn following the Nagpur 
Congress session and his party’s renewed rhetoric of progressive land reform.  However, 799
because the end of Tibet’s autonomy seemed to prove the total failure of Nehru’s friendly China 
policy, the whole package of related domestic and international policies could now be challenged. 
Therefore, it was imperative for Nehru to contain the fallout with Beijing. A first step was to prevent 
the Dalai Lama from operating politically, against right wing demands.  Nehru knew that strong 800
language about China aimed deliberately to embarrass his government.  This pressure combined 801
with continuing assaults on economic policy and trapped Nehru between the left and the right.  802
Nehru fought India’s internal Cold War,  ridiculing the fear that cooperatives meant ‘red ruin’ for 
India. Riding through a barrage of attacks from right and left, he said some fear US imperialism 
and others say China will ‘swallow us’. Nehru countered: ‘No country, great or small, is going to 
swallow India. If it attempted to do so, it would have most violent indigestion.’803
International opponents of Indian non-alignment also sought to exploit Sino-Indian discord. Nehru 
perceived a Western attempt to effect a realignment of India’s posture in a way that they had failed 
to do during the Hungary crisis.  He was clear that the US was behind a Pakistani attempt to 804
transform Indo-Pakistan relations. Prime Minister Ayub Khan had pointed to the ‘danger from the 
north’ in his appeal for a policy of ‘common defence’. Nehru entirely rejected such talk as implying 
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a retreat from non-alignment, casting aside Pakistani inducements that they could settle the thorny 
question of canal waters in the Punjab and that even Kashmir ‘was not such a difficult problem.’805
Instead, Delhi quietly appealed first to Beijing and then Moscow to help preserve Indian non-
alignment and, implicitly, Nehru’s domestic programme. On the 23 April, RK Nehru, India’s 
Ambassador to Egypt, and formerly to China, met his Chinese counterpart Chen Jiakang. ‘Little 
Nehru’ told Chen that the Prime Minister could not control the opposition and Beijing should 
support Nehru because he adhered to Panchsheel.  Subsequently, in early May, the Soviets 806
were asked to exert themselves in Nehru’s favour also. An Indian diplomat at the UN told the 
Soviets that if the right succeeded in their attempt to use the current furore to oust Nehru, then 
Indian nonalignment would fall with the Prime Minister.807
Beijing’s firm rejection of reconciliation with Nehru indicated a continued desire to test his class 
loyalties and also underlined and contributed to the widening fractures in the Sino-Soviet alliance. 
While Moscow and Beijing had recently united to dismiss Nehru’s development ideas in his article, 
The Basic Approach, the Soviets had nevertheless continued its practical endorsement of Nehru’s 
policies by sending a delegation to discuss new aid for India in February 1959.  By contrast, 808
rather than protect Nehruvian non-alignment, Beijing upped the ante by directly attacking the 
Indian Prime Minister.  Mao had hesitated about taking this step for fear of driving Nehru into the 
imperialist camp. But reading Indian newspapers on 7 April convinced him of Delhi’s sustained 
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involvement in the Tibet rebellion. The Dalai Lama’s public call for independence on 18 April also 
bolstered Mao’s resolution. The Chairman ordered a propaganda campaign:
‘We will begin a counteroffensive against India’s anti-China activities, emphasizing a big 
debate with Nehru. We should sharply criticise Nehru and should not be afraid of making him 
feel agitated or of provoking a break with him. We should carry the struggle through to the 
end.’
Mao explained that the attack on Nehru would highlight his obstruction of reform in Tibet, his 
territorial ambitions and confused desire that Tibet be a buffer. This would educate the Indian 
people and justify both China’s international position regarding Tibet and the crushing of the 
rebellion and promotion of reform. Friendship with India would be preserved and Nehru compelled 
to adhere to Panchsheel in dealings with China. Eventually on 6 May 1959 the People’s Daily 
published, ‘The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru’s Philosophy’.  This attempt to confront Nehru in 809
order to restore friendship with India was the first salvo in a developing diplomatic strategy of 
struggle.810
Beijing’s suspicions of Nehru and India were not delusional and the idea that India wanted to 
create a buffer in Tibet was not ‘absurd’.  The perception that India manipulated the Dalai Lama 811
was certainly exaggerated.  But as seen above, Nehru always had trouble crafting a Tibet policy 812
that fully reassured Beijing. And at this moment, the Indian Government’s relationship with the 
Dalai Lama was certainly provocative. As Chinese diplomats pointed out, one of the Lama’s 
 Chen, ‘The Tibetan Rebellion’, 86-88809
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statements attacking China was distributed by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.  813
Furthermore, Nehru had even met Tibetan rebels at his official residence.  Nehru’s daughter and 814
sister, Indira Gandhi and Mrs Pandit, had both appealed publicly for support for Tibetan 
independence.  The sum of many Indian words and actions over the last several years pointed to 815
a desire that Tibet be a buffer. China’s Ambassador in North Korea explained that the anti-China 
clamour in India was a product of the elites’ desire to quarantine the Indian people from the 
example of progressive politics in China, and that they hoped to pressure Beijing to abandon 
progressive reform in Tibet.  The Indian media’s constant harping on Tibetan autonomy appeared 816
in Beijing to reflect an attempt to obstruct social revolution in Tibet.   Indian leaders were indeed 817
obsessed with Tibetan autonomy, hence the excitement when Zhou had assured Nehru at 
Bandung that communism would not be imposed on the province. Furthermore, some Indian 
officials, such as Apa Pant in Sikkim, had consistently sought to encourage a spirit of psychological 
opposition to the Han, and Nehru’s own promotion of cultural relations was an implicit defence of 
Tibetan autonomy. So China’s suspicion cannot be dismissed just because India was not materially 
assisting the Tibetan rebels. In the worldview of Beijing’s leaders in 1959 India’s ideological threat 
to China’s hold on Tibet was real.
Mao did not want a military confrontation with India. He saw an ideological threat and responded in 
ideological terms with diplomacy as a form of struggle. The handling of India and Tibet on pure 
class terms did irreparable damage to relations with Delhi however.  In April and May Mao had still 
sought to accommodate India’s security concerns and appealed to a shared strategic interest in 
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remaining friends.  Mao was worried that Jiang Jieshi was going to exploit the Tibet crisis to 818
attack Yunnan.  The polemical attack on Nehru was the Leninist pursuit of unity through 819
struggle.  Zhou and Mao told a Soviet delegation they wanted to demonstrate to the people of the 820
world the links between some of India’s big capitalists and the Tibetan rebels. Nehru was left some 
‘leeway’ and relations with India would be friendly again as there was no argument with the Indian 
people as a whole.  Similarly, Tibet was now being pacified and reformed along strict ideological 821
grounds based on class analysis.822
Mao’s attempt to draw clear lines of class confrontation and pressure Nehru and other vacillating 
elites in India, Tibet and elsewhere ignored the power of nationalism. Nehru, Mao told Soviet 
visitors, was a middle bourgeoisie, but India’s prospects remained good because ‘Nehru had no 
option but to reflect the will of those 400 million [Indian] people.’ Mao welcomed the instability in 
Tibet, suggesting it would give the Third World’s ‘labouring people a little education, and have the 
communist parties of these countries also learn how not to fear ghosts.”  Mao understood the 823
‘anti-China wave’ in India as aa product of class antagonism rather than national sentiment. His 
little sympathy for ethnic, cultural and religious relationships had exacerbated the instability in 
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Tibet. However, while Nehru was constrained by Indian public opinion, it was nationalism and 
religious sympathy for Tibet, not class allegiance to Mao’s programme that drove Indian feeling. 
Sino-Indian relations therefore became an acute problem for Sino-Soviet relations. In Beijing it was 
thought that Delhi exploited the Tibet issue to divide Moscow and Beijing.  New Indian requests for 
Soviet aid, the pleading that Nehru was in a dilemma and his nonalignment under pressure were 
all perceived as attempts at influencing the Soviet view of Beijing. The Indian media was even 
publicly claiming that the USSR was neutral in the Sino-Indian dispute.  The Soviets seemed to 824
be trying to mediate between Beijing and Delhi.  In May, Chen Yi agreed with Yudin that Nehru 825
wanted help fending off the right wing attacks, but Chen said the Chinese were not inclined to do 
so.   The difference was clear. Beijing wanted Nehru pressured and Indian politics reduced to a 826
crucible of contradictions. The Soviets did not, they were content with Nehru and his nonalignment.
The Tibet crisis prompted Mao to restore class to the centre of his prescriptions for political 
problems. A framework of analysis privileging the nation-state had proved insufficient to deal with a 
growing array of threats to revolutionary China. Therefore, he had seized on the Lhasa uprising to 
clarify and redefine those threats in the idiom he preferred, class confrontation. The crisis proved a 
fruitful testing ground of class loyalties. While Nehru tried to maintain cooperation and confound 
the narrative of inevitable class confrontation, Beijing believed he, his Government and the Dalai 
Lama had all demonstrated their basic sympathy for reaction and therefore made themselves 
targets for Beijing’s ideological struggle. In addition, the Soviets had fatefully underscored their lack 
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of ideological rigour and conviction with their continued sympathy for Indian non-alignment, a 
posture that Beijing now regarded as simple cover for Delhi’s stance on the wrong side of history.
Conclusion
The dramatic deterioration in Sino-Indian relations in the spring of 1959  was caused by the 
incompatibility of a politics based on class with one based on the nation. The years of cooperation 
in the mid-1950s had been predicated on Beijing’s agreement to conduct a genuinely inter-national 
foreign policy based on an acceptance of the legitimacy of the Indian Congress and other 
governments of non-socialist Asia. Beijing had renounced a revolutionary policy that implicitly 
rejected others’ claims to absolute sovereignty and permitted intervention in other states’ politics to 
foment class confrontation. This posture had produced an agreement to operate on the basis of 
Panchsheel and had resulted in India’s enthusiastic support for Beijing’s role at Bandung. Beijing’s 
desire to cooperate with India had also led to moderate rule and assurances of autonomy for Tibet.
But from the end of 1956 Chairman Mao’s underlying tendency to perceive the world in terms of 
class formations gradually returned to the centre of his calculations. The Hungary crisis had 
sharply brought home the danger posed by class enemies clinging on in socialist countries who 
might seek the support of overseas allies. Mao’s continual anxiety about the undying hostility of 
reactionaries in general made him profoundly sceptical of new Soviet theories such as ‘peaceful 
transition’ to socialism and revealed an intrinsic suspicion of governing elites in states like India. 
Mao’s commitment to the ongoing necessity to deal with the class problem, including in China, was 
solidified by his shock at the attacks against the CCP that emerged during the ‘Hundred Flowers’ 
movement, and he responded in July 1957 with thorough suppression of all reactionary thinking in 
his ‘Anti-Rightist Campaign’. The fact that Indian politics in 1957 and particularly in 1958 seemed to 
be increasingly defined by class confrontation confirmed the basic trend in Mao’s thinking but also 
suggested that relations with India were going to become more difficult. Political trends in India 
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only added to the sense that the Soviets were labouring under fundamental ideological 
misapprehensions in their growing support for the Indian state and embossed Mao’s sense that 
Moscow was retreating from its responsibilities towards global revolution. So, in 1958, to underline 
his domestic departure from Soviet development policy, but also to burnish his qualifications for 
international revolutionary leadership, Mao shifted to a far more provocative foreign policy posture 
of passionate rhetorical support for non-state resistance movements, implying also that he had 
discarded the inter-state foundation of Sino-Indian partnership.
Mao’s appetite for cooperation with Delhi in regard to Tibet also declined in 1958 due to his 
perception of spreading class confrontations in general. For some time, Beijing and Delhi had been 
collaborating, if somewhat ambiguously, across the Himalayas, in a form of inter-state compromise. 
The Chinese leadership had agreed to accommodate Indian sensibilities about Tibet by protecting 
its autonomy and deferring radical social change. In return, the Indians had accepted Tibet’s 
integration to the PRC and assisted with its consolidation by encouraging trade for instance. Delhi 
even hoped that the Chinese were acquiescing in its special relationship with the Himalayan border 
states.  But the growing tendency in Beijing to view events in class terms destabilised this pattern. 
Any cooperation with Delhi anyway looked dangerous now as India’s rising comprador class was 
allying with the US. But given that Tibetan elites were spreading instability across their region  with 
US support, the danger from India seemed even more pervasive. In addition, Beijing saw less 
reason to tolerate limitations on its sovereignty in Tibet now because state-building projects had 
better integrated it with the rest of the PRC. Hence, the Chinese started to clamp down on this 
collaborative policy to limit the influence of Indian reaction in Tibet. 
In 1958, Beijing also became less inclined to tolerate Delhi’s continued public claims that the 
border was largely settled. In this case, it was less collaboration than Beijing’s simple desire to 
avoid making the border an issue, which had permitted Nehru to maintain the belief that China 
accepted his conception of the boundary. But in 1958 in particular, Indian doubts accumulated as 
Beijing’s attitude became markedly less cooperative. The Chinese perception of Indian elites’ class 
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enmity and sympathy for the Tibetans was undoubtedly at play also, but the problem of Tibetan 
instability meant that India’s apparent claim to the strategically vital new Chinese road in Aksai 
Chin had to be soundly rejected. With this, Nehru’s whole projection of public certainty about the 
border became highly vulnerable.
Beijing’s class scepticism of Nehru and his government was heightened by the way in which the 
Indian Prime Minister, driven by national sentiment, expressed sympathies for the rebels in Tibet, 
and defended his legal view of the border. The uprising in Lhasa in March 1959 seemed to Mao a 
way to more clearly identify the lines of class confrontation within Tibet and India.  Careful 
delineation of the antagonisms between different social groups had always been the basis of 
Maoist politics, and this would enable him now to consolidate control of Tibet by unleashing those 
hungering for revolution against the recalcitrant elites. Clearly this would transform relations with 
India also, as a pillar of Sino-Indian partnership had been moderation in Tibet. But confrontation in 
Tibet would serve as a test not just of the Tibetan elite and Dalai Lama’s loyalties but also of Delhi, 
as everyone would be required to choose sides. Moreover, the Soviets too would be tested 
because the crisis in Tibet would demonstrate the limitations of peaceful, non-class methods of 
politics and development. More profoundly, the expected political crisis in India would only add to 
the impression of class confrontation there further underlining the naiveté of Khrushchev’s theory 
of ‘peaceful transition’. 
The contradictions of Nehru’s Tibet policy then became acute. Delhi had always had difficulty 
forging a policy towards Tibet that genuinely reassured Beijing that India had dropped any ambition 
for influence in the region. But the escape of the Dalai Lama and suppression of the Tibetan 
uprising made it almost impossible for Nehru to reconcile Indian popular regard for Tibet’s cultural 
independence with the political need to get along with Beijing. Nehru’s own sympathies could 
hardly be concealed and India continued to project a confused stance on Tibetan autonomy.  
Nehru’s problem was that his right wing opponents seized on the crisis to attack his central political 
positions. And in truth, it did appear that a key justification of his China policy, light rule in Tibet, 
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had collapsed. The West also tried to use the crisis to lure Delhi away from non-alignment. Nehru 
failed to realise that his attempt to confound all this, in terms of reinvigorating his syncretic 
development policy and appealing to Beijing to help him preserve non-alignment was not regarded 
as a conciliatory act. Rather it was a manifest provocation to a worldview that rejected harmony 
and synthesis and sought to intensify political contradictions everywhere as the precursor to 
revolutionary progress.
So Nehru was failing Mao’s test. The Chairman perceived a profound level of threat emanating 
from India. Delhi was not materially aiding the Tibetan rebels, but Beijing measured Indian 
interference in terms of public and private rhetoric, and this revealed a desire to obstruct the 
Tibetan people’s liberation under the revolutionary mandate of the CCP. Now operating in terms of 
transnational class dynamics, Mao launched an ideological attack against Nehru’s ideological 
challenge. So, Beijing deployed Leninist tools against Nehru, a diplomacy of struggle that sought to 
restore ultimate, ideological unity. This shift paralleled Mao’s conviction that reactionaries globally 
must be confronted to more actively advance the revolution which the Soviets seemed to be 
retreating from. Indeed, confronting Nehru might illustrate to Moscow its errors. Mao assumed that 
the unity derived from his struggle with Nehru would deliver the Indian people to Beijing’s side of 
the argument and compel Nehru to return to a more progressive posture. Mirroring Zhou Enlai’s 
analysis of the Hungary crisis, Mao failed to realise that what he actually achieved was the 
incitement of Indian nationalism against China.
Page  224
Chapter Five - Diplomacy, imperialism and war, 1959-62
Introduction
Two essential questions excite those who lend any time to reflection on the origins of the Sino-
Indian war of 1962. Why was the Indian Government so unreasonable in its management of the 
border crisis, so obstructive, stubborn and obtuse, when a practical deal appeared available to 
settle relations with China, for so long identified as a critical concern of Nehru’s foreign policy? And 
why did China act as it did when it resolved to transform the confrontation with massive 
deployment of force in a theatre spanning the entire length of the border? China’s eventual use of 
overwhelming force is usually regarded as the reluctant resort to a forceful resolution in face of 
Indian recalcitrance, recklessness and irrationality. But if India’s response to the border crisis that 
developed in late 1959, and which proved impervious to solution, was more reasonable than 
usually allowed, then surely we need also to reappraise China’s decision for war.
In fact Nehru was more reasonable than often assumed and Beijing was more ideological than 
allowed. Nehru’s private diplomacy following the eruption of the border crisis was constructive and 
an effort to steer around the severe limitations created by the Indian public’s excitement and 
widespread domestic criticism of Nehru. It was Nehru’s endeavours which led to serious talks 
between the Prime Ministers and at which India proposed the division of Ladakh. The subsequent 
Forward Policy was ill-conceived but was a rational attempt to improve the prospects of diplomacy. 
On the other hand, Beijing’s ideologically framed handling of India on class lines, Leninist struggle 
to achieve unity, was deliberately provocative and a continuation of the attacks on Nehru begun 
after the Dalai Lama’s flight in 1959. Beijing then was competing with Nehru to influence Indian 
public opinion. Events at the international level served to confirm the colossal mistrust that had 
congealed around Sino-Indian relations, and so reinforced the mutual perception of the other as 
posing a local imperial threat. Nehru tried to fashion a strategy to circumvent the restraints of public 
opinion and seek a compromise on the border. This failed largely because by the middle of 1962 
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Mao had decided confrontation with India served his most pressing political needs. By escalating 
hostility with Delhi, Mao sought to inflame political divisions within India and test the level of 
Moscow’s betrayal before an audience of global revolutionaries.
Strikingly different diplomatic methods had first emerged from the contention over the Tibet 
rebellion and Dalai Lama’s flight to and asylum in India, but evolved further in response to the 
major border clashes in autumn 1959. The Indian leadership and public’s shock at these events is 
well known, and is often presented as the cause of what was thereafter an often obstructive and 
irrational approach to a territorial dispute with a powerful neighbour. What is clear however, is that, 
despite the public and government’s disquiet, Delhi conducted a series of private diplomatic 
initiatives to seek an understanding with Beijing and contain the disruption to the relationship. 
Concerned to a great extent with the domestic political consequences of a collapse in his friendly 
China policy, Nehru explicitly sought Beijing’s help to undercut his domestic critics. Furthermore, if 
Indian governmental and public distrust of China was indeed a crucial obstacle to stabilising 
relations with Beijing, then it is clear Beijing’s specific diplomatic strategy for handling the border 
dispute with India was to a great extent responsible for this distrust. China’s leaders were clear that 
they adopted a form of diplomacy as struggle, conceived as an intervention in India’s political 
battles. For Beijing, public discourse in India was a field of battle. Ironically, while Nehru sought 
Beijing’s understanding for his domestic travails and difficulties with public opinion, the PRC’s 
diplomacy was fashioned by the CCP’s ideological interest in exacerbating political conflict in India. 
The great diplomatic set piece of April 1960, when Zhou Enlai came to Delhi for talks, foundered on 
these differing concerns.
The distrust and exasperation resulting from the failed talks of April 1960 were inflamed by the 
resumption of Cold War tensions that erupted soon after Zhou Enlai left Delhi. Beijing and Delhi 
observed closely how the other reacted to the crisis in superpower relations caused by the U2 Spy 
Plane incident in May and drew conclusions that intertwined with their local conflict. Beijing’s 
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contention was that India’s response to events illustrated its growing collaboration with global 
imperialism, but even worse, it showed Delhi’s active encouragement and even manipulation of 
Moscow to follow suit and shelve world revolution. In the context of the unprecedented crisis that 
Beijing faced as the Sino-Soviet alliance began to crumble and economic disaster swept across 
China, Delhi’s attitude was viewed as a profound threat. Meanwhile, Delhi was equally alarmed by 
Beijing’s apparent delight at the possibility that the Soviets would turn away from constructive 
engagement with the US. These perceptions accentuated the suspicion each felt for the other’s 
approach to the border and the narrower region. The Chinese saw a parallel between India’s 
obstruction of independent movements internationally and its more active regional imperialism and 
aggression on the border, underscoring its overall loss of anti-colonial virtue. The Indians similarly 
saw China’s anxiety to disrupt Moscow’s peaceful coexistence with the US as reflecting a more 
assertive projection of revolutionary goals in Tibet and the wider region. A cycle of imperial anxiety 
therefore ensued, with each more actively pursuing its interests, and so confirming the suspicions 
of the other. The conviction that India had become an imperial power gave China the opportunity to 
align more closely with key neighbours Nepal and Pakistan, intensifying the general insecurity 
created by the border crisis. 
Growing insecurity and the public opposition to any attempt to make a reasonable deal with the 
Chinese led Nehru and his advisers to produce a new strategy in 1961. Delhi’s much maligned 
‘Forward Policy’ was part of a strategy to create the conditions for more flexible diplomacy by 
alleviating the Indian public’s concern at lost territory. This approach had some flaws. It assumed 
that the Indian public could be placated sufficiently to make concessions but also that Beijing did 
not factor Indian public discourse into its calculation of threat.  Furthermore, this approach 
presumed that the Chinese would not be sufficiently provoked militarily to make a major strike back 
against Indian incursions. This latter premise was the height of military folly but reflected thinking at 
the absolute centre of Nehru’s political world. The Indian leadership’s binary understanding of war 
and peace as absolute opposites blinded it to the creative use that Mao could make of limited 
warfare for political ends. Furthermore, Delhi was misled by confidence in Moscow’s ability to 
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restrain Beijing, a sense that Indian non-alignment placed it beyond reproach and a racial prejudice 
for a Chinese lack of valour. However, while Delhi was entrapped by public bellicosity, Mao decided 
that a more acute confrontation with India would bring major political benefits. Not least, India was 
again seen to be threatening Beijing’s grip on Tibet, particularly with the wave of popular support 
and interest in the Tibetan cause. Beijing’s turn against India in summer 1962 was partly motivated 
by the desire to fracture public discourse in India. Despite the more cooperative diplomatic tone 
regarding the border the Indian Government had also confirmed its inveterate hostility by its 
attitude to Indochina and links to Taiwan. But, for Mao the value of confronting India lay most of all 
in the meaning this would have for relations with Moscow. Beijing had come to believe that India 
was now a vehicle for Soviet hostility towards China. This meant that, at the moment when Mao 
was storming back to political centrality in Beijing, he could use hostility with India to demonstrate 
the utter corruption of Soviet revisionism. The higher Mao could raise the temperature of Sino-
Indian confrontation the more would Moscow’s treachery stand exposed before the Indian people 
and the global masses yearning for true revolutionary leadership.
Diplomacy
The border crisis that began in late summer 1959 set off a critical diplomatic phase of Sino-Indian 
relations. There was in fact an acute clash in terms of two diplomatic methods that were both 
crafted to influence India’s domestic politics. Beijing intensified its attempt to conduct diplomacy 
with India as a form of political struggle. This was a pre-eminently ideological approach because it 
was framed as an intervention in the class confrontation underway within India. As an ideologically 
conceived and managed form of diplomacy it was also closely related to Beijing’s growing 
dissatisfaction with Soviet foreign policy in general and specifically towards India. Beijing believed 
its diplomacy towards India had a crucial wider meaning in that it illustrated to Moscow, and the 
rest of the socialist bloc, a superior principled approach to global politics. In India, Beijing’s 
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diplomacy provoked already aroused nationalist sentiment and seriously damaged trust in Beijing 
amongst Indian leaders, and so compounded Nehru’s difficulty in seeking a resolution of the 
border. Nehru nevertheless responded to the challenge and sought to manage the problem of 
popular opinion by taking a hardline in public while pursuing Beijing’s understanding in private. The 
resulting high-level talks that were held in April 1960 ran aground however on Indian distrust and 
China’s refusal to relent in its struggle.
The clash at Longju on the Eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, on 25 August 1959, began 
this new diplomatic phase. The fighting seemed in Delhi to indicate a new level of Chinese threat. 
Many in India were already exasperated by Chinese charges of Indian collusion with the rebels in 
Tibet. Now, in August 1959, the Indians clearly believed that the location of these latest clashes 
were south of the McMahon Line in Indian territory.  Nehru thought the fighting signalled the 827
‘culmination of progressive Chinese unfriendliness’.  The Indians were particularly shocked 828
because they had warned the Chinese of a planned air-drop at Longju to aid a sick officer. The 
Chinese had reacted by forcing back Indian troops and occupying the post.  The violent 829
encounter also activated a residual distrust of China caused by the integration of Tibet to the PRC. 
The Indian military’s secret enquiry into the 1962 war, the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report 
(HBBR), characterised the Longju conflict as having ‘militarily upset the status quo on the INDO-
TIBETAN Border’ for the first time since the ‘occupation of Tibet’.  Use of the term ‘occupation’ 830
emphasised that China’s presence in Tibet was regarded in some quarters in India as illegitimate 
and evidence of expansionist and aggressive tendencies. 
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But it was Zhou Enlai’s note to the Indian Government, of 8 September 1959, repudiating the 
legality of the McMahon Line and apparently laying claim to much of NEFA, that especially caused 
widespread outrage in India and a collapse of trust in China. The impact was compounded 
because it coincided with Nehru’s release of the first White Paper on correspondence with China, 
revealing to the Indian public the extent of Beijing and Delhi’s outstanding differences regarding the 
border.  Beijing appeared duplicitous because Zhou’s note seemed to renege on earlier oral 831
assurances about the McMahon Line.  Repetition of the Chinese claim in other arenas 832
accentuated Indian shock. For example, Zhou told a Chinese audience that the incidents on the 
Eastern border were ‘due to Indian occupation of China’s territory and [India] even went north of 
McMahon Line’. The implication of such a comment being that territory south of the McMahon Line 
was claimed to be Chinese.  Nehru labelled the claim on NEFA ‘absurd’ and sent a written 833
rejection on 26 September.834
Zhou’s provocative communication signalled a new stage in diplomacy as struggle with India. 
Nominally speaking, the note continued an earlier exchange with Nehru about the McMahon Line 
in which the Indian Prime Minister had in March made a detailed explanation of the legal and 
historical basis of the McMahon Line.  No doubt Beijing had been irritated then by Delhi’s resort 835
to, in Chinese eyes, utterly illegitimate legal argument.  But clearly the long delay since March 836
meant there were more proximate concerns in September. Beijing believed that Delhi was trying to 
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use incidents such as that at Longju to pressure it into accepting the McMahon Line.  Given this 837
perception, and despite the ongoing instability in Tibet, Beijing had to make clear they would not 
submit to bullying. Furthermore, Beijing may well have been laying the basis for the future proposal 
that India and China simply make a swap deal of India’s claim on NEFA for China’s claim in 
Ladakh, vital now given the Tibet situation.  But the significance of this new bout of diplomacy as 838
struggle went well beyond the security sphere.
The 8 September note was also a deliberate intervention in Indian public politics and an escalation 
of transnational class conflict.  Diplomacy as struggle targeted Nehru’s recent efforts to win the 
support of the Indian public: his claims in Parliament that the McMahon Line was India’s border 
and that China was guilty of aggression, and the deposition of the White Paper on 7 September, 
which had warmed up the debate about the border in India.  Beijing was deliberately taking sides 839
in Indian politics, in line with global class alignments. As Chinese diplomat Fu Hao explained to the 
Soviet comrades in Delhi on the 9 September, Zhou’s written refutation of Delhi’s claims was 
tailored to support Indian ‘progressive’ forces and weaken the ‘reactionaries’. Fu made clear the 
international significance of this intervention by explaining that hostile elements in India sought to 
destroy Sino-Indian relations because of China’s development success, and these efforts to upset 
India’s relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc was aimed at demolishing Indian non-alignment.  This 840
perception of the Indian elite’s hostility to the example of Chinese economic development closely 
mirrored Beijing’s notion that India’s policy towards Tibet had been governed by the desire to forge 
an ideological buffer in that province to shield the Indian people from the dynamic example made 
by CCP guided progress.  Mao was now operating actively on the basis of global class alliances, 841
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so his sense that Indian elites were attacking China made it logical to intervene to support those 
elites’ domestic opponents.
Diplomacy as struggle was always crafted to deliver ‘unity’. But this ‘unity’ had a very specific 
meaning. It either meant the object of struggle gave in and made concessions accepting the 
principles of the subject of struggle. Or else, no concession emerged and the object revealed itself 
to be recalcitrant and beyond reform, in which case it was an enemy to be destroyed. If Nehru 
responded to Beijing’s principled stand and made concessions then the PRC could continue to 
cooperate with him and his government. Otherwise, Nehru would reveal himself as aligned with 
reaction, and the PRC’s alliance with India’s revolutionary forces would be cemented. Nehru’s 
Government was not yet anathema to Beijing because its non-aligned foreign policy was still useful 
in Indochina. Despite Chinese concerns over the last year that India was blocking its interests 
through the International Control Commissions (ICC) in Indochina, it was still making enough 
positive contributions in autumn 1959, despite Longju, to justify some respect for Indian non-
alignment.    Beijing’s concern with the survival of Indian nonalignment was further underscored 842
by the perception that the US and UK wanted to use the border dispute to chaperone an entente 
between Delhi and Islamabad.  So, cooperation with the Indian state still retained attractions for 843
China’s leaders if Nehru would compromise.
Beijing’s intensification of the diplomacy of struggle with Delhi was also a response to Moscow’s 
deeply unsatisfactory posture regarding India and the border clashes. The Chinese wanted to 
show the comrades that relations with India could not be conducted at the cost of principle. The 
Soviets had been very unsupportive of Beijing’s approach to the border so far in 1959 and after 
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Longju had ignored both a request to withhold a planned statement of neutrality and Chinese 
admonitions that Delhi was trying to manipulate Moscow.  While Moscow’s subsequent TASS 844
statement of 8 September did give China priority as the USSR’s brother, with India only designated 
a friend, it still horrified Beijing for failing again to highlight Indian errors. It seemed to Beijing that 
Moscow did not want to offend Delhi for fear of upsetting the forthcoming summit with 
Eisenhower.  That the dispute with India became, in Chinese eyes, a test of Moscow and 845
Beijing’s relative ideological rectitude, only added to the resolution to stick to diplomacy as 
struggle. By late September, the Chinese official assessment was that while the Soviet attitude 
towards India had not improved, diplomacy as struggle had indeed delivered some unity because it 
had forced Nehru to soften his position.  Chinese confidence in their approach contributed to a 846
bitter row with Khrushchev on 2 October, at which they complained that he only emphasised their 
threats, and not the softer side of Beijing’s treatment of Delhi, such as the invitation for the Indian 
Vice-President to visit Beijing.847
However, Beijing’s attempt to achieve unity through diplomacy as struggle mainly resulted in 
provoking Indian nationalism. Broad Indian hostility to any concessions placed severe limits on 
Nehru’s options. As the Chinese embassy in Delhi noted, not even the CPI was fully supportive of 
Beijing’s stance.  The huge loss of trust that Beijing had created with the NEFA claim was then 848
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compounded by the Kongka La clash of 21 October on the western sector of the border. This 
incident seemed to show that the Chinese had advanced in Ladakh through the summer because 
the previous year an Indian patrol had gone unhindered through the pass at Kongka all the way to 
Lanak La, at the border line claimed by Delhi.   Beijing now said Kongka La marked the border 849
and warned that if India continued to cross this line in the west then China would retaliate by 
crossing the McMahon Line in the east. Nehru believed this was a warning to Delhi to relinquish 
Ladakh.  Ill-treatment of Indian prisoners further inflamed public ire and Nehru became defiant in 850
face of domestic opposition, public uproar and China’s claims.  He boldly told his Chief Ministers 851
that any major invasion on the border would be successfully met.852
Despite the growing perception of Chinese hostility and loss of trust in Beijing, Nehru had 
consistently tried to circumvent public sentiment, defuse tensions and persuade Beijing it was in 
China’s interest to support his position against his domestic opponents. Shortly after Longju, the 
Indians had resolved not to return to that post if the Chinese would also withdraw and repeated an 
invitation for China to join an agricultural exhibition in Delhi.   The Indians tried to get a message 853
to Beijing via Polish diplomats that Nehru’s statements on the border were only due to the 
domestic uproar but nevertheless non-alignment and Delhi’s friendly China policy were threatened 
by ongoing pressure.  TN Kaul had already explained to Chinese diplomats in Delhi that the 854
border crisis weakened Nehru and Krishna Menon relative to those opposed to sound Sino-Indian 
relations.  Even after the apparent claim on NEFA, discreet appeals for Beijing’s support had 855
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continued. One Congress MP visited China and argued that although Nehru had perhaps 
mishandled the border question he had done so because he earnestly desired strong relations with 
Beijing and Moscow and needed protection from the capitalist press in India.856
Nehru continued to sidestep public outrage through private diplomacy. The Indian Prime Minister 
did not think China was seeking outright conflict on the border despite the outrageous border 
claims they were making.  A major Indian diplomatic gambit begun by AV Baliga, an Indian 857
surgeon and advocate of Indo-Soviet relations, continued despite the encounter in Ladakh. He had 
met the Soviets on 25 September and proposed he travel to Beijing for talks, explaining that Sino-
Indian friendship must be maintained to prevent the Indian right wing from toppling Nehru’s 
Government.  Baliga eventually arrived in Beijing in late October and met Zhou soon after. He 858
repeated the dire warnings of Nehru’s precarious domestic situation and said that Delhi was likely 
to accept Zhou’s suggestion of talks.  859
Nehru’s diplomacy simply boosted Beijing’s confidence in its strategy however. First of all, Nehru’s 
interest in discussions only confirmed that he was weakening and that diplomacy as struggle was 
therefore effective.  But more profoundly, there was a contradiction at the heart of Nehru’s 860
approaches to Beijing. The general perception in Delhi was that China had reverted to a more 
ideologically tainted view of India and so over-estimated the impact of US aid on Indian policy. 
Chinese thinking had become more of ‘doctrinaire rigidity’ with a preference for sharp cold war 
divisions.   Nehru’s diplomacy sought to counter this appealing to Chinese Ambassador Pan Zili 861
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in mid-October not to pre-judge the balance of forces in India and assume the reactionaries were 
managing to change Indian policy.   And yet, Nehru’s consistent appeals for Beijing to consider 862
the domestic opposition he faced only confirmed Beijing’s own perception of a political crisis in 
India.
A growing sense of revolutionary opportunity in India also bolstered the logic for Beijing of 
intervening in Indian politics to exacerbate the confrontation underway. Chinese analysts believed 
the surging power and ambition of India’s reactionary classes had positive revolutionary 
implications: ‘This will cause India’s domestic class struggle and contradictions between the ruling 
groups to increasingly sharpen, to the benefit of the speedy improvement of the Indian people’s 
political awakening.’  By November, Chinese analysts were concluding that India’s big capitalists 863
were forming a new comprador class whose collaboration with imperialism and feudalism was 
revealed by a proliferation of new joint ventures with foreign capital, growing opposition to Nehru’s 
policies and an alliance against Nagpur’s progressive land reform agenda. The moderates on 
India’s middle ground - Nehru and his allies - were weakening and confrontation of the hard right 
with the progressives was escalating.  In fact, it was thought in Beijing that there had been a 864
general shift in India since Longju, and not only now were the right-wing using the border crisis to 
attack Nehru, but Nehru himself was exploiting the tension over Tibet and the border to pressure 
China on the McMahon Line, distract attention from his failing economic policy and discredit 
China’s ‘success’, expose the CPI as unpatriotic and exert pressure on the border states to form a 
‘Himalayan Alliance’.   By the end of November, the Chinese believed that even Indian 865
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moderates were attacking the Sino-Soviet bloc and that Nehru was an impediment to revolution 
who only differed in tactics to the Indian right.866
Such assessments of the brewing confrontation in India and the related international hostility of 
Indian reactionaries, and even Nehru, impacted Beijing all the more powerfully because they were 
closely related to profound ideological differences with the Soviet Union. In fact, Beijing believed 
trends in India bolstered its ideological argument with Moscow. CCP analysts noted that the 
Soviets had re-evaluated the counter-revolutionary function of big and monopoly capitalists in the 
colonial world, subsuming these into the class of national bourgeoisie which, in India’s case, had 
contributed to the struggle for independence and against feudalism. Just when the Chinese had 
identified a dangerous new comprador class in India, the Soviets had dispensed with the concept 
of comprador altogether and concluded that monopoly capitalists were an important source of 
Indian opposition to foreign capital.  Such profound theoretical differences produced conflicting 867
approaches to India. Naturally, the feasibility of ‘peaceful transition’ to socialism in India looked far 
more possible to Soviet eyes that believed Indian capitalists to be fundamentally benign. In Beijing, 
the dismissal of the CPI Government in Kerala in the summer had seemed concrete evidence 
against Moscow’s position.  Indeed by the end of 1959 Mao was entirely skeptical of the concept 868
of peaceful transition.   Furthermore, Soviet aid to India also looked increasingly dubious to 869
Beijing given the power of reactionaries in the country, and their aggressive nationalism.  Finally, 870
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developments in India made the Soviet absolute commitment to peaceful coexistence look naive 
and ineffective when the US imperialists were constructing powerful transnational class alliances 
with Third World capitalists.871
Even as the Baliga initiative paved the way for high-level talks, Beijing kept its eye on global class 
formations and maintained its commitment to the logic of diplomacy as struggle and an inflexible 
internal position. On 7 November 1959, Zhou wrote in notably gentler tone to Delhi, not retreating 
on principle but formally proposing talks and mutual withdrawal.  Privately, the Chinese thought 872
the Indian authorities were ‘two-faced’, so struggle was unavoidable, but the aim was to achieve 
‘unity’ in order to concentrate forces against US imperialism. Therefore, attacks on imperialists and 
reactionaries were made to support the CPI and other progressives, but struggle would go on while 
Delhi refused compromise.  Zhou and Chen Yi continued to explain regularly through December 873
and January that it was foolish to expect Chinese concessions to stop Nehru’s drift rightwards. 
Instead, principled criticism would expose Nehru’s reactionary side, educate the masses and 
perhaps soften his stance.874
Baliga’s efforts in particular put Nehru’s diplomacy in a fresh light. Delhi’s rejection of Zhou’s 7 
November proposal for joint withdrawal on the border was not unreasonable anyway, given the 
more challenging topography on which Indian forces were arrayed. But, it is clear now that Zhou’s 
proposal for talks was a response to Baliga, so the idea that Nehru only agreed to talks in January 
1960 is incorrect.  Furthermore, some contend that Nehru’s distinction between talks and 875
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negotiations made it clear Delhi ruled out any thought of compromise.  But this ignores Nehru’s 876
strategy which was to maintain a tough line in public to give him maximum flexibility while privately 
seeking Beijing’s understanding. Nehru then sought to continue this approach in the April talks.
A key element of the April talks in Delhi was India’s rejection of the apparently reasonable and 
highly practical offer by Zhou to exchange confirmation of the McMahon Line in the east for China’s 
claim in Ladakh. The Chinese insisted the Indians had misunderstood their earlier note in 
September, it was not a claim on NEFA they now said.  However, Zhou told Nehru, if Delhi 877
insisted on negotiating the Ladakh boundary then they would have to discuss the eastern sector 
also.  India had foreseen this offer and had ruled out it internally already.  The offer only 878 879
seemed to confirm Chinese duplicity. The Indians believed that the Chinese had long since 
accepted the McMahon Line, so to make it the basis of a swap deal now indicated extreme 
duplicity. In addition, the Chinese had previously assured India that maps showing Ladakh as 
Chinese were old and needed revising. Furthermore, the swap deal was premised on the notion of 
a long-standing status quo and Chinese occupation up to its claim line. However, the Indians felt  
the Chinese had only very recently seized territory in southern Ladakh, and to accept the swap 
meant acquiescing in this aggression. In addition, it was not even clear where exactly China was 
claiming the border in Ladakh should run.880
The Chinese in turn rejected an alternative compromise. Despite good grounds for affront, public 
opposition, constitutional impediments and new confidence in India’s case, Nehru nevertheless 
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hinted that concessions were possible.  The Indian Prime Minister’s closest adviser, VK Krishna 881
Menon, had favoured a political deal, despite the difficulties.   Therefore, while Nehru rejected the 882
idea of a straight swap of China’s claim in Ladakh for the McMahon Line, he suggested that China 
need not give up all its claims in Ladakh, only those parts in the south and south east which had 
‘obviously come under Chinese occupation only in the last one or one and a half years.’  Nehru 883
had also made a public statement before the talks that India might be able to concede use of the 
Aksai Chin road to China, and the Indians also considered offering this in talks.  However, Zhou 884
rejected India’s charge that China had only recently occupied territory in southern parts of Ladakh 
and insisted there was a longstanding status quo.  The reality was then that it was China that 885
refused a compromise where one was available in the Western sector, insisting instead that India 
accept an offer based on China conceding the McMahon Line - already conceded, the Indians 
believed, in 1957 - in return for India accepting China’s new claims in the West.
The inability to define a status quo on the borders led the Indians back to the legal case and 
produced an impasse because Beijing’s diplomacy as struggle focused on a principled rejection of 
the legalities. All Beijing could agree was that a joint committee of Indian and Chinese officials 
could meet to compare their arguments. However, Beijing had already made it clear several times 
in 1959 that they rejected the legal basis of the McMahon Line. Zhou now told Nehru that he 
advised in a ‘friendly manner’ that the Indians should not bring up Simla to make a legal argument, 
it was this that had caused a problem.  And Chen Yi also explained to one Indian Minister that 886
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Simla had very problematic implications for Beijing’s sovereignty in Tibet.  The reality of entering 887
the legal lists against Zhou was simply that he countered every argument with one of his own. 
When Nehru cited the history of Minsar, an enclave within Tibetan territory, from which Kashmiri 
authorities had collected taxes until 1950, Zhou shot back that ‘we’, by which he meant Lhasa, had 
collected taxes in the East, south of the McMahon Line, up to 1950 also.  The agreement to have 888
a joint committee examine the respective facts of each case was simply an agreement to wrangle 
endlessly over legal interpretation, and signalled no solution. For the Chinese, legal arguments 
were anathema, a threat to Beijing’s sovereignty and legitimacy. A final note handed to the Chinese 
at the conclusion of the talks underlined the problem. It detailed India’s provocative notion of 
Himalayan sovereignty. The note pertained to questions of Indian rights over Bhutan and Sikkim, 
the 1954 agreement, pilgrims, traders and cross-border movement, and also various enclave rights 
within Tibet.  India saw this as legitimate because these hierarchical arrangements were inherited 889
from the British, but failed to grasp how provocative this was to the Chinese, hyper-sensitive to the 
existence of external interference in Tibet and any limits on its sovereignty.
There were compelling reasons for Delhi to take refuge in legal argument however. Not least, 
asserting a strong legal case gave Nehru some cover from his domestic critics. But, in addition, the 
Indians just did not trust the Chinese enough to drop the legalities and move to a full renegotiation 
of the border. They feared an array of new claims. India could not drop the legal argument in the 
East partly because it was also making a legal argument in the West.  The Government of India’s 890
research into the history of the Western sector had given it a new confidence in their rights in 
Ladakh by the time talks began with Zhou. Also, Delhi now found that there were constitutional 
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constraints to making territorial concessions.  More profoundly, the Republic of India was legally 891
speaking, if not also in other ways, a continuity state. To reject the McMahon Line as illegitimate 
would throw into doubt an array of claims made by Delhi on the princely states, tribal areas and 
Himalayan states. And finally, Nehru, at least, saw legal argument as the only alternative to war in 
international politics.
Beijing and Delhi each presented the outcome of the talks in line with their own diplomatic strategy 
but both were most concerned with the opinion of one constituency, the Indian public.  Beijing 
emphasised that potential unity was only obstructed by Indian reactionaries. Hence, the Chinese 
tried to insert to the talks’ concluding joint statement Zhou’s imagined ‘common points’ and an 
expression that the joint committee would progress towards a ‘reasonable settlement’.  Zhou 892
then reiterated his ‘common points’ in his one man show with the Indian press on the 25 April.  893
The Chinese media concluded in the following weeks that the Indian people had now learnt how 
fair Beijing was and that Zhou’s account was accurate and the limited results of talks was down to 
the obstructionism of Indian reactionaries.  894
With India’s private probing of a compromise thwarted, Delhi only wanted to make clear to the 
public how unreasonable China was. Hence, Dutt was content that the joint statement ‘will give no 
false impression to public that there is hope of reasonable settlement on basis of Chinese 
suggestions.’ Delhi’s distrust of the Chinese remained strong because Beijing still avoided 
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clarifying their actual view of the border and had refused to share their historical materials.  Dutt 895
wrote to all embassies abroad that China would not accept the McMahon Line and wanted a swap 
of NEFA for Ladakh.  The fact he did not explain that China only objected to the legality of the 896
line showed how distrust clouded Delhi’s perception of China’s position. Dutt simply saw Ladakh 
for NEFA as an outrageous attempt to secure recently seized territory. Delhi held out very little 
hope for the work of the joint committee because of China’s apparently sly approach to sharing 
evidence. Therefore, India dismissed Beijing’s attempts to characterise the committee as 
movement towards a solution.   897
Beijing’s diplomacy following the Longju clash was highly ideological in conception and practice. All 
its moves were framed as interventions in Indian political confrontations to support its class allies. 
Beijing’s goal was to either force Nehru to make concessions or else to expose his hypocrisy 
before the Indian people. This diplomacy as struggle was also pursued with an eye to 
demonstrating to the Soviets the dubious nature of Nehru’s state. The ideological importance of 
making that clear to Moscow fortified Beijing’s resolution. The problem was that Beijing managed 
to provoke Indian nationalism so profoundly that Nehru would find it extremely hard to make any 
reasonable concessions. Nehru found that as a result he had to quietly circumvent public opinion 
and discreetly approach the Chinese to persuade them that he was their best hope for good 
relations with the Indian state. However, perversely Nehru’s efforts were one reason why the 
Chinese maintained their approach. In addition, Chinese analysis of Indian politics was that a 
revolutionary tide was building and so they should do nothing to stem the flood. The Chinese 
believed that the Indian capitalists who were inciting the border crisis and intervention in Tibet, 
were increasingly allied to global imperialism and so to not confront them was to abandon Beijing’s 
revolutionary responsibilities. The Soviets, by contrast, seemed in Chinese eyes, to have become 
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so ideologically corrupted that they could not see the risks. As a result, Beijing had no intention of 
compromising at the talks in April. When Nehru’s efforts ran aground diplomacy was left as a 
simple exchange of legal arguments, an empty game that barely suppressed the mounting distrust.
Imperialism
The conclusions drawn in Delhi and Beijing from the failure to secure a compromise over the 
border swiftly became entangled with various levels of contest around the idea and practice of 
imperialism. Beijing believed that India’s comprador class were compelling the country to collude 
with global imperialism and pursue local imperialism. Indian obstinacy regarding the border was 
manifest Indian expansionism. Conversely, many Indians thought the territorial claims apparently 
made by Beijing were only reheated Chinese imperialism, long evinced by Tibet’s fate. Each side 
then viewed the dramatic explosion of new Cold War tension in spring 1960 through this prism. 
Beijing thought India was manipulating the Soviets to accommodate US imperialism and thereby 
betray the world revolution. In effect, Beijing had decided that Nehruvian non-alignment was a 
sham.  This perception implicated India in the absolute crisis that Beijing faced in terms of the 
collapsing alliance with Moscow just as China was being overwhelmed by economic calamity. 
Confrontation with Delhi therefore served to highlight India’s true nature as an opponent of 
revolution and underscore Beijing’s own revolutionary virtue, in order to help the Soviets rectify 
their own errors. Meanwhile, Indian leaders imagined that Beijing’s opposition to Moscow’s detente 
policy reflected the patent and intrinsic aggressiveness already revealed at the border. These 
perceptions fed into the contest of local imperialisms between China and India with a paranoid 
feedback stimulating further insecurity and counter-measures. Both viewed the other’s local 
imperialism through the prism of their international image, multiplying therefore the sense of threat. 
Beijing believed particularly that India’s defection from global anti-colonialism complemented its 
increasingly chauvinist regional attitude. India believed the Chinese were implementing revolution 
in Tibet and threatening the same more widely. India’s much damaged reputation for anti-
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colonialism undermined its strategic position regionally, giving Beijing the opportunity to woo Nepal 
and Pakistan. These accumulating insecurities only added further relief to the border dispute.
The international crisis that developed in May 1960 gave a hard-razored edge to the simmering 
Sino-Indian conflict and showed that there was a contest underway to influence Moscow’s attitude 
to detente. US pilot Gary Powers had crashed his U2 spy plane in Soviet territory on 1 May and the 
fall-out from this incident had eventually derailed the much anticipated Four Power Summit in Paris 
in mid-May.  Delhi regarded Beijing’s welcome of renewed superpower tension as demonstrating 
China’s inherent belligerence, preference for cold war conditions and desire to attack India and its 
nonalignment, and Indo-Soviet relations. Subimal Dutt noted the Indians were again labelled 
‘running dogs of imperialism’ for being, he assumed, insufficiently critical of the US.  Nehru 898
thought that the Chinese ‘not only expressed their pleasure at the break up, but have tried to run 
down India. Their attempt has been to break up the friendly relations that exist between India and 
the Soviet Union as this comes in the way of their own policies.’  There was therefore relief in 899
Delhi when Sino-Soviet differences were publicly aired at the Bucharest Conference of Communist 
Parties in June. Indian observers particularly relished the fact that these differences were on issues 
on which Delhi and Moscow were in agreement: peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition and the 
positive character of the bourgeois governments of the newly independent African Asian states. 
India applauded the criticism at Bucharest of China’s support for confrontational local communist 
parties therefore.   Indian leaders clearly felt they had a stake in the growing Sino-Soviet split and 900
Nehru remained fundamentally optimistic about Khrushchev also, believing his recent disarmament 
proposals were sincere.901
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Beijing interpreted India’s response to events as evidence that Delhi was hostile and implicated in 
the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance due its encouragement of Moscow’s accommodation of 
global imperialism. In Beijing it seemed that Indian anxiety at the failure of the Summit Conference 
was linked to fear that this would lead to an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations.  Beijing 902
believed there was a vicious Indian media campaign to attack China, in cahoots with US 
imperialism, and the collaboration of senior ministers.  Indian President, Rajendra Prashad’s, 903
June visit to the USSR was held to be a spoiling effort prior to the Bucharest Conference.   The 904
Indian media’s subsequent focus on the disagreements at Bucharest therefore looked hugely 
provocative and aimed at forestalling Sino-Soviet rapprochement.  That Khrushchev publicly 905
doubted, before the international comrades, China’s account of Indian aggression on the border 
suggested Indian manipulation was successful.  China’s sense that Delhi was toying with 906
Moscow was heightened by the impression that India had a fundamental partiality for the US.  907
Therefore, India seemed to be actively exacerbating the first order crisis that Beijing now faced as 
the alliance with Moscow crumbled and Khrushchev recalled Soviet experts from China while the 
country confronted vast economic damage.  908
In a major change from just the end of 1959, Beijing now regarded Indian non-alignment to be a 
complete charade and an obstacle to national independence movements. Soviet support for India 
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was therefore a huge error and in stark contrast to Beijing’s own activism. First of all, India had 
switched voting patterns on the ICC in Vietnam, supporting, it seemed, US interests.  But more 909
generally, India’s whole policy to the Third World had taken a reactionary turn. India’s press was 
undermining China’s reputation in Africa, especially Algeria, and Indian advocacy of non-violence 
and economic ‘reformism’ only encouraged compromise with capitalism and imperialism there and 
in Latin America. Furthermore, India had shamelessly rushed to supply the US’s sugar shortfall 
when Washington had imposed an embargo on Cuba.  While in Beijing’s eyes India’s reputation 910
for anti-colonialism had collapsed, Mao was increasingly proclaiming a vision of a global 
revolutionary struggle against imperialism. The Chairman sought to frame his own foreign policy 
action as supportive of resistance movements such as in Algeria or Lebanon.  He told Latin 911
American and African visitors in May that they ‘all stood on one front line together’, and though 
everyone wanted peace one cannot trust imperialists.  He lectured an FLN delegation on the 912
power of cross-border popular alliances, and, hinting at the problem of working with the Indian 
Government he added, ‘The only people we do not ally with are feudal landlords and compradors.’ 
Mao also subtly sidelined the Soviets pointing out that their relations with France meant they could 
not recognise Algeria’s provisional government.913
Soviet support for India’s foreign policy was one aspect of its revolutionary treachery but Moscow’s 
burgeoning relations with Indian state elites further evinced its infamy at a moment when revolution 
beckoned. To Beijing, the massive strikes of July and rumours of a right wing coup signalled that 
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India teetered on the edge of ultimate class confrontation.  Feudalism, monopoly capitalism and 914
dependence on US imperialism had sabotaged the Second Five Year Plan (FYP) and the newly 
unveiled Third Five Year Plan appeared to be an abject capitulation to reactionary pressure.  915
Rather than rally the revolutionary ranks, Moscow was canoodling with the compradors. In June, 
‘even the comprador capitalist Birla’ was to visit the USSR to discuss ‘the possibility of some 
investment in India’s private sector by the Soviet’s’.  Cooperation with Birla was shocking. Mao 916
had recently ascribed the CCP’s long term success to its ability to distinguish comprador capitalists 
and nationalist capitalists.  So, not only had Moscow recalled its expert advisers from China, it 917
was obstructing India’s revolution by channeling support to those very reactionary elites who were 
blocking progressive economic policies.
Beijing had some brief success in dragging Moscow away from Delhi, but the recovery was short-
lived, and the Chinese soon concluded that the Soviets had abandoned Marxism under Indian 
influence. In the latter half of 1960, mass starvation in China created an acute desire for Soviet 
economic aid and softened Beijing’s treatment of Moscow.  But Khrushchev had also indicated a 918
more revolutionary view of the Third World by literally embracing the Algerian nationalists at the UN 
in October.  As a result, the Moscow Conference in December saw more warmth in Sino-Soviet 919
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relations, and the CPSU supported Deng Xiaoping in his spat with the CPI.  But, even while 920
Beijing and Moscow largely agreed that India’s contribution to the UN intervention in the Congo 
was wrong, Chinese judgement was far harsher, regarding India now as having lost its anti-colonial 
reputation entirely.  In May 1961 Zhou warned the Soviets of Indian greed for US aid: ‘China has 921
an old saying: “Who has milk is mother.” Children can be forgiven for this, they are puerile, but 
Nehru is no child, he is consciously acting as the running dog of imperialism.’ Zhou urged a more 
revolutionary line on India. If Nehru became even more reactionary, or even died, then the ruling 
group in India might split, inciting the revolutionary mood of the Indian people.  The Chinese 922
leadership believed that Nehru no longer opposed imperialism and his views had infected the 
Soviets. Liu Shaoqi explained to Albanian guests that Nehru had forgotten that ‘war follows 
imperialism’, and now some among ‘the ranks of communists’ think like this representative of the 
‘capitalist class’, showing that ‘in our revolutionary ranks there are people who have cast off 
Marxism.’  As the glaring fissures within the Sino-Soviet alliance collapsed, Beijing refused to see 923
Nehru’s seizure of Goa in December 1961 as anything but a shameful fig leaf shielding his 
defection from anti-colonialism, while the Soviets defended the action resolutely as a great 
victory.  924
These perceptions of each other at the international level, of India as defector from the anti-colonial 
camp, and of China as inherently belligerent and opposed to detente, intensified the spiral of 
imperial anxiety at the local and regional level, in turn reinforcing those wider views. The border 
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dispute was seen on both sides as serving a wider extension of power across the region, with India 
pursing a ‘Himalayan alliance’, while the Indians once again tried to stimulate development projects 
in the border regions to compete with the progress of the ‘dynamic Chinese’.   But Beijing and 925
Delhi often reacted as much against the others method of securing assumed imperial objectives as 
against the simple fact of the other’s presence.
Nehru’s increasing anxiety to gain Beijing’s acceptance Delhi dominance of the border states, only 
underlined his imperial image in Chinese eyes. Since the border clash at Longju in August 1959, 
and the newly acute sense of a Chinese threat, Delhi had been making fresh efforts to tie Bhutan 
and Sikkim into a subservient relationship.  Various efforts were made to secure Beijing’s 926
recognition of these arrangements.  At the end of the April 1960 talks Delhi’s supplementary note 927
had included its rights over Sikkim and Bhutan. However, it was only in July 1961 that the Indians 
finally managed to wrench an oral reassurance from the Chinese to ‘respect’ India’s relations with 
Sikkim and Bhutan. Despite this the Chinese said they thought it strange India used China to 
pressure these states.  The Chinese expressed puzzlement at Indian treatment of Sikkim as a 928
‘protectorate’ and said such practice ‘is rare in Asian and African countries’.929
Beijing’s resumption of revolutionary techniques to consolidate peripheral zones confirmed Indian 
perceptions that the Chinese had turned away from moderation and opposed Moscow’s detente 
policy. Following the Lhasa rebellion and Dalai Lama’s flight, Mao had explicitly, and almost with 
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relief, deployed the tools of class struggle and radical social transformation to secure Tibet, 
dispensing with the idea of autonomy in the process. Indeed, at the end of 1959, as the border 
crisis broke, Chinese officials had assumed that only thorough ‘democratic reform’ in Tibet would 
resolve the border problem.  Indian observation of this change to revolutionary methods in Tibet 930
only heightened the general sense of a Chinese threat. One official remarked that China’s strategy 
was to use the Himalayas to project a communist transformation onto India.  This Indian 931
insecurity had the concrete effect - common in the Cold War - of leading Delhi to jettison more 
progressive preferences in favour of securing the allegiance of Himalayan elites, such as the 
Maharajkumar of Sikkim, in order to secure his opposition to the Chinese.932
Beijing exploited Delhi’s declining reputation for anti-colonialism and presented itself as the 
defender of the victims of Indian chauvinism. In particular Beijing was able by the end of 1961 to 
have made great progress in vastly improving its ties to Kathmandu and Islamabad.  Delhi’s 933
rejection of Pakistan’s proposal of joint defence in 1959 allowed Beijing to develop ties so that it 
began talks with Islamabad in summer 1961 on a border settlement, deliberately seeking to create 
tension between India, the US and the Pakistanis.  India’s reputation for being a regional bully 934
permitted Beijing to lever these key regional actors further away from it.
In 1960 the realisation in Beijing and Delhi that their keenest international ambitions were in acute 
conflict sharpened the already well developed sense of local and regional conflict.The border crisis 
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had led both Delhi and Beijing to increasingly perceive the other as aggressive and imperialist, but 
in 1960 the wider Cold War crisis added a layer of suspicion to Sino-Indian relations by testing, it 
appeared to both, where each stood on the question of international peace.  Delhi interpreted 
Beijing’s welcome of the crisis in superpower relations as proving both its desire to wreck 
Moscow’s detente policy and its inherent preference for conflict. Meanwhile, Chinese leaders 
thought that India had abandoned anti-colonialism and was encouraging Moscow to break from 
revolution and collaborate with global imperialism. Furthermore, Beijing was shocked that although 
India teetered on the verge of revolution, and its Government had shifted towards a reactionary 
foreign policy, the Soviets were perversely increasing aid. In Beijing, this perspective underlined 
the absolute crisis they faced as their alliance with the Soviets crumbled while economic disaster 
engulfed the country. Confrontation with India, and Mao’s more active revolutionary foreign policy, 
were a way of exposing Nehru and highlighting Beijing’s revolutionary virtue to educate the Soviets 
about their errors. These negative perceptions of each other at the global level fed into the 
suspicion of each other’s local and regional aims, adding to the paranoia about the border.  But the 
specific, contrasting approaches that Beijing and Delhi each took to their respective imperial 
projects were particularly provocative because these seemed to confirm, and so reinforce, those 
impressions formed at the wider international level. Nehru’s efforts to secure Bhutan and Sikkim’s 
submission only compounded his reputation in Beijing’s eyes. Beijing by contrast was pursuing 
revolutionary imperialism in Tibet and therefore underscoring, from Delhi’s perspective, the 
Chinese retreat from Moscow’s moderation. Delhi soon discovered that its declining reputation for 
anti-colonialism and more assertive regional policy provided China the chance to draw away Nepal 
and Pakistan further compounding and deepening the security crisis that defined Sino-Indian 
relations by the middle of 1961.
War
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In late 1961, Delhi conceived the ‘Forward Policy’ as a counter to China’s advance and a way to 
reframe the public mood to create domestic political conditions more conducive to Nehru’s efforts 
to solve the border problem. The new policy was enabled by a change in military leadership and by 
a broad-based conviction that China would not respond in force. This confidence lay in a matrix of 
overlapping views related to Nehru’s binary understanding of war and peace as absolute 
opposites, his trust that Moscow would restrain Beijing’s belligerence, his conceit that India was 
protected by its unassailable reputation for non-aligned virtue, and racial prejudice about Chinese 
cowardice. But Nehru’s strategy was undone by the failure to grasp both Beijing’s capacity for 
deploying limited warfare and its tendency to view public discourse, whether in terms of media, 
parliament or public events as objects of political struggle. It was less Indian advances on the 
border that prompted Beijing to escalate the confrontation, but more the public reception of this 
advance. Furthermore,  Beijing’s observation of a renewed and public Indian challenge to its 
legitimacy in Tibet further underlined the importance of again intervening in India’s public debates.  
Meanwhile, as India’s general hostility was further confirmed by its dalliance with Jiang Jieshi and 
hostile tone at the ICC in Vietnam, China’s overall security crisis had eased, giving Beijing more 
flexibility to deal with India. But the most critical factor in Beijing’s turn against Delhi would be the 
conviction that the Soviets were making India the vanguard of their hostility to China. Cooperation 
with Moscow, tenuous as it had been, lost its final value once the Laos Accords were signed in July 
1962. This meant that Mao was free to stir the cauldron of Sino-Indian confrontation and thereby 
highlight the woeful sins of Soviet revisionism, Moscow’s turn from revolution and embrace of 
China’s enemies in India.
Delhi began 1961 by combining a hard public line with a new bout of private diplomacy. The Joint 
Committee, set up during the April 1960 talks and tasked to compare each sides’ border 
arguments, had produced the Officials’ Report. This document - essentially divided between 
China’s and India’s separate cases - reinforced Nehru’s confidence regarding Ladakh but therefore 
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also increased Delhi’s outrage at Beijing’s new expanded claim in that sector.  One Indian 935
historian says India’s misrepresentation of historical facts in the report related to the West was a 
‘disgrace’.  As a result, Beijing unsurprisingly rejected Nehru’s initial demand that China accept 936
India’s case as a precondition of talks. The Chinese later explained that they avoided public 
comment to temper the controversy but for India to claim an irrefutable case ‘does not hold water 
at all’.  Despite the public confidence in the Indian arguments contained in the Officials’ Report, 937
Delhi nonetheless accepted the former Ambassador to the PRC, RK Nehru’s, plan in early 1961 for 
‘quiet talks’ with the Chinese. RK said they must exit the ‘collision course’ they were on and 
prevent the developing entente of Pakistan and China. He warned against the assumption that 
poor relations with China buttressed Indian ties to the US and USSR. He pointed out the Officials’ 
Report had been put in ‘cold storage’ in Beijing while India’s parliament was denouncing the 
Chinese as ‘expansionists and aggressors.’  RK’s advice that Delhi again use private diplomacy 938
to sidestep this public furore was accepted.
Although RK Nehru’s July 1961 trip to China overcame intense Chinese suspicion to achieve what 
he called the possibilities of a ‘grand bargain’, nevertheless, public protest and opposition in India 
again proved insurmountable. Chinese skepticism perceived an array of ulterior motives behind 
Indian action and no real sign it was ready to end the ‘anti-China’ policy.  Zhou’s personal 939
assessment was that the US ‘brazenly made use of India’ while India ‘shamelessly supported the 
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US’, and Nehru was ‘treacherous and extremely cunning’.  Regardless, Beijing’s desire for ‘unity’ 940
meant detente with India was welcome and RK was told the quiet diplomacy ‘which India had 
initiated should be continued either on the basis of the reports, or on the basis of new proposals.’ 
On the principle of ‘recent administrative control’ China might concede ‘Southern Ladakh’ and 
NEFA, with some adjustments, in return for India conceding Aksai Chin and Lingzitang. Indian 
‘treaty rights’ in Bhutan and Sikkim and even Indian sovereignty in Jammu and Kashmir might also 
be recognised.  After RK left Beijing, the Chinese told Ambassador Parthasarathi that Delhi could 941
not claim the US’s stance on Kashmir was worse than China’s,  and nor did Chinese diplomats 942
reject the mooted ceding of use of the Aksai Chin road.  But public opinion and Parliamentary 943
pressure forced Nehru to dismiss the talks as ‘infructuous’ and RK’s visit to Beijing was widely 
derided as appeasement.944
Not only did Delhi continue to face the vast impediment of public opposition to a deal, but there 
was also a very real sense in 1961 that India’s security position was deteriorating, as China 
advanced on the border. Already, in January 1961, the Indian military was acutely aware of how 
vulnerable they were in both Eastern and Western sectors of the border.  This situation continued 945
to decline through the year. By September, China had twenty two new posts in the West, an 
interconnected road system and 4,600 square km of new territory. China’s total number of posts 
was unclear but India had only twenty seven and few were in disputed territory. In the East, China 
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had twenty five new posts along the McMahon Line.   But, not only were the Chinese 946
consolidating powerfully, the activity also suggested they were pushing up to the new claim line in 
the West, presented during the officials’ talks.  The extent to which Indian officials commented on 947
this new claim line showed the anxiety over China’s reputation for duplicity.948
Facing the combination of an intractable security problem, made worse by Nepal and Pakistan’s 
warming relations with Delhi, and the limitations dictated by public sentiment, Nehru shifted to a 
more active defence of the border to complement diplomatic efforts. The ultimate goal was to 
placate public opinion sufficiently to make a deal with Beijing in a less pressured political 
environment after the 1962 elections. Indeed, Ambassador Parthasarathi hinted to the Chinese in 
Summer 1961 that such was Delhi’s thinking when he told Vice Minister Geng Biao that, ‘the era of 
making use of the problem of Sino-Indian relations as an electoral trick is already over’.   The 949
new approach on the border was outlined on 2 November 1961 in a meeting of Nehru and his 
senior advisers and became known as the ‘Forward Policy’. This shift called for a more assertive 
posture with the army to patrol, in both East and West, as far up to the - Indian defined - 
international border as possible, and set up posts to block further Chinese advance. Concentrated 
forces were also to be built up in deep strategic positions to back up this advance.  The exact 950
origins of this policy are unclear, but it was certainly facilitated by changes at the highest level of 
the Army.  The change was complemented by a combination of diplomatic pressure and some 951
private flexibility. In December 1961, Delhi rejected Beijing’s request for talks to renew the 1954 
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agreement on Tibet, and would repeat this in April.   Then, in January 1962, Delhi deputised 952
Burmese leader U Nu as an intermediary with a more conciliatory proposal for Beijing.  If Beijing 
could accept Indian sovereignty in Aksai Chin then the road could be de facto ceded to China. 
Beijing only needed to show some willingness to withdraw but physical withdrawal itself was 
unnecessary. Although U Nu’s message produced no reply, in March the Indians explained to the 
British that a token Chinese withdrawal in the West would lead to a settlement; or else both sides 
withdraw to form a vast no-man’s land, with the Chinese maintaining use of their road.953
The ‘Forward Policy’ was premised on the militarily naive assumption that Beijing would not 
respond with major force. The previous military strategy of simply opposing a limited attack had 
assumed that the politicians would ensure no major attack occurred.  But this view survived the 954
change to a more active border posture. Some have speculated that BN Mullik, Director of the 
Intelligence Bureau, and BM Kaul, the new Army Chief of General Staff, were encouraged by their 
CIA contacts to diffuse the idea of Chinese passivity.  Indeed, at the key meeting of 2 November, 955
Mullik contradicted the Army HQ Annual Intelligence review of 1959-60 by saying, ‘the Chinese 
would not react to our establishing new posts and that they were NOT LIKELY TO USE FORCE 
AGAINST ANY OF OUR POSTS EVEN IF THEY WERE IN A POSITION TO DO SO’.  BM Kaul 956
had pointed out the logistical limitations of the ‘Forward Policy’, but was confident that this 
weakness could be ignored because the Chinese would not respond.  957
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Whatever the influence of the CIA, the broad confidence amongst Indian politicians that China 
would not respond in force was partly derived from the conception of the ‘Forward Policy’ as 
defensive and serving a clear diplomatic goal. However, Nehru was unaware that in 
implementation the new approach was more rash than originally conceived. On 5 December, Army 
Headquarters’ written orders to local commands dropped one of the three key operative decisions 
of the  new policy: ‘to position major concentration of forces along our borders in places 
conveniently situated behind the forward posts from where they could be maintained logistically 
and from where they can restore a border situation at short notice.’  Chief of the Army, General 958
Thapar later said that such a build up would have taken years to achieve.  The HBBR report 959
surmised that if this element of the plan had been given to local commanders they would have 
made it clear that they lacked the resources to implement the policy.  So, Nehru and his 960
Government wanted to be more cautious, but were not fully apprised of the military restraints. 
Nehru’s comments in Parliament suggested that he did not know that the military had modified the 
‘Forward Policy’ in this way.961
But the general insouciance about the risk of provoking Beijing also came from more profound 
sources. Nehru and many of his colleagues appeared ignorant of Mao’s subtle understanding of 
war and peace. Indian leaders often remarked that fear that any Sino-Indian conflict might escalate 
into a major international war restrained Beijing.  Such confidence was hard to explain given the 962
Korean War and crises over Taiwan, and Mao’s often expressed appreciation for the progressive 
value of war and generally bellicose language. But Nehru did not realise that his own 
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understanding of war and peace as binary opposites stood in stark contrast to Mao’s view of these 
as existing on a broad spectrum on which ultimate war and ultimate peace were fairly unlikely 
outcomes.  This in fact explained Mao’s nuclear posture. It was not that he disregarded the 963
devastation of a nuclear attack, but that he was able to imagine a confrontation encompassing 
such devastation and being won. A correct analysis of Mao’s fomentation of the Taiwan Straits 
crises and regularly belligerent language should have alerted Indian leaders to Beijing’s readiness 
to embark on carefully calibrated, limited warfare. Nehru was strategically hobbled therefore by the 
inability to think beyond the absolute categories of nuclear war or total peace. Delhi’s reluctance to 
regard military action as warlike was suggested by the tendency to refer to its forceful moves on 
the border as ‘police action’, a ‘nominalist fallacy’ committed also in discussion of the Hyderabad 
campaign.  964
Nehru also seemed to think that close relations with Moscow protected him from Beijing.  Delhi 965
knew that Sino-Soviet differences were most acute on the question of the feasibility and desirability 
of peaceful coexistence.  But the assumption seemed to be that Moscow’s commitment to 966
peaceful coexistence would constrain Beijing. This was a strange view given that Nehru had 
always expected that Beijing would prove to be independent of Moscow. Furthermore, because 
Nehru misunderstood Beijing’s appreciation of the possibilities of limited warfare, no one in Delhi 
realised that Mao’s opposition to Moscow’s policy of peaceful coexistence and superpower bi-polar 
hegemony meant that proximity to the USSR made India more, not less, of a target. In essence, 
Mao’s growing desire for ideological and political independence from Moscow made him more 
likely to engage in limited warfare to underline the superiority of his strategic insights, which 
contrasted with a strategy based on absolute peaceful coexistence.
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That the forward policy has been identified as having a ‘flavour’ of satyagraha seems persuasive. 
Delhi’s sense of victimhood in Ladakh must have stimulated a desire to wield Gandhi’s weapon of 
the virtuous weak in the hearts of onetime Gandhian warriors like Nehru.  However, it was 967
Nehruvian nonalignment that provided the additional moral armour necessary to confront a 
materially superior foe because to attack nonaligned India was surely anathema. The test of India’s 
foreign policy, Nehru said in October 1959, ought to be ‘does it keep alight the lamp of peace and 
spread its radiance… For the world has to face a great choice, peace or terrible and ultimate 
war.’  Nehru conceded that nonalignment might have isolated the PRC but it also kept the 968
Soviets neutral in the Sino-Indian dispute.  Nehru’s unique understanding of nonalignment 969
precluded the formation of a bloc or alliance even on the basis of nonalignment.  This principled 970
stand gave India an exemplary moral stature and a priori demonstrated India to be bereft of any 
hostile intent. Hence, the ‘Forward Policy’ could only be regarded as the righteous response to 
injustice.
Delhi’s confidence was finally buttressed by a hint of racial stereotypes redolent of the Raj. The 
Intelligence Bureau assessment of September 1961, just prior to the formal decision for the 
‘Forward Policy’ gives some impression: ‘the Chinese would like to come up to their claim line of 
1960 where we ourselves are not on occupation. But where even a dozen men of ours are present, 
the Chinese have kept away.’  The sense that Chinese soldiers were flighty and not up to the 971
stalwart Indian jawan was not uncommon. One MP complained in Parliament in 1962 that, ‘Two 
hundred Indian soldiers are equal to two thousand of the Chinese…why should we be afraid of 
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them?’  This perception acted at a vital junction of Indian strategic thinking as was shown by LP 972
Sen’s reassurances to his officers in September 1962 that the army’s experiences in Ladakh 
showed the Chinese were apt to run away if confronted.  The broad influence of racism on China 973
policy was further illustrated by efforts to disguise the fact that moves to register and restrict 
foreigners in India from late 1959 was motivated chiefly against the Chinese population. Dutt 
wanted civil officers to avoid giving the impression that there was a census of Chinese underway. 
However, the resolution to exclude the possibility of Indian citizenship for any Chinese of Calcutta, 
except in the most exceptional of cases, rather pointed to the reality of anti-Chinese paranoia 
within the Indian Government.  Public statements by senior Ministers like Pant about the threat of 974
a ‘Yellow Peril’ only confirmed the extent to which many Indians had imbibed European racial 
prejudice.975
As Spring thawed in 1962 across the Himalayas, geographic and climactic obstacles to India’s 
‘Forward Policy’ melted away and military tensions grew. New Indian posts were spread out in both 
Eastern and Western sectors, but the posts in Ladakh were especially provocative because they 
were within China’s 1960 claim line and were often very close to Chinese positions in territory each 
side firmly believed to be its own.  Beijing sent a series of protest notes but, with India now on the 976
advance, it was decided in April that China also needed to resume patrolling.  A special border 977
meeting called by Zhou in May indicated the concern in Beijing regarding the issue of border 
security generally.  Indian confidence that the Chinese feared conflict only grew when a 978
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confrontation in early May, in Chip Chap Valley in the far West of Ladakh, ended with the PLA 
troops withdrawing.  979
However, Indian confidence was misplaced because Beijing was fully aware of the inherent fragility 
of Delhi’s posture and the effort to use the advance on the border to build public support.  One 
Chinese diplomat explained to the Soviets in Delhi that India’s overall position on the border was 
rather weak with its small posts hard to supply. Although each new advance was greeted with a 
‘big noise’ by the Indian media, the whole strategy simply invited a final conflict to resolve 
matters.  Therefore, although Beijing was skirting direct clashes on the border it was initiating 980
moves to prepare for a much wider confrontation. Through May, planning for war was accelerated 
on both fronts, with an attack in the east conceived as supporting the theatre in the west. 
Preparations were to be completed by June. These measures were carried out in parallel with 
readiness to meet a possible attack from Taiwan.981
Beijing had recognised a new diplomatic and media tone in India in early 1962 but despite the U 
Nu message of January the Chinese saw no substantive change.  It seemed that India was 982
linking the border to other issues like Tibet and the visit of a union delegation to Beijing. In mid-
May, Zhang Wenji complained that India only repeated the unfair demand for China to withdraw in 
Ladakh, but to be fair India should also withdraw in the East. Zhang said the Aksai Chin road plan 
was simply interference in China’s domestic affairs but if India stopped advancing the situation 
would stabilise. He added that Delhi complicated matters by linking the border to renegotiation of 
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the 1954 Tibet treaty and other questions.  Nevertheless,  Beijing did observe in June that the 983
Indian media viewed Nehru’s public comments that the Chinese desired to improve relations as 
perhaps a sign to Beijing that he would respond to a positive move.984
However, by June Nehru was confident that the Forward Policy had given him new diplomatic 
options and he began to lever the advantage he thought he had gained. Nehru told Parliament that 
India’s position on the border had been improved by new posts and roadbuilding. He added, ’[T]hat 
improvement does not justify any complacency  but whether any action is contemplated or whether 
even apart from any action any operations are contemplated, they can only come from an 
improved position.’  As a result, when Pan Zili argued on 29 June that India only repeated the 985
argument of 1959 about withdrawal in Ladakh, RK Nehru countered that it was different now 
because India also could withdraw. Pan said this just showed India had been advancing over the 
last two years.  Thus, the position of the April 1960 talks, when India had rejected Beijing’s 986
change to the status quo, was reversed now with Beijing objecting to India’s recent advance.
India’s confident probe into the Galwan Valley in Ladakh in early July led to a new phase of 
tension. The PLA, which enjoyed better supplies and logistics across the border, began a policy of 
surrounding new Indian posts such as the one in Galwan, which only increased the risks of actual 
violence. Beijing and Delhi both told their militaries they were permitted to fire on the enemy if 
required. By 10 July Chinese and Indian troops were tensely facing off at the Galwan post, but 
eventually the PLA troops retreated a small distance, to great fanfare in India’s media. Although a 
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clash had been avoided at Galwan, further West the permission to open fire produced an armed 
encounter in the Chip Chap Valley on 21 July.987
But India’s military assertiveness in Ladakh proceeded alongside a new burst of diplomacy in 
which Delhi made additional concessions over what was offered in January.  Even while troops 
faced off in the Galwan Valley, Krishna Menon suggested on the 10 July that an exchange of 
territory was feasible: 
China’s final claims should be stated clearly. Some areas can go to China, at the same time 
China can make some symbolic concession in other areas, and making modifications in this 
way, we can perhaps solve the problem. In this way India can say to the public some places 
have been given to China, and China has in other places made concessions…The Aksai 
Chin road has perhaps a fairly big strategic meaning for China, or is perhaps related to 
Chinese face, certain places here can go to China [this sentence was not said clearly by 
Menon].988
Nehru reinforced this on 13 July, proposing to Pan that they could take the officials’ report as the 
basis of talks without preconditions, only mentioning that he hoped that China would stop 
advancing on Indian posts in Ladakh.  989
 See Fravel, 185-7; and Raghavan, 2010, 287987
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The hostilities in Ladakh did not prevent the evolution of a new diplomatic breakthrough, similar to 
RK Nehru’s ‘grand bargain’ of 1961. Ambassador Pan had told Krishna Menon that if he went to 
the Geneva conference on Laos, he might there discuss the border with Chen Yi.  Arthur Lall, an 990
Indian participant in the talks, showed that the two sides considered a creative political solution to 
marry China’s desire to secure unchallenged rights to the Aksai Chin road with the Indian 
government and public’s opposition to surrender of territory. India suggested both sides could set 
up posts in the region but would avoid challenging each other’s respective positions. The Indians 
kept Nehru informed and at the third meeting Chen Yi said a solution of ‘intertwining posts’ could 
be agreed. The implication being that Aksai Chin could be partially claimed by both sides and 
divided, leaving China the road. Chen Yi did not rule out a territorial concession to India elsewhere 
on the border to compensate for conceding territory in Aksai Chin.991
Contrary to the some claims, Nehru was positive about the results of the Geneva talks and when 
public opposition exploded he tried to navigate this and salvage the progress made.  Lall’s 992
account made it clear that Nehru sent a positive response to Chen Yi’s proposal for a joint 
communique, but it arrived too late and Chen had already left Geneva.  When news of the talks 
was leaked and uproar ensued, Nehru publicly distanced himself but privately took steps to restore 
the situation. A note was sent to Beijing reiterating that Delhi favoured talks once tensions had 
eased. However, India’s Charge D’affaires in Beijing, PK Bannerjee was also instructed to tell Zhou 
at once that Delhi sought talks ‘without preconditions, [on] all bilateral problems and disputes.’  993
 ‘Zhu Yindu shiguan jianbao Pan dashi yu Yindu guofang buzhang meinong tanhua jiyao’, 12 990
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In fact it was Beijing that now turned its back on constructive diplomacy. Bannerjee’s conciliatory 
move was harshly rejected by Chen Yi and then a week later by Zhou himself. Bannerjee’s 
encounter with Chen Yi occurred on either the 26 or 27 July, before the uproar in India over 
Geneva had even begun. Chen rejected talks as impossible until India ‘unequivocally and publicly 
withdrew all fictitious and false claims on Chinese territory.’ India’s proposal, Chen said,  ‘was 
loaded with ammunition for Indian propaganda against the Chinese. It was a trap and therefore not 
acceptable.’ On 4 August, Zhou told Bannerjee that India must ‘withdraw from Chinese territory and 
not make further excuses’. For good measure, Zhou added that India was working with the CIA to 
support the Tibetan rebels. Nehru either knew or pretended not to know, or else he no longer 
controlled the Government of India, said Zhou.994
Beijing’s rejection of Bannerjee was not related to the tension in Ladakh, which had been peaking 
even as talks carried on at Geneva. In fact, the turn was part of a general switch to a more 
confrontational diplomacy. As seen, India had been using Tibet to complement the pressure 
applied by the Forward Policy, rejecting Beijing’s requests in December 1961 and April 1962 for 
renegotiation of the 1954 treaty. Beijing had sought talks over the Tibet agreement despite the fact 
that India had been embargoing trade with Tibet since late 1959. However, in Summer 1962 as 
India confidently shifted into a more constructive diplomatic gear, China went the other way, and 
roles were reversed when India’s proposal in June for talks on the Tibet treaty were roundly 
rejected.995
The change in Beijing was closely related to a more acute sense of an Indian threat to Tibet. The 
‘Forward Policy’ itself was regarded as a direct threat to Tibet and the South West just as the 
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region had been pacified.  However, the Chinese embassy also kept Beijing updated on a more 996
insidious risk to Chinese control of Tibet represented by broad support for Tibetan activities within 
India. Media reporting on rebel activity, support for cultural activity and the Dalai Lama’s 
unrestricted political activity were all viewed as hostile in Beijing. It was noted the Government of 
India had declared it wished to create a new ‘centre of Buddhist activity, to replace Lhasa’. The 
embassy linked all this to India’s forward moves on the border.  Sly Indian attempts to hold on to 997
their radio transmitters in Lhasa and Yatung also smacked of old style imperialism. The Chinese 
argued they had never given explicit approval for these, while the Indians said they had long been 
there, since 1936. On the 21 June the Chinese further underlined the more confrontational 
diplomacy and desire to sever Indian ties with Tibet by telling Indian diplomats in Beijing that they 
had two months to remove the transmitters.998
The perception in Beijing had long been that Indian policy was to maintain an autonomous Tibet 
which they could dominate and which served as an ideological buffer, insulating the Indian people 
from radical economic development. The rebellion in Tibet had ended Beijing's toleration of such 
efforts and the Chinese had moved to fully assert themselves in the region, upending the old 
system with land reform. Bannerjee’s explanation to Zhou of India’s consistent support for Chinese 
‘suzerainty’ in Tibet was therefore highly provocative.   The Chinese thought Nehru always 999
‘played games with words, saying China had sovereignty over Tibet, but on the other hand saying it 
was suzerainty, deliberately maintaining an ambiguity between these two very different  terms’.  1000
Beijing believed that once Tibetan autonomy was ended Nehru responded by seeking to pressure 
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China via the border dispute.  This perception also pointed towards China’s utter rejection of 1001
Indian attempts to create a zone of graded sovereignty across the Himalayas. Whenever India 
made any reference to this it provoked China for two reasons. Because it threatened China’s 
absolute sovereignty in Tibet and made India appear imperialist. The Chinese were now shutting 
down India’s links with Tibet.
The harsh rejection of Bannerjee was also a response to public discourse in India in line with the 
logic of diplomacy of struggle. The resumption of prominent public and official support for an array 
of Tibetan activities in India was always going to provoke a response from the Chinese. But the 
‘Forward Policy’s’ apparent success in recovering Indian territory was also receiving much acclaim 
in the Indian media, and this too was problematic for Beijing.  So when Chen Yi repudiated 1002
constructive diplomacy in late July he demanded a ‘public’ withdrawal of all Indian claims on the 
border. Here was the paradox of Nehru’s strategy to placate public opinion in order to improve the 
conditions for diplomacy. If a sense of military advance on the border gave Nehru more leeway, the 
public’s enthusiastic support for Nehru had to be targeted. Beijing could not tolerate this easing of 
pressure on Nehru and his government, they sought therefore to disrupt the public triumphalism 
and renew the fractures within Indian politics.
Beijing’s renewed desire to confront Delhi was also related to developments surrounding Taiwan 
which both confirmed Indian hostility but also eased the overall pressure on China. In late May, the 
PLA had begun contingency preparations for war with India while plans were also being made to 
meet an invasion from Taiwan.  On the 7 July while tensions built up in Ladakh, Pan Zili told his 1003
 Yang, 1999, 255-91001
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Soviet counterpart there was a real threat of a KMT invasion, and on the 14th he revealed that the 
KMT and India had a consensus to threaten China.  However, the US had in fact assured the 1004
Chinese in late June that they would not support any such action by Jiang Jieshi, thus that 
immediate risk had faded.  Although Indian cooperation with Jiang would have confirmed Delhi 1005
to be a primarily reactionary actor, it did not significantly add to China’s threat assessment. Telling 
the Soviets about the India KMT link was probably just part of efforts to educate the comrades 
about India’s true nature, particularly when one considers that Pan denied on the 14 July that he 
and Nehru even discussed Sino-Indian relations, let alone that India had been making some very 
positive noises.
The situation in Indochina also seemed to underscore Indian hostility while alleviating the overall 
security crisis China faced. To be sure, Beijing and Moscow differed on the nature of India’s role in 
the ICC and impact on their interests in Indochina.  However, Delhi had largely succeeded in 1006
maintaining an image of impartiality regarding Indochina, indicated by the DRV’s self-designation 
as an ‘outsider’ to the Sino-Indian dispute.  The level of Indian opposition to Beijing’s interests in 1007
SE Asia soon escalated however. Nehru suspected DRV subversion of South Vietnam and had 
begun an investigation in December 1961, and by June the following year those suspicions were 
confirmed.  India’s research led to the ICC Vietnam’s report, published over Polish dissent, 1008
accusing all sides of interference and causing outrage in China’s key ally, the DRV.  The Laos 1009
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Accords, signed at Geneva on 23 July then reduced pressure on Beijing by neutralising Laos.  1010
But the combination of India’s accusations about the DRV, and this neutralisation of Laos would 
have meant India now had very little to offer Beijing in Indochina. It is in fact possible that Chen Yi’s 
talks with Krishna Menon at Geneva were more about smoothing an agreement over Laos, than 
genuine progress towards a border settlement. The Laos agreement also had a major impact on 
Beijing’s need for cooperation with Moscow.
Beijing’s assessment of the Soviets was a critical aspect of China’s hard line after the aborted 
Geneva diplomacy with India. The Laos agreement had removed one major reason for Beijing to 
maintain a degree of cooperation with Moscow. Beijing had needed to work with Moscow to 
neutralise Laos.  But Beijing and the Soviets had been rivals in Indochina since the rupture at 1011
the CPSU 22nd Congress of October 1961. Moscow’s consistent attitude to Indochina through the 
Laos crisis demonstrated that it prioritised detente and superpower hegemony over global 
revolution and China’s interests.  After the Laos Accords, Moscow rejected Beijing’s calls that 1012
they continue giving material aid via Hanoi to Laos. The Soviets advised they focus instead on 
political struggle and uphold the new agreements.  The Soviets lack of revolutionary ambition for 1013
Indochina mirrored its attitude to India, confirming Beijing’s disillusionment.
China’s assessment of the USSR, and India’s relationship to that perception, had now reached an 
absolute nadir. Not only was Moscow failing to seize the revolutionary opportunities available in 
India, or Indochina, but the Soviets had made India a platform from which to project their anti-
China policy. In February, Beijing’s analysts had explained how the Soviets used India to attack 
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China and that the lurid evidence of Soviet revisionism was scrawled all over Indo-Soviet relations: 
Moscow was close to providing credit to Indian private industry, and Birla and the Soviet Foreign 
Trading Company were approaching cooperation; the CPSU was bending the CPI to its revisionist 
ways; and the India-China Friendship Association had been broken up and was being replaced by 
branch offices of a new Soviet sponsored alternative.  Moscow’s apparent destabilisation of 1014
Xinjiang’s border between April to May 1962 confirmed the perception of a traitorous Soviet Union, 
collaborating with India.  Despite India’s aggressive behaviour at the border, Moscow was giving 1015
Delhi public support and selling it MiG fighters and advanced military equipment for border 
defence. Aid for military manufacturing, research and training was also in flow. No publicity was 
given to China’s stance on the border, and Khrushchev blamed the CPI’s failure in Kerala on the 
border dispute. The Soviets also provided anti-China articles to the Indian press. The Soviets 
exploited the anti-China movement to ‘break into’ India and make it a test case for peaceful 
transition in Asia. Gallingly, experts withdrawn from China were sent to India. At the same time 
Moscow wanted to discredit China’s claims of peaceful coexistence, ‘blacken China’s face in Asia’ 
and make it submit to Moscow.  By the summer of 1962 India seemed to have become the 1016
leading edge of Moscow’s enmity towards the PRC.
Such dire assessments meant that an intensification of Sino-Indian conflict now served Mao’s 
ultimate priority of exposing the true face of Soviet revisionism. The more acute China’s 
confrontation with India became, the more shameless and shocking Soviet support for Delhi would 
appear. Chinese analysts explained that the Soviets did not realise that ‘Nehru, ultimately serves 
US imperialism’. The benefit of highlighting this were then made clear: ‘as far as India’s 
revolutionary wing are concerned, Moscow’s brazen anti-China method is truly the best negative 
instructor, there are some officials of the Bengal CPI already who have clearly recognised the face 
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of modern revisionism, therefore from the angle of the long-term benefit of India’s revolution, this 
all has its advantages.’  Thus, Beijing now had good revolutionary reason to privately welcome 1017
Moscow’s support of India because it highlighted Soviet treachery. Beijing therefore had good 
cause to take a hardline with Delhi. Moscow would either have to back China in line with 
proletarian internationalism, or else, its true revisionist face would be revealed. In the latter case, 
the lines would be drawn clearly, the world’s people would see where Moscow stood, and Beijing 
would stand as the bastion of pure revolution. Thus Beijing used confrontation with India to lay 
claim to leadership of the Socialist Camp.1018
The decision to exacerbate the confrontation with Delhi in order to expose Khrushchev’s 
revisionism was not just Mao’s bid for global leadership but also closely linked to his return to the 
centre of CCP decision making. The disasters that pursued the Great Leap Forward had rather 
diminished Mao’s confidence and a period of more moderate and flexible policies had ensued.  1019
Particularly since February 1962, Mao had been in the ‘second-line’ of leadership, and excluded 
himself from critical domestic policy.   At the Beidaihe leaders’ conference of 6-28 August, Mao 1020
upturned the agenda, much as he had done at Lushan in 1959, to ambush his opponents and 
focus the discussion on class struggle. Mao’s chief concern may have ultimately been domestic 
policy and attempts to push in less radical directions. The international environment was looking 
fairly benign with the US having reined in the Taiwan and Laos threats, the Xinjiang border had 
stabilised, even the India conflict appeared limited, and the crisis in South Vietnam was only an 
indirect danger. Mao had hinted in January at links between international revisionists, imperialists 
and counter-revolutionaries and domestic enemies, and now he made this explicit. Therefore, at 
Beidaihe he attacked Wang Jiaxiang’s moderate foreign policy proposals of compromise with the 
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Soviets, US and India and reduction in support for overseas liberation movements.  The 1021
Beidaihe Conference was then followed by a huge increase in military aid to the DRV to 
demonstrate the new taste for confrontation.1022
Having begun his transformation of Chinese politics, Mao moved to expand the conflict with India 
by creating confrontation in the Eastern sector. On 8 September, the PLA set up a position directly 
opposite India’s ‘Dhola’ post, below the Thagla Ridge and along the north side of the Namka Chu 
river, in what the Indians called the Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA. This move was a new 
provocation for a number of reasons.  India had established its ‘Dhola’ post back in early June. 
Admittedly, India’s action was itself provocative as it disturbed the 1959 agreement to hold 
positions in the area and it came despite awareness that claims there were ambiguous.  1023
However, Beijing knew that India regarded the Thagla Ridge as the boundary, based on adjusting 
the McMahon Line’s alignment on the map in line with McMahon’s original statement that the 
actual boundary should run along the watershed.  Also, India’s forward move to the Namka Chu 1024
was arguably a defensive response to the consistent Chinese threat to link East and West. With 
India resisting China’s advance to a new claim line in the West, Delhi justifiably feared China finally 
making good the threat to counter and cross the McMahon Line.  Therefore, India’s Dhola post 1025
was not some fundamentally aggressive move. So, even if preparatory steps had been taken since 
July, with a build up of Chinese forces conducted on Thagla,  the decision to advance directly in 1026
front of India’s Dhola post was a conscious move to expand the confrontation to the Eastern sector.
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China’s move up to the Dhola post was regarded as very offensive therefore and the mood 
changed in Delhi. The crisis atmosphere produced a dynamic in which India came to appear 
increasingly aggressive while actually dissipating its military strength. The Indians had been fairly 
relaxed in early September with Radhakrishnan dismissing the risk of war and Nehru happy to 
leave India for London where he and TN Kaul even drafted a new proposal for talks.  However, 1027
Krishna Menon and Nehru’s desire to keep China’s move out of the press failed, and calls for 
Nehru’s resignation were heard. The renewal of this level of domestic pressure contributed to 
Delhi’s anxiety to reinforce Dhola and the Namka Chu, which led to the dispersal of troops from 
more secure positions and added to the appearance of aggression. There was also a struggle 
between commanders on the ground in NEFA, who urged caution, with Army Headquarters and 
Delhi, who pushed for early action to remove the Chinese. The impasse was resolved on 4 
October, when BM Kaul, Chief of the General Staff, was appointed to form IV Corps, and 
dispatched to lead the eviction of the Chinese forces at the Namka Chu river.  Media coverage 1028
of Kaul’s impending mission compounded the effect of the earlier publication of the ‘top secret’ plan 
to remove the Chinese from the Namka Chu area on 27 September in the Times of India.  Such 1029
reporting portrayed India as aggressive and gave Beijing generous forewarning of Indian plans. It 
also whet the Indian public’s appetite for action, further boxing Nehru in. Aware no doubt of the 
pressure Nehru faced, Kaul proceeded with his plan to begin the removal of the Chinese on 10 
October, despite the fact that arrival in theatre had brought home to him how vulnerable India’s 
position was.1030
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India’s military incompetence and weakness combined with the newspapers display of public 
aggression to provide Chairman Mao with the chance to use a limited war to gain major political 
ends. As we have seen, Mao saw warfare as simply another form of political struggle. At the end of 
September at the Tenth Plenary of the CCP’s Eighth Central Committee, Mao had maintained his 
attack on Wang Jiaxiang’s moderate foreign policy proposals. Support for the DRV was one way to 
burnish his demand that the party ‘never forget class struggle’ and distinguish itself from Moscow’s 
revisionism.  An attack on India would reinforce the message. The opportunity to strike was too 1031
good. The Indian media’s advertising of forthcoming operations on the border allowed Beijing to 
cast itself in a defensive role.  In addition, the Chinese were perfectly aware of how vulnerable 1032
Indian forces were on the border. As already seen, in May, Cheng Hao had underlined this point to 
the Soviets. The destruction of General Kaul’s ill-judged foray across the Namka Chu on 10 
October confirmed Indian frailty. In particular, Indian military leadership appeared a mess. Kaul had 
withheld permission for a well-placed machine gun post to open fire on an attacking column of PLA 
troops, which might well have ended the battle of Namka Chu, and he then fled the scene while his 
men were given a mauling. Indian commanders had also disallowed use of mortars.  Given 1033
Mao’s general strategy to target small, weak forces, to ‘cut off the fingers’ and slowly consume the 
enemy, the appeal of targeting Indian forces becomes clear.  When the war with India came, 1034
Castro criticised Beijing for not providing real relief to Cuba in the midst of the missile crisis by 
attacking Taiwan.  But if one understands that Mao’s strategy was to expose the Soviets to 1035
facilitate his return to power and eliminate a threat that was easy to deal with, then it is no surprise 
he hit India rather than Taiwan.
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The Namka Chu debacle knocked confidence in Delhi but public opinion shackled Nehru and his 
colleagues to confrontation with China. Kaul had rushed back to the capital to report and the 
immediate question became whether to withdraw from Dhola and the Namka Chu area or to hold 
the line. Kaul had disagreed with other local commanders and insisted that Indian forces hold their 
positions and those orders remained in place from the 15 October.  But this shift to a less 1036
aggressive stance was not signalled to Beijing. Krishna Menon and Nehru had both made public 
comments on the 12 and 13 October that the Chinese would be pushed off the Thagla ridge 
eventually, but Nehru’s words in particular were distorted in sensational manner by the press to 
suggest the orders were for immediate action.  So public opinion and media excitement not only 1037
prevented Delhi from last minute efforts to appeal to Beijing, but in actual fact these seemed to the 
Chinese a declaration of bellicose intent. Not even the Soviet intervention on the 18 October, 
underlining a clear shift to support China and appeal for Delhi to back down on the border, had any 
effect now.1038
Beijing also took the opportunity of hostility with India to present itself as leading the regional 
campaign against Delhi’s imperialist chauvinism and so further disrupt its reputation for anti-
colonialism and standing in the Third World. Throughout 1962 Beijing had watched Delhi’s efforts 
to confound Nepal’s independence and maintain its profound dominance of Nepal’s culture and 
economy.  Chen Yi now announced on 12 October that the PRC would defend Nepal from 1039
Indian aggression.  In September, intimacy with Islamabad had developed to the extent that Liu 1040
Shaoqi and the newly arrived Pakistani Ambassador communed eagerly over Indian perfidy, 
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regional ambitions and attempts to subjugate Nepal.  As already seen, in the final hours before 1041
China’s strike against Indian border positions, the Pakistanis would plead with Chinese diplomats 
that they teach Nehru a lesson. Beijing did not launch its attack on India because of Nepali and 
Pakistani concerns, but it was careful to be sure that they gave Beijing credit for sharing their views 
of India.
The CCP Central Military Commission’s operational order for war against India, of 18 October, 
gave three goals: stabilise the borders, create conditions for negotiations, and attack 
reactionaries.  Thus the war adhered to diplomacy as struggle within the framework of 1042
transnational class politics. Beijing now fully identified Nehru and his government with the 
reactionary forces that had been the main power behind India’s anti-China clamouring and policies 
since 1959.  But to attack these reactionaries had both broader international and narrower 1043
domestic meanings. Indian reactionaries were, as a new comprador class, now allies of global 
imperialism, so to attack India was to attack the global enemy. But more significantly, given Soviet 
support for the Indian state, the attack was also a blow against those revisionists in Moscow. 
Furthermore, China’s strike was therefore also a lesson to Mao’s own colleagues that confrontation 
must be embraced. Four days after China’s attack, Delhi rejected the 24 October offer of a 
ceasefire, and Beijing resumed its attack and called for an armed uprising in India.  The appeal 1044
for an Indian revolution was a final intervention in Indian politics to support Beijing’s class allies. It 
complemented China’s overwhelming attack on Indian positions along the border and burnished 
Mao’s credentials as the leader of global radicalism, contrasting him with the spineless traitors in 
Moscow.
 “Record of Conversation following Pakistani Ambassador to the PRC Raza’s Presentation of 1041
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In 1961, Nehru had found himself trapped between profound distrust of China’s ambitions on the 
border and the Indian public, press and parliament’s implacable hostility to any suggestion of 
territorial compromise. From this predicament emerged the ‘Forward Policy’ and a strategy to 
recover enough territory to assuage the Indian public sufficiently to allow Nehru to pursue some 
accommodation with the Chinese. Delhi’s assumption that Beijing would not authorise a major 
response to India’s advance was based on a conviction that India was only adopting a defensive 
posture and that the Chinese feared risking a wider conflagration. These assumptions originated 
with a sense that Moscow would restrain Beijing and that anyway India’s well-known non-alignment 
made it an inconceivable target, even if the Chinese were not racially inclined to withdraw from 
direct confrontation. Nehru also assumed that Indian public opinion would react to some victories 
on the border by giving him more support, whereas the inflamed belligerence only became a target 
for Chinese intervention. By July 1962, Beijing had decided that India now represented a peculiar 
threat and so Nehru’s more flexible diplomacy was rejected. There were a number of reasons that 
Beijing turned against Delhi. There was a desire once again to disrupt public discourse in India 
related to the border and Tibet. Beijing regarded broad popular interest in Tibet’s cause and the 
activities of the exiles in India as a renewed Indian threat to its strategic and ideological hegemony 
in that province. In addition, Delhi had demonstrated through its connections to Indochina and 
Taiwan that it was utterly hostile to the PRC, while at the same time, the overall reduction in threats 
to China from those areas gave Beijing more options. Mao saw an opportunity to tackle his major 
political enemy, Soviet revisionism. It had become clear that the Soviets were using India to attack 
the PRC and so Mao decided to intensify the confrontation with Delhi in order to highlight to his 
colleagues and the global masses how Moscow was betraying its erstwhile ally and the cause of 
revolution. Once Mao had chosen to intensify the conflict in September 1962, Indian tactical 
maladroitness made it clear that the historic political benefits of crushing Indian pretensions on the 
border overwhelmed any military risks.
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Conclusion
A profound clash of diplomatic methods contributed to the spiral of distrust between Delhi and 
Beijing. The border crises of the second half of 1959 led the Chinese leadership to intensify their 
diplomacy as struggle with the Indians. This diplomatic approach was conceived as an intervention 
in the political confrontations underway in India, and was made possible by Mao’s active 
resumption of a transnational class perspective, and a complete shift away from the inter-state, or 
nation based approach of the Panchsheel and Bandung era. Diplomacy as struggle not only 
reflected his sense of the need to support his class allies within India, but was also linked to class 
conflict within China, in Tibet, and also globally with the US, which was allied with Indian elites. 
This approach to India also served to highlight Soviet errors, to whom it was explained that 
struggle would produce unity because the Indians would either make concessions, or else the true 
class loyalties of the different Indian actors would be profitably revealed. The latter outcome would 
intensify class confrontation and prove how fatal total reliance on peaceful transition might be.  It 
was this diplomatic method, exemplified by the apparent claim on NEFA in September 1959, and 
the refusal to consider any compromise of principle, that was a major cause of Indian public and 
governmental distrust in China.  Despite this distrust, Nehru sought to cope with Beijing’s approach 
by constructing a flexible and fairly reasonable diplomatic strategy. Nehru tried to privately engage 
the Chinese and appealed to their interest in supporting his leadership in Delhi against his 
conservative opponents to preserve non-alignment. He did this while at the same time trying to 
placate the Indian public and domestic critics by maintaining a firm rhetoric in public.  The problem 
with Nehru’s approach in this early stage was that his flexibility seemed to confirm the rectitude of 
Beijing’s approach, indicating that struggle was indeed producing a degree of unity. 
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Sino-Indian hostility was exacerbated by competing understandings of what counted as 
imperialism and the prospects of international peace. Renewal of Cold War tension in 1960 
brought home to Beijing and Delhi how different were their attitudes to international affairs. This 
recognition fed into and was in turn reinforced by the mutual perception of hostility at the local 
level. Beijing looked on with horror at India’s apparent defection from anti-colonialism and 
accommodation of global imperialism in 1960, its acceptance of superpower hegemony and 
encouragement of Moscow’s treacherous policy of detente. The fact that Beijing’s relationship with 
the Soviet Union was collapsing at this time seemed to make India complicit in the unprecedented 
crisis that the PRC now faced. India’s claim to moderation and non-alignment now looked to 
Beijing like nothing less than counter-revolution. Conversely, the Indians were repelled by Beijing’s 
opposition to detente and continued desire for global revolution. The manner in which each 
pursued the consolidation of their competing spheres then seemed especially provocative because 
of these broader perceptions of the other as either a belligerently revolutionary state or else a 
collaborator with imperialism. Beijing found that Delhi’s desire to subjugate smaller neighbours and 
limit their sovereignty to be confirmation of its general retreat from anti-colonial virtue. Indian 
leaders similarly were provoked by Beijing’s resumption of revolutionary methods to consolidate 
control in Tibet, in a total rejection of the reassurances of the Bandung era. Thus the security crisis 
that had become acute with the border clashes of 1959 intensified.
Delhi discovered that public hostility towards China obstructed constructive diplomacy. This reality 
led Nehru to form a strategy in which the ‘Forward Policy’ was pursued on the border to recover 
territory and placate the public mood sufficiently to enable more flexible talks with Beijing. An initial 
period of flexible diplomacy from late 1959 failed because it only confirmed to Beijing that 
diplomacy as struggle had softened Nehru’s stance. In 1962 Nehru’s diplomacy was undermined 
because the ‘Forward Policy’ increased the public’s belligerence. Indian strategists were also 
hobbled by the assumption that Beijing shared their dismissal of the possibility of limited warfare. 
Furthermore, just as Nehru began to confidently pursue a more creative diplomatic approach, 
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Beijing opted to confront India. One problem was simply that Beijing was provoked by public 
discourse in India regarding victories on the border, and that also seemed a renewal of interference 
in Tibet.  However, the impression of Indian hostility had also grown in 1962 just when Beijing’s 
leaders began to feel a slight lessening of other pressures. This created an opportunity for Mao to 
confront India as a way of striking against the threat which he perceived as dominating all others 
by the summer of 1962, Soviet revisionism.
Nehru’s approach to Beijing was riven with provocative contradictions. The appeal for support 
against the attacks of his conservative opponents in India contradicted the claim that there was no 
class confrontation in India. Nehru did not realise that Mao and his colleagues regarded hostile 
public comment as a genuine threat and legitimate object of political struggle. The strategy of trying 
to satisfy nationalist opinion with some forward gains on the border was likely to just provoke 
Beijing. Nor did Nehru understand that Mao did not share his conviction that limited war was an 
unacceptable risk in a nuclear armed superpower system. While Nehru believed that peaceful 
coexistence was the inevitable and necessary answer to its absolute alternative of nuclear 
armageddon, Mao felt no such tactical restraint. Nehru failed to realise that agreement with 
Moscow on this question, far from making India safer, actually made it an object for demonstrating 
the feasibility of limited war and exposing the naiveté of total commitment to peaceful coexistence. 
Nehru seemed oblivious to the provocative nature of his attempt to subordinate the sovereignty of 
Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, and the damage it did to his reputation for anti-colonialism. Most 
fundamentally, Nehru was unaware that his reassurances to Beijing that non-alignment would 
remain intact was no balm to Chinese ears, because non-alignment was simply regarded as a 
reactionary blockade of revolution.
The power of these contradictions was multiplied by the strength of ideological conviction in 
Beijing. Ideology is not a separate category to ‘national interest’, instead it is the frame in which the 
world is interpreted and interests are defined. Mao’s understanding of global politics as most 
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profoundly driven by the dynamics of transnational class relations meant that perceptions of India’s 
domestic politics created an expectation of a hostile Indian foreign policy. Reactionaries within 
India were perceived as a threat to China, most notably on the border and in Tibet. Even if there 
was no concrete material threat to Tibet, media comment and public events were considered 
threatening despite the fact these might have no relationship to government policy. Within the logic 
of transnational class dynamics, hostile public opinion was an expression of class enmity to be 
confronted. Diplomacy as struggle emerged from this ideological framework and was considered in 
1959 to be a demonstration to the Soviets of ideological rectitude. The Soviet factor grew acute 
however as the split with Moscow became irreversible by 1962. It was ideology that defined India’s 
relations with Moscow as a threat and then determined that confronting India was the best way of 
revealing Soviet treachery. This was a continuation of the logic of diplomacy as struggle. But in 
1962 exposing the Soviets had profound domestic meaning as the means for Mao to assert not 
just international leadership, but also restore his primacy within the Chinese party. The war with 
Indian was no doubt understood in security terms. Yes it aimed to stop incursions and prod Nehru 
to negotiate the border. But it was also an attack on reactionaries. The combination of these aims 
was consistent with diplomacy as struggle. ‘Unity’ would be achieved by a firm display of principle, 
but this did not mean compromise. Instead it meant the enemy must give way or, even better, 
stand exposed and alone on the losing side of history.
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Conclusion
The Sino-Indian War broke out because Mao Zedong believed a new level of conflict would be 
useful to him. The Chairman’s basic political approach was always to identify where the 
‘contradictions’ existed between different groups. With lines of hostility clear he could marshal his 
own forces and strike the enemy. By forcing the dispute with India into all out military conflict Mao 
believed he was able to measure the exact extent of Soviet revisionism’s antagonism towards the 
PRC. Clear definition of Soviet hostility would have a vital domestic value because, since at least 
1959, Mao had associated domestic criticism of his own economic policies with Moscow’s support, 
so to expose it as utterly hostile would undercut his rivals within the CCP. Striking India also 
underlined Beijing’s utter rejection of its claims to have a progressive development model or to be 
sincerely non-aligned. Mao was particularly reacting against the hostile tone of Indian public 
rhetoric, he wanted to crush the reactionary confidence of the Indian media. Mao believed this 
intervention would rebalance the confrontation within Indian politics and improve the possibility of a 
revolutionary denouement. While the PLA used the war to consolidate its hold over Tibet by 
improving its hold over the Aksai Chin road, the rapid retreat from NEFA also made plain that the 
swap deal remained on the table.
India and Nehru blundered into the war. The Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report quoted the 
nineteenth century British military thinker, Field Marshal Lord Roberts, to summarise Delhi’s basic 
error: ‘The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy not coming, but in our 
own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we 
have made our position unassailable.’  Collectively, the leadership in Delhi were handicapped by 1045
two assumptions. The first was that Beijing shared Delhi’s view that limited warfare had become 
inconceivable in the new nuclear age. Secondly, Nehru and his colleagues believed that Delhi’s 
practice of non-alignment placed its virtue so far beyond reproach that no one could consider 
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significant hostilities against it. The diplomatic strategy that emerged from these assumptions was 
problematic. Nehru tried to assuage popular opinion with the ‘Forward Policy’ hoping that this 
would allow him to make a deal, but all this achieved was to whet the appetite for belligerence and 
add to Beijing’s impression of a hostile public mood. Operating within a framework of international 
class struggle once more, Mao was keen to prove that limited war was possible, that non-
alignment was not simply weak or naive idealism but an insidious threat and a counter-
revolutionary sham, and that the Indian media’s enmity would not be tolerated. Above all Mao 
wanted to prove that history was a question of inevitable class confrontation, rejecting the 
proclaimed mission of India’s first ambassador to the PRC to demonstrate that neutrality was 
possible.
Much of twentieth century history was driven by a basic dispute over what force determines 
historical progress. Do people unite and act on the basis of a collective sense of class solidarity, 
finding identity in either a common desire to challenge their economic exploitation or else to protect 
and further their own material advantages? Or, rather, is it nationhood that fuels the engine of 
change over time, as people coalesce around a shared sense of historical, geographic and 
linguistic identity to assert and defend their independent differences against external intrusion? 
How this question is answered will lead to very different outcomes in terms of political organisation 
and attitudes towards the international sphere. If one assumes that the former position is correct 
then it is the conflict between the exploiters and exploited and the alliances they form 
transnationally that counts. To many anti-colonial intellectuals and leaders, schooled by foreign and 
racial oppression, this latter perspective seemed a distraction from the sanctity and haven that self-
rule within one’s own nation would provide. To these individuals it was the suppression of national 
aspiration that was the major cause of global conflict and those bullied nations should rally together 
to collectively assert and protect their independence. 
What counts then, class or nation? For a few years in the middle of the 1950s, Chairman Mao, with 
Moscow’s encouragement, deferred to the idea of national collaboration with non-socialist Asia and 
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Nehruvian India because it offered Beijing the opportunity to draw breath after decades of war. But 
Mao and his colleagues’ entire political experience showed them that what really counted was the 
support of the masses and their hunger for social revolution. This was not idealism but practical 
politics. The CCP’s own history had proved that once aroused the masses were invincible and 
could defeat any enemy. It was only a question of determining where the enemy lay. 
Beginning on the night of the 19-20 October, PLA units sliced through Indian positions in the 
Eastern sector of the border and drove all the way to the Buddhist town of Tawang. On the 24th a 
ceasefire proposal was sent to the Indians but was rejected. The Chinese forces remained where 
they were in the East while in the West they continued removing India’s grip on its forward posts. 
Although India soon accepted US military aid, Delhi had made a general appeal for assistance, not 
excluding the USSR, and Nehru argued Indian non-alignment remained secure.  During this lull 1046
in activity, the 17th Session of the UN General Assembly debated again the question of China’s 
representation at the UN. The UN Yearbook of 1962 records India’s contribution:
The representative of India asserted that the People’s Republic of China had committed 
flagrant, massive and premeditated aggression on the eastern and western sectors of India’s 
territory, while glibly talking of peaceful negotiations. His delegation believed that the only 
effective way to check Chinese military adventurism was to make it accept its responsibilities 
as a Member of the Organization and thereby be subject to the views and disciplines of the 
United Nations.1047
The idiosyncratic defence of the PRC’s case at the UN was not simply because India’s confidence 
had recovered during the ‘phoney war’ after the PLA’s initial advance into Indian territory. The 
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following year, and after the Indian army had experienced further humiliation at Chinese hands in 
Ladakh and NEFA, Delhi again voted in favour of the PRC’s admission to the UN.1048
Nehru’s international support for Beijing was underpinned by his sense of history as driven by the 
rise of nations. This worldview combined with his pan-Asianist sympathies and led him to place 
profound significance on the PRC’s place in the international system. He had therefore often given 
Beijing unconditional support despite sharp rhetorical attacks on Delhi, or its obvious appetite for 
confrontation. Now, even when it was India that had suffered Chinese aggression, Nehru 
maintained his argument that the way to eliminate the danger posed by Beijing’s belligerence was 
to socialise it, to integrate the PRC to the international system, ease its isolation and temper its 
disruptive ambitions. Furthermore, Nehru’s underlying hopes for the UN meant that just as in 1950 
when he had ruled out India entering the UN Security Council before the problem of China’s 
representation had been solved, so now he continued to uphold the principle of a genuinely 
representative UN, even though that meant supporting a state that had recently battered India’s 
military. Support for Beijing at the UN was also about demanding global respect for the self-
determination of Asian states. No one had the right to countermand the Chinese people’s decision 
to rejected the GMD and chose the CCP.  To support and engage the PRC in this way was also a 
profound assertion of India’s rejection of the logic of the Cold War, a clear demonstration of the 
sincerity of non-alignment, and hence also of India’s own independence. At the very broadest level, 
Nehru’s policy towards China was an exemplary expression of his non-aligned posture and an 
encouragement to others that a middle way could illuminate a path out of the dark terrain of the 
Cold War. This policy was both highly idealist but also served practical ends. Placating China 
would generally serve India’s interests by defusing the overall level of international tension and 
reducing the security dilemma related to Tibet and the border. Furthermore, the consistent and 
principled assertion of Indian non-alignment in face of all provocations would give India a moral 
armour and stature in international politics in excess of its objective, material power. A similar effect 
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would be felt within India where Nehru would benefit from standing above the Cold War divisions 
that disrupted domestic politics. 
But Nehru’s efforts to earn Beijing’s trust and reassure it were always undermined by the 
ambiguities of his policy towards Tibet and the border.  Nehru struggled to cooperate with Beijing 
on Tibet.  He accepted Delhi must give up British India’s rights in the region and recognise Beijing’s 
primacy, he helped feed the PLA in Tibet by transhipping Chinese grain from Calcutta, and he 
several times pressured the Dalai Lama to work with Beijing. But Nehru never gave up his idea that 
Tibet should preserve a degree of separation from the rest of China, and furthermore that special 
cultural ties with India ought to be protected. Having conceded China’s rights he paradoxically 
always insisted on autonomy for Tibet and regarded the Chinese presence as an occupation. 
Important Indian officials encouraged the Tibetans to resist Chinese authority non-violently, and 
Indian officers in Tibet displayed obvious reluctance to accept the end of Indian influence. 
Furthermore, while he imagined that Beijing might acquiesce in Delhi’s own imperial ambitions in 
the Himalayan border states, his hope that the Chinese would thereby cooperate in a system of 
limited sovereignty which included Tibetan autonomy was hugely misguided. Nehru’s border policy 
was also problematic. Having briefly flirted with the idea of seeking a candid discussion of the 
border, Delhi moved instead to a policy in which they would avoid the issue and instead claim in 
public that the borders were settled and then try and consolidate India’s physical position in the 
meantime. But the projection of public certainty was never matched by progress on the ground, so 
Nehru had created popular expectations of what the border should be without ensuring the means 
to guarantee it. And once the need for a compromise became apparent, the Indian public were not 
prepared for concessions. His fundamental error was to not use the good atmosphere that existed 
in Sino-Indian relations to clarify and then settle their respective border claims. 
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However the key variable in Sino-Indian relations was Beijing’s faith that class confrontation 
powered history. The CCP’s ideology meant that India, with the revolutionary potential of its 
massive impoverished population, was always an important state. But India’s size and claim to 
stand above the Cold War also meant that, as the Korean War ended and Beijing made the 
strategic decision  to drop its revolutionary rhetoric in order to engage non-socialist Asia, Delhi was 
the obvious first target. India had after all consistently shown a willingness to engage with Beijing 
since October 1949.  But cooperation with the Indian state would also encourage Delhi to assist in 
the consolidation of Tibet, while Beijing attempted to stabilise that region by working through the 
existing elites. The united front that Beijing pursued with the Dalai Lama, despite Mao’s preference 
for revolutionary methods, was simultaneously a complement to his foreign policy goal of courting 
Delhi by projecting a new moderate image. Nehru believed that Beijing’s apparent embrace of 
moderation was, at least partly, a result of his own policy, and he thought that the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Coexistence agreed with the Chinese were an Asian innovation in international relations 
that would provide a model for the rest of the world. The Indian Prime Minister under-estimated the 
continued commitment in Beijing to its ideological vision and the contingency therefore of 
engagement with India and moderation in Tibet.
The Soviet Union was the PRC’s partner in this projection of broad moderation and courtship of 
Delhi but when Beijing began to perceive that this project was not serving its interests then 
tensions emerged. The policy was meant to ease the international pressure on China by 
eliminating regional anxieties that gave the US a pretext for intervention. It was also meant to give 
Beijing’s leaders the time to focus more energy on development, as well as specifically helping 
them stabilise Tibet. Of course, the very logic of socialist bloc solidarity was threatened by a shift 
towards a foreign policy predicated on inter-state rather than inter-party relations. But, the main 
problem was that the Soviets appeared to be moving towards the enshrinement of peaceful 
coexistence as a permanent doctrine, rather than a Leninist tactic. Mao’s concern was accentuated 
by practical evidence that this would be a strategic blunder of catastrophic proportions. Not only did 
US imperialist power remain entrenched on Taiwan, a situation which itself made the notion of  
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coexistence with Washington farcical, but to Mao’s mind an array of other threats also suggested 
that ruling out confrontational class politics would severely handicap Beijing. Through 1956-57 Mao 
observed the persistent danger posed by reactionaries in Tibet, in Eastern Europe, amongst 
China’s intellectuals and within India. It seemed to Mao that Muscovite moderation overlooked the 
dangers of cooperation with those who resisted revolution.
The anti-rightist campaign of 1957 was Mao’s attempt to crush the class threat within China and it 
created the opportunity for him to pursue his ambitions more freely. The most immediate impact on 
relations with India were linked to events across the Tibetan plateau. For all his growing wariness 
of class enemies within Tibet, India and elsewhere, Mao still preserved a pragmatic interest in 
partnership with the Dalai Lama and the Indian state. However, the moderate accommodation of 
elite sensibilities within the province of Tibet had not been maintained in the Tibetan areas of the 
surrounding provinces, and persistent resentment at the Han presence there soon exploded into 
armed rebellion. While Beijing still hoped that the Dalai Lama, and indeed Delhi, would do what 
they could to support pacification of this uprising, the general instability continued to spread along 
lines of ethnic-cultural allegiance towards central Tibet. As disturbances proliferated the 
compromises and restraint demanded by partnership with India began to look increasingly like 
obstacles to a solution.
The eruption of violence in Lhasa provided the opportunity for Mao both to sweep away the 
impediments to the revolutionary integration of Tibet with the PRC and also to test the real class 
loyalties of the Dalai Lama, the Indian government and Nehru himself. In turn they all failed the 
examination Mao prescribed. The Dalai Lama’s talk of an exile government proved he was simply 
a reactionary traitor. The massive sympathy expressed by public speeches, the media and popular 
demonstrations within India for the rebellious class enemies in Tibet, including by Nehru and his 
circle, confirmed the ascendance and hostility of reactionary power in that country. Confronted by 
this enmity Mao had no option but to respond in kind and his diplomacy towards Delhi underwent a 
dramatic shift to one based on transnational class struggle. Beijing now conducted diplomacy as 
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struggle, attacking its enemies in India and trying to forge an alliance with the masses. The entire 
basis of cooperation with India was over-turned. Beijing and Delhi’s underlying world-views, of a 
politics premised on the continual dialectic of social antagonism and one premised on national 
revival and independence, now collided.
One consequence of this was that the whole idea of an imperial concord across the Himalayas 
collapsed. Empires are bound to compete with one another, but they also collaborate, and often do 
both simultaneously. And a similar dynamic had been at work between India and China through the 
1950s. But this cooperation had been based on an occasionally explicit agreement to limit the 
imposition of central power on the respective objects of imperial ambition. In Beijing’s eyes any 
ideological compromise to accommodate Indian sensitivity to Tibetan autonomy simply looked like 
a massive threat. In fact, Mao came to regard partnership with Nehru as simply serving counter-
revolutionary interests in Tibet. Once Mao reverted to a politics of class confrontation then the 
whole structure of collaboration with India fell. Delhi and Beijing’s imperial goals were now at odds, 
less in material and territorial terms than in the manner in which they challenged each other’s 
legitimacy. Delhi’s notion of Raj-era limited sovereignty for the border states, meaning submission 
to Indian guidance in foreign affairs and military protection with domestic autonomy, clashed with 
Mao’s desire to stabilise Tibet’s place in the PRC by unfurling the revolutionary banner against the 
old elite.  Once Mao took this step then a crucial pillar of Nehru’s sense of security in the 
Himalayas vanished, just as Beijing also decided it also needed to better secure the as yet 
undefined borders of Tibet. Furthermore, once Mao had decided he no longer wanted Indian 
assistance with regard to Tibet, then one major reason for maintaining civil relations disappeared. 
A most fundamental element of Mao’s ideological turn against the Indian state and Nehru was the 
question of economic development and what this implied for the possibility of partnership between 
Beijing and Delhi. This issue had, early in the 1950s, been the basis of a degree of common 
identity and a field of diplomatic exchange. However, it had quickly also become a subject of 
competition, and gradually on China’s side, of deep suspicion. Delhi’s claims to have a unique 
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hybrid form of development, while a ridiculous affront in Beijing’s eyes, was nonetheless 
threatening given that Moscow was offering so much support. It seemed to Beijing that Moscow’s 
support of Indian development, to buttress the theory of ‘peaceful transition’, was evidence of its 
worrying ideological corruption. As Beijing’s analysts understood India to be increasingly 
reactionary, Soviet policy looked ever more alarming in its support for a moribund development 
model and sham non-alignment. Beijing believed India’s economic progress was fundamentally 
imperilled by a resurgent class of comprador capitalists allied with foreign imperialists. The Soviet 
danger became more acute for Mao personally when it seemed as if his own critics in China 
echoed Khrushchev’s own reservations about the Great Leap Forward. The apparent 
intensification of class confrontation within India prompted the question of where exactly Nehru 
stood, and the dismissal of the CPI administration in Kerala seemed to indicate that he was 
powerless against the reactionaries who were also flaunting their sympathy for Tibet and the Dalai 
Lama.  
So it should be no surprise that these profoundly ideological perceptions of India in 1959 produced 
an equally ideological response in the diplomacy as struggle. The shift in diplomatic approach 
signalled the abandonment of Panchsheel based moderate engagement with India and was also a 
challenge to Moscow’s Asia policy. Beijing had for a number of years partnered with the Soviets to 
publicly accept the sanctity of national sovereignty and committed to avoid intervention in the class 
struggles underway in other states. But with Mao acutely aware of Moscow’s endorsement of the 
charade of Indian moderation and the boiling hostility of reactionary elements in India, he could not 
sit on his haunches and allow them to attack. Thus, he now re-fitted Beijing’s diplomacy to 
intervene in the struggle within India. Beijing attacked Nehru and his government in print, exposing 
their hypocrisy and trying to win the sympathy of the Indian masses for the CPI’s struggle and for 
China’s stance on the border. 
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Diplomacy as struggle was a huge challenge for Delhi. The massive distrust felt by the Indian 
public and government made it impossible to accept the simple swap deal that Zhou offered in April 
1960. Nehru was hugely contained by the outrage felt across India and he was compelled to 
maintain a tough stance in public. At the same time he took a more flexible approach in private and 
many Indian envoys to the Chinese appealed for them to soften their own attitude in order to 
preserve Nehru’s own political position and his policy of non-alignment. Unfortunately, Nehru’s 
display of flexibility only suggested struggle with Delhi was working and so effected no change in 
Beijing. Nehru realised that he needed to change the public mood if he was going to eventually 
reach a settlement with Beijing and so was born the ‘Forward Policy’. However, Nehru’s strategy of 
using gains on the border to satisfy the public mood sufficiently to make a deal with Beijing only 
exacerbated the problem. It is true that Nehru underestimated the ideology of the CCP.  One factor 
was his misplaced confidence that Beijing was contained from launching a limited war by the fear 
of sparking nuclear armageddon. However, his real failure was that he simply did not understand 
that within Beijing’s worldview, governed by the perception of transnational class conflict, public 
opinion was as much of a material threat as any military advance. The belligerence of the Indian 
public and warm welcome for the success of the ‘Forward Policy’ simply confirmed Delhi’s 
implacable reactionary hostility and made India even more of a target.
Diplomacy as struggle was also intended as a lesson to the Soviets in how to conduct principled 
revolutionary policy. Moscow’s disapproval of Beijing’s handling of India only added to the 
impression of ideological weakness shown by Soviet endorsement of Delhi’s development policy 
and non-alignment. Beijing’s exacerbation of the tensions in Indian politics would illustrate to 
Moscow how naive their attitude to India was. By exposing the true nature of India’s government 
the Soviet comrades might revise their own approach. Beijing’s overriding concern in 1960 was 
that India was successfully encouraging the Soviets to pursue global detente. It was this Soviet 
factor that hardened Beijing’s commitment to struggle with Delhi. However, Beijing failed to effect 
significant change in Moscow and the Soviets appeared rather to become increasingly hostile. By 
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1962, it seemed that Moscow was using India to actually target China ideologically and materially, 
by supplying military equipment for border warfare. Once Moscow had helped certain other 
international dangers recede, in particular the crisis in Laos, then Beijing’s attitude to confronting 
India changed. Mao now wanted his own colleagues in Beijing and whole the world to see that 
Moscow had abandoned the PRC and embraced revisionism. The best way to achieve this was to 
drive tension with India to a new peak. Moscow’s shocking sympathy for the Indian state, now 
dominated by reactionary power, would be revealed and leave beyond doubt its turn from 
revolutionary purity.
The weight of all this ideology and the long-term strategic damage that Mao’s India war caused for 
China should not obscure either the cautious pragmatism of Beijing’s strike or the politics that lay 
behind it. The war was in effect a repeat of the swap offer Beijing had made since 1959. Despite 
advancing all the way to the Brahmaputra river the PLA soon withdrew back behind the McMahon 
Line in the East and only in Ladakh did they hold on to a small amount of new territory up to 
Beijing’s latest claim line. Strategically, the PLA’s key interest was obviously to secure the Aksai 
Chin road that underpinned control of Tibet. There was nothing to be gained from holding territory 
in the East, and the retreat aimed to demonstrate how fair and principled Beijing was.  
Confrontation and eventual war with India was only chosen once other international threats had 
somewhat dissipated. Mao could have bombarded Taiwan during the missile crisis, but he did not 
want to relieve the pressure on Khrushchev. What counted for Mao, beyond the road in Ladakh, 
was the public politics of his action. The Indian people, the Soviets,  the global audience and Mao’s 
own colleagues were all invited to appreciate Beijing’s rejection of reactionary pressure and strict 
adherence to principle, in what was just another iteration of diplomacy as struggle.
The war of course brought changes within India despite the continued support for the PRC’s rights 
at the UN. Against Nehru’s wishes the defence portfolio was wrenched from Krishna Menon's 
hands, who was largely blamed for the under-equipped army’s poor showing in the Himalayas. The 
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wider question of why the war had not been foreseen was not confronted, as this cut too close to 
Nehru’s own figure. However, in practical terms, Delhi now shifted towards the approach 
recommended by Patel back in 1950, in the aftermath of the PLA’s destruction of the Tibetan army. 
Defence spending was raised and the militarisation of the border was embraced. In addition, India 
would begin cooperating openly with the US to support the Tibetan resistance and would itself train 
and raise Tibetan troops. Gradually Indian distaste for nuclear arms would also decline, especially 
after Beijing tested its first weapon in 1964, and Delhi itself would cautiously set out on the road to 
an Indian bomb. The war also intensified the racist paranoia regarding India’s own Chinese 
population, which faced severe repression under the Defence of India Act with thousands detained 
or pressured to leave the country. Some Indian nationalists today still stew in the humiliation 
suffered in 1962 and hurl abuse at Nehru’s memory for his weakness and naiveté. However, they 
possibly under-estimate Nehru’s imperial successes. After all, the final outlines of the Indian state 
were far from clear in August 1947, but under his leadership the British inheritance was secured 
and even extended. Nehru’s forceful assertion of Indian ownership of NEFA, and special ties to 
Sikkim and Bhutan have ultimately kept these more or less in Indian hands when China certainly 
had grounds to claim these itself. The non-aligned world remained non-aligned in the war, but 
Nehru himself had recommended this approach at Belgrade in 1961. Certainly the West was swift 
to support India, presumably believing it finally had its chance to wrest Delhi to its side. However, 
within weeks Delhi’s diplomats were joking with Khrushchev about arresting ‘Stalinists’ in India, and 
the ongoing strength of Indo-Soviet relations indicated the resilience of Nehruvian non-alignment.
The war helped Mao break with Moscow and set him on the road to the Cultural Revolution and 
absolute paramountcy in China. Military success was always the foundation of Mao’s stature in the 
party so the compact success over the Indian army helped reassert his authority. But this began a 
longer process of comprehensively destroying the Chairman’s opponents, which would climax with 
the Red Guards’ savage treatment of his main rival Liu Shaoqi. The Soviets briefly backed Beijing 
during the war but once the Cuban crisis ended Moscow reverted to its traitorous friendship with 
India. Beijing’s public rhetoric focused on Moscow’s spineless behaviour over Cuba, but the 
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passion was intensified by the clear proof of Khrushchev’s revisionist partiality for Delhi. When 
Moscow agreed the Limited Test Ban Treaty with the US and others in 1963, Mao’s fear that the 
superpowers were constructing a bi-polar global hegemony was confirmed and Beijing began its 
public attacks on Soviet ideological treachery. Besides being a tool for crushing his domestic 
critics, the Cultural Revolution was also a means of breaking entirely with the Soviet approach. 
These rather short term Maoist benefits of the war belied a longer term problem for the PRC. 
Indian distrust of China today is symptomatic of a common problem that Beijing confronts with 
many in its neighbourhood. The memory of China’s radical belligerence in the Maoist period still 
makes many wary, constraining China’s rise and providing opportunities to its geopolitical rivals. 
Arguably, for all his reputation for strategic vision, the cost of Mao’s tactical humiliation of Nehru 
has not yet been fully realised.
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